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ABSTRACT 
This research is motivated by the continued push in challenging the validity of the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH). The current thesis contributes to the discussion by 
addressing the gap in the literature regarding the informational efficiency of ASX 200 
sectors. The research was carried out by examining the determinants of return volatility 
of various sectors in the Australian market by testing the strong form EMH. This was 
achieved by examining the impact of two new private information proxies (i.e. analyst 
price targets and Morningstar stock star ratings) and scheduled and unscheduled public 
information (ASX announcements) on sectoral return volatility. Data for each proxy 
spanning from 2013 to 2017 were used for stocks listed on the ASX 200 index. Results 
from the study brings insight into how the volatility of each sector responds to private 
and public information disclosures.  
Stock return volatility was empirically estimated using three asymmetric 
generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models:                
E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH and APGARCH. These models were chosen to ensure 
robust results and that the best model was chosen to represent the data for each stock. 
The stock return volatility was employed as the dependant variable to ascertain how 
analyst price targets, Morningstar stock star ratings and ASX announcements impact 
sectoral return volatility using panel regression analysis.  
The findings suggest that analyst price targets play an important role in sectoral 
return volatility, indicating that investors place heavy reliance on this information 
when undertaking investment decisions. Morningstar stock star ratings indicate a 
minor impact on sectoral return volatility due to the lower degree of informational 
content. Furthermore, the results highlight the fact that the degree of reliance on private 
information varies significantly between each sector, indicating varying levels of 
informational efficiency. The impact of public information, proxied by ASX 
announcements, on sectoral return volatility is found to be of minor effect. Hence the 
results are mixed, indicating that the strong form EMH holds true in some sectors but 
not in others. This research provides valuable information for investors who are 
looking to generate excess returns as well as hedge against future losses, by utilising 
private information proxies.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
Financial markets have historically moved and continue to move, in a cyclical pattern 
driven by periods of market optimism and pessimism. In the wake of the 2008 global 
financial crisis (GFC), investors have begun to appreciate the importance of financial 
market cycles in maximising their portfolio gains, whilst minimising losses. With 
approximately 3,680 points lost in 2008 on the ASX 200, individual and institutional 
investors endured severe financial losses. After the GFC, the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) released a presentation called ‘Regulatory Response 
to the Financial Crisis: The ASIC story’ (ASIC 2010). In an effort to improve market 
transparency, in November 2010 ASIC detailed plans to introduce more stringent 
disclosure requirements, which were reviewed and approved by the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Moreover, in March 2013, the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) issued an update to its guidance on listing rules 
relating to the continuous disclosure obligations of listed entities. The ASX increased 
the disclosure requirements related to ‘market sensitive information’ and ‘earnings 
guidance’ (ASX 2013). Due to the stringent continuous disclosure requirements of the 
ASX, the Australian financial market is seen to be transparent in nature (ASX 2018a).  
With the continuous drive for increased information transparency, it is 
expected that making abnormal returns is relatively difficult. This was asserted in 
Fama’s (1965) seminal paper on the EMH whereby in an efficient market, all available 
information will be reflected in stock prices as all users obtain information 
simultaneously. However subsequent research by Black (1975), Easley and O’Hara 
(1987), Bolster, Trahan and Ebrahimi (2017), Natarajan, Singh and Priya (2014), and 
Worthington and Higgs (2008) found evidence refuting the EMH across the United 
States, Australian, Indian and Brazilian markets, stating that markets may not be fully 
informationally efficient. As these studies indicate that market inefficiency exists 
across both developing and developed markets, it signals that information asymmetry 
may still exist on the ASX, despite its highly transparent nature.  
A common theme identified across studies is the distinction between the effects 
of public and private information on investor returns due to volatility. The literature 
illustrates public and private information do not have the same impact on volatility and 
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are incorporated into stock prices at different times (Vega 2006; Tetlock 2010; Nguyen 
2010; Kreutzmann 2010; O’shea et al. 2008; Bradley et al. 2014; and others). The 
varying arrival times of information branches from the three forms of the EMH i.e. 
strong, semi-strong and weak forms. The strong form EMH states that all information 
is disseminated and received by market participants simultaneously and is immediately 
reflected in share prices. The semi-strong form EMH is where all public information 
is captured in the stock prices immediately and the weak form EMH posits that today’s 
share prices are not affected by past prices, thus following a ‘random walk’ behaviour. 
The conclusions reached by most authors’ reviews suggest that the semi-strong form 
EMH is more plausible than the strong form EMH. However, since many of these 
studies look at an entire index, this study aims to re-test the strong form EMH to 
determine whether it can be refuted on a sectoral level.  
1.2. Significance of the Study 
The reason for exploring the determinants of sectoral return volatility is to primarily 
provide investors with more information to aid their investment decisions. By 
evaluating the informational efficiency of the Australian stock markets, investors can 
better understand the impact of private information and public information on 
volatility. If private information does not cause excess return volatility it would be 
inadvisable for investors to purchase private information, as it would not be useful in 
generating excess returns or hedging against future capital losses. However, if private 
information does cause excess volatility, it signals investors to take advantage of this 
type of information for two reasons. The first is that they would be classified as 
‘informed investors’ due to their access to private information and therefore can 
undertake investment decisions before ‘uninformed investors’ who only have access 
to public information. This can potentially aid informed investors to generate excess 
returns. The second is that private information proxies provide an indication of the 
direction of the stock price. For example, if they indicate a decrease in the stock price, 
investors can also adjust their portfolio asset allocations to hedge their risk against 
potential future capital losses.  
1.3. Stock Return Volatility at the Sectoral Level 
The primary motivation behind this research is the knowledge that there are a limited 
number of Australian studies on sectoral return volatility. This research will ascertain 
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the impact of various types of public and private information, across each of the 11 
sectors on the ASX, using the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). The 11 
sectors are aggregates of 24 separate industry groups, consisting of a further 68 
industries and 157 sub-industries (ASX 2018b). Due to the wide range of industries 
existing within each sector, it is expected that each sector experiences different degrees 
of volatility, as investor reactions vary based on information disclosures. This is 
because depending on the sector and the specific trading day, some sectors are 
expected to perform better than others, therefore investor expectations of sector 
performance varies accordingly. For example, the Telecommunication Services sector 
has recorded a -27.6% one-year return as of 19 March 2018. This result can partly be 
attributed to the recent fierce competition seen in the industry, with innovative wireless 
communication methods continuously entering the market (Lo 2018). This places 
additional pressures on large telecommunication companies, such as Telstra, to deliver 
superior services at more competitive prices. This constant battling among 
telecommunication companies within the sector has subsequently led to slimmer 
margins and negative returns for investors (Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission 2018).  
In contrast, the Health Care sector has seen a one-year return of 24.9% as of 19 
March 2018. This is due to the improvement in Health Care facilities and by the 
increase in the ageing population (Harrison 2018). The Health Care sector produced 
superior returns to investors, despite funding from the Australian Government 
declining yearly (Macquarie University 2018). It was not long ago that the 
Telecommunications Services sector and Health Care sector were on opposite ends of 
the spectrum, with the Telecommunications Services sector dominating the market. 
Over the last 10 years, the Telecommunications Services sector has significantly 
declined, recording an average annual return of 2.06%. However, the Health Care 
sector rose and registered an annual average return of 11.79% (Harrison 2018). The 
figures indicate that investors experience varying levels of portfolio returns due to 
varying expectations regarding the performance of each sector, which explains why 
each sector experiences differing levels of volatility. A sectoral analysis provides 
investors the benefit of understanding the composition of sectoral volatility in their 
portfolio, thereby allowing them to adjust their asset allocation, as per their risk 
preference. Additionally, the study will enable investors to gain insight into whether 
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multiple sectors experience similar volatility in response to public and private 
information, thus assisting in the portfolio diversification process.  
1.4. Contributions of the Study  
Prior studies have attempted to identify an appropriate proxy to represent private 
information and its impact on financial markets. Bradley et al. (2014), Jegadeesh and 
Kim (2009) and Barber et al. (2001) used analyst buy/hold/sell recommendations as a 
proxy for private information in financial markets. However, Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2009) identified that buy/hold/sell recommendations instil a greater tendency for 
analysts to herd, resulting in a biased recommendation. Easley and O’Hara (1987) used 
the probability of informed trading (PIN) model to proxy for private information. 
However, PIN was unsuccessful in capturing the impact of private information for 
small capitalisation stocks. Boussaidi (2013) used trading volume to proxy for the 
existence of private information. Though his study identified that trading volume 
increased due to private information signals, it could not attribute the source of the 
signals. In contrast, Bolster, Trahan and Wang (2016) and Bolster, Trahan and 
Ebrahimi (2017) used Morningstar stock ratings as a proxy for private information, 
however; their studies examined the impact of these ratings on investor returns, rather 
than volatility. 
Based on the limitations discussed, the current research presents a number of 
contributions. Private information will be represented by employing two alternative 
private information proxies to improve the accuracy of measuring its impact on 
sectoral return volatility. Firstly, this study will employ analyst price targets to 
examine their impact on sectoral return volatility. Analyst price targets are appropriate 
to proxy for private information as it is a paid service for investors who want to obtain 
information first. Since this data is not available to the public straight away, investors 
who pay for this service can capitalise on this information to aid their investment 
decision before a stock price moves towards the price target. Although it is not 
guaranteed by analysts that the stock price will reach its target price, if many investors 
rely and invest based on price targets, this may instigate volatility in the stock price 
due to buying/selling of those stocks. If private information (informed) investors take 
advantage of this private information, public information (uninformed) investors may 
see the stock price abnormally change, and accordingly, undertake investment 
decisions, thus catalysing further volatility. Therefore, price targets may be beneficial 
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for private information holders to base their investment decisions on before the 
volatility caused by changes in the stock price occurs. This private information may 
also impact sectoral return volatility across the Australian market as each sector may 
receive and react to information differently, indicating varying levels of information 
efficiency. Thus, it would be beneficial to explore the volatility of each sector in 
response to the release of price targets.   
Secondly, this study will utilise Morningstar stock star ratings as its additional 
measure of examining how private information influences sectoral return volatility. 
Morningstar stock star ratings have had limited coverage in literature thus far. Bolster, 
Trahan and Wang (2016) and Bolster, Trahan and Ebrahimi (2017) examined the 
relationship between changes in stock ratings and stock returns. However, no study to 
date has employed Morningstar stock star ratings as a private information proxy to 
explain sectoral return volatility. Morningstar stock star ratings are considered an 
appropriate private information proxy as it is also a paid service. Therefore, investors 
who capitalise on this private information may experience significant capital gains and 
minimise capital losses. Bolster, Trahan and Wang (2016) and Bolster, Trahan and 
Ebrahimi (2017) found that when stock ratings are upgraded, investors experience 
abnormal returns and when stock ratings are downgraded, investors experience 
significantly greater negative returns. Therefore, it would be beneficial for investors 
to obtain and act on this information before public investors to allow them to maximise 
their capital gains (rating upgrade) and minimise their losses (rating downgrade). The 
reaction of investors to this information may impact volatility across each sector in the 
Australian market as each sector receives and reacts to information differently. As 
such, this study will also explore how the volatility in each sector corresponds to the 
release of Morningstar stock star ratings.  
If private investors capitalise on information drawn from price targets and 
Morningstar stock star ratings, there would be an expectation of excessive stock return 
volatility after price targets are updated and stock ratings are upgraded or downgraded. 
For analyst price targets, the sectoral return volatility would be expected to be greater 
for decreases in price targets compared to increases, due to the leverage effect. 
Similarly, stock return volatility is expected to be greater for rating downgrades 
compared to upgrades. Consequently, investors should take advantage of using analyst 
price targets and Morningstar stock star ratings as a form of private information to 
increase their portfolio gains and minimise their losses.  
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The study also contributes to understanding the impact of public information 
on sectoral return volatility. This will be achieved by improving the accuracy of 
measuring ASX announcements by disaggregating public information into each of 
their 19 specified ASX categories. The significance of disaggregation is that each ASX 
category has been shown to exhibit varying levels of volatility depending on the ASX 
announcement type (Nguyen 2010). Moreover, each ASX announcement type will be 
categorised as either a scheduled or unscheduled announcement. The significance of 
this disaggregation is the fact that unscheduled announcements are expected to exhibit 
greater volatility in response to various information disclosures, in contrast to that of 
scheduled announcements (DeGennaro & Shrieves 1997).  
The current study is unique in that it employs new private information proxies 
as well as measures of public information in its most deconstructed form (i.e. each 
ASX announcement type categorised as a scheduled or unscheduled announcement). 
These information proxies are then used in a panel regression analysis, measured 
against stock return volatility. The stock return volatility will be measured using three 
asymmetric GARCH models: Nelson’s (1991) exponential GARCH (E-GARCH), 
Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle’s (1993) (GJR-GARCH) and Ding, Granger and 
Engle’s (1993) asymmetric power GARCH (APGARCH).  
1.5. Research Questions and Objectives 
Based on the significance of the study and research gaps identified, this research aims 
to address the research questions listed below. These questions support the concept of 
sectoral return volatility in response to public and private information, within the 11 
GICS sectors in the Australian context.  
The research questions are as follows:  
1. Using the GICS sector data, to what extent does private information (price 
targets and Morningstar stock star ratings), impact sectoral return volatility?  
2. Using the GICS sector data, to what extent does public information (ASX 
announcements) impact sectoral return volatility? 
3. What are the similarities and differences in volatility in response to both private 
and public information across the 11 Australian GICS sectors? More 
specifically: 
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 Private information: What is the behaviour of volatility after analyst 
price targets and Morningstar stock star ratings are released/updated?  
 Public information: What is the behaviour of volatility around 
scheduled and unscheduled firm specific ASX announcements? Are 
there any similarities identified in changes in volatility between the 
GICS sectors?  
To answer the research questions, three research objectives have been 
identified.  
Objective 1: The study aims to validate (or refute) the strong form EMH by examining 
the extent to which analyst price targets and Morningstar stock star ratings impact 
sectoral return volatility by employing various asymmetric GARCH type models and 
panel regressions (corresponds to research question 1).  
Objective 2: The study will endeavour to examine the impact of ASX announcements 
on sectoral return volatility in its deconstructed form. This information will allow 
investors to gain further insights into the informational content of public information 
(corresponds to research question 2).  
Objective 3: The study will investigate the behaviour of volatility in response to private 
and public information within each GICS sector. This may aid investors in the stock 
selection process for their portfolio to earn abnormal returns and/or achieve portfolio 
diversification (corresponds to research question 3). 
1.6. Benefits/Implications of the Research 
The findings of this research will have positive implications on the superannuation 
industry. At the end of the December 2017 quarter, superannuation assets in Australia 
were valued at $2.6 trillion, an increase of 10.1% since December 2016 (Association 
of Superannuation Funds of Australia Limited 2017). This makes the Australian 
superannuation system the fourth largest in the world with one of the highest growth 
rates (Austrade 2017b). A new wave of regulation by the Australian Labour Party 
(ALP) changed the manner in which superannuation funds operate and will continue 
to operate in the future. On 1 July 2014, the Australian Government announced that 
compulsory contributions would be increased from 9.5% and will continue to steadily 
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increase to 12% by July 2019. However, under new legislation enacted by the Liberal 
government, the superannuation guarantee (SG) was frozen at 9.5%, until 2021. This 
means that it will take an additional seven years (i.e. until 2025/26) to reach the initially 
planned SG rate of 12%. Additionally, the 2014 Murry Financial System Inquiry 
revealed that there is a difference of 1.36% in fees charged among various 
superannuation funds (IBISWorld 2018b). As a result, many individuals have realised 
that the freeze of the SG will slow down their ability to generate sufficient retirement 
savings. The superannuation industry revenue is projected to fall at an annualised rate 
of 0.7% over the next five years, consequently impacting investor returns. Therefore, 
many individuals have opted to use Self-Managed Super Funds (SMSFs) to help grow 
their superannuation funds at faster rates and avoid higher fees charged by retail funds.  
Currently, there are 600,000 SMSFs in Australia, which hold about 30% of all 
superannuation assets (Australian Taxation Office 2018). However, the lack of 
investment expertise by SMSF users present a risk of low long-term growth in their 
superannuation funds. The lack of knowledge regarding financial markets and its 
associated volatility can amplify the negative effects on an individual’s superannuation 
balances. Therefore, this study will provide insight to retail investors who manage 
SMSFs by highlighting specific information about how investing in particular GICS 
sectors can impact the volatility, and thus the returns, of their portfolios. The findings 
of the study will enable retail investors to gain greater knowledge with respect to the 
informational content of ASX announcements, price targets and Morningstar stock star 
ratings, and their potential to impact the volatility of investor portfolios. This will 
permit investors to adjust their portfolios accordingly based on their risk appetite. 
Moreover, the results of the research will enable investors to understand the 
determinants of volatility for each GICS sector, for example, whether two or more 
sectors exhibit the same degree of volatility in response to specific announcement 
types e.g. scheduled earnings or specific private information proxies. Therefore, 
investors can reallocate their wealth to stocks in other sectors which do not exhibit as 
much volatility in response to the same type of information. This will consequently 
lead to a higher level of risk diversification within their SMSF portfolio.  
The results of this research will also be of importance to the funds management 
industry. Australia’s funds management industry is classified as the largest across the 
Asia-Pacific region with A$2.8 trillion sitting as funds under management as of 
December 2017. Since 1991, Australian managed funds produced an annual growth 
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rate of 10% and on a global scale, 19 Australian investment management firms have 
been placed within the world’s top 500 largest firms. With respect to asset allocation, 
Australia’s managed funds hold ‘shares’ as their largest asset class, with a total value 
of A$685 billion in December 2016, with ‘overseas shares’ comprising A$500 billion 
(Austrade 2017a). Australia’s hedge fund industry also sits within the funds 
management industry, which produced a total asset turnover of A$1,205 billion and 
investment returns of 15.6% in 2014 alone. These gains were made through heavy 
exposure of portfolios to listed equities (A$30 billion) and fixed interest derivatives 
(A$18 billion). These heavy concentrations of shares within the portfolios have 
resulted in significant returns. However, a return of 15.6% is not considered to be 
impressive as certain sectors have produced higher returns. For example, the Health 
Care sector alone has produced a three-year annual return of 17.03%, and a one-year 
return of 24.90% (Harrison 2018). Within these managed funds, the Australian equity 
funds delivered an annual return of 12.9% in 2017, indicating that the return associated 
with equities is declining (Morningstar 2018b).  
This indicates that fund managers lack substantial knowledge with respect to 
understanding the informational content of Australian equity announcements and 
private information. Analysts and individual investors are limited to basing their 
investment decisions on fundamental and technical analysis. Therefore, this study aims 
to provide fund managers with further insights into how various types of information 
in the market are received and their impact on sectoral return volatility. This will allow 
fund managers to take advantage of investment opportunities by enabling them to 
determine which equities produce higher rates of return because of specific types of 
information arrivals. Similarly, for SMSF investors, these insights will also enable 
fund managers to understand how volatility behaves around specific types of public 
and private information, thus posing implications for their portfolio diversification.   
Moreover, the results of this study will allow policy makers to be better 
equipped with further knowledge to understand the degree and nature of volatility 
within the different sectors of the Australian share market. This may aid in the 
development of policy frameworks to limit excessive price volatility for firms 
operating within each sector. An example of a measure that could be implemented to 
reduce excessive price fluctuations are ‘circuit breakers’. Circuit breakers are 
measures which can implemented to prevent market panic-selling and selling during 
periods of excessive volatility, if volatility levels reach a specified limit on a trading 
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day. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented 
circuit breakers for stocks within the S&P 500 index during 2010 in the form of trading 
curbs and trading halts (SEC 2010). These measures placed temporary restrictions on 
all stock trading to prevent the amplified effects of panic selling on stock price 
volatility. This may help policy makers apply such measures to prevent excessive 
volatility on specific GICS sectors within the ASX.  
Regulators should look at sectors individually because although the ASX 200 
volatility index (VIX) exhibits low volatility, this is not the case on a sectoral level. 
For example, the return for the Real Estate sector was approximately -1% in Q1 2017, 
but jumped to 4% in Q2 2017 (Tevfik & Liu 2017) and the Utilities sector produced a 
return of 9% in Q1 2017 but -0.5% in Q2 2017. However according the ASX 200 VIX, 
volatility remained at approximately 12% during both quarters. The VIX is 
consequently a poor measure of volatility for each sector as the overall index masks 
sectoral volatility. The insights gained from this study will aid regulators to push the 
on-going commitment to promote market transparency at the sectoral level.  
In the wake of the 2008 GFC, ASIC placed a temporary restriction on short 
selling on the ASX. Short selling is the process in which an investor sells a financial 
product, hoping to re-purchase the product again later at a cheaper price. This 
temporary ban was put in place to allow financial markets to recover and re-strengthen 
from the effects of the GFC (ASIC 2012). ASIC implemented short selling restrictions, 
as it was believed that short selling was contributing to market volatility and further 
weakening the market. However, by May 2009, the ban on short selling for financial 
and non-financial stocks was lifted. Although the ASX 200 VIX indicates that the 
average implied volatility has been at its lowest point since October 2013, this study 
aims to shed light on the volatility that exists within each GICS sector and how each 
sector responses to different types of information. This will allow financial market 
regulators such as ASIC to potentially consider placing a permanent ban on short 
selling for sectors constantly exhibiting high volatility. This will enhance investor 
confidence and integrity in the market and prevent excessive price fluctuations.  
1.7. Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 provides an extensive analysis of literature related to return volatility, public 
information and private information disclosures. This chapter starts with a discussion 
of the EMH and its relationship to financial market volatility. The studies examined 
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measures of volatility utilising a wide range of standard GARCH and asymmetric 
GARCH models. The chapter next presents a thorough analysis of the methodologies 
employed across each study and the results reached by the researchers. Following this, 
the current private and public information proxies which have been employed across 
various are explored and critiqued based on their benefits and limitations. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the gaps in the literature which need to be addressed.  
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework on which the study is based, as 
well as the methodology employed in the study. The section on the theoretical 
framework explains the relationship of the EMH to the current study and how it was 
empirically tested based on stocks in the ASX 200 index. The section on the 
methodology provides a detailed explanation of the two main testing procedures 
undertaken to achieve the objectives of the research. These involve the method for 
estimating the asymmetric volatility for each stock in the sample and the method for 
employing a panel data regression to examine the impact of private and public 
information disclosures on sectoral return volatility. 
Chapter 4 starts with a description and the chosen index in the study and the 
justification for its use as well as a description of the data sources utilised and the study 
period. The second part of the chapter presents the results of preliminary tests carried 
out in preparation for the econometric modelling.  
Chapter 5 presents and analyses the results of the asymmetric volatility 
estimations and panel data regressions. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of 
the impact of analyst price targets, Morningstar stock star ratings and ASX 
announcements on sectoral return volatility. The chapter concludes with a recap of the 
important findings of the study and addresses the hypotheses developed initially in 
Chapter 1. 
Chapter 6 concludes and summarises the recommendations for future research 
and policy implications of the results. The chapter also describes the limitations of the 
study in relation to data constraints.  
The final part of this thesis consists of the Appendices. Appendix 1 includes a 
flow diagram graphically representing the method undertaken in this study. The next 
section of Appendix 1 includes a list of ASX announcements used as the proxies for 
public information, classified as scheduled or unscheduled. Appendix 2 summarises 
the lag lengths chosen for each of the ASX 200 stocks in the sample. This is followed 
by Appendix 3A, which details the asymmetric volatility estimations for each stock 
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grouped by sector using the E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH and APGARCH models. 
Appendix 4 provides the correlation matrices for each sector for the purpose of 
multicollinearity testing of panel data. Appendix 5 presents the results of the 
stationarity and unit root testing performed for each stock. Appendix 6 shows the 
detailed panel regression results of each sector. Appendix 7 provides a list of all the 
stocks utilised in the study which are classified into their respective ASX sectors.  
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1. Introduction 
A large volume of literature exists regarding the informational efficiency of financial 
markets based on the EMH. A majority of the studies on the EMH have been empirical 
and have been undertaken in both developing and developed financial markets. Thus, 
this chapter is presented in three distinct sections.  
The first section introduces studies which explain the importance and necessity 
of examining the relationship between the EMH and financial market volatility. This 
section discusses the assertations made by Fama (1965) regarding the strong, semi-
strong and weak form EMH, and the various literature that suggest that there is a 
positive relationship between the number, timing and type of information disclosures 
and volatility.  
The second section discusses the various studies which have examined the 
relationship between public information arrivals and volatility. These studies 
employed either the standard GARCH or asymmetric GARCH models to model the 
impact of public information disclosures and volatility. Research was conducted across 
various markets including that of Australia, the United States, the Middle East and 
Asia. In addition to identifying excess volatility due to information disclosures, each 
study utilised different proxies to represent public information depending on the nature 
of the study.  
The final section discusses studies of the various proxies employed to represent 
private information in financial markets. A wide range of proxies were specified to 
represent the existence of private information such as Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) estimates, PIN models, trading volume and Morningstar fund ratings.  
2.2. Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and Financial Market Volatility  
Since, Eugene Fama’s pioneering work on the EMH in 1965 and 1970, stock market 
volatility has become a topic of interest for subsequent research. Fama (1965) posited 
that in an efficient market, all available information will be reflected in stock prices as 
all users obtain information simultaneously. This implies that stock price fluctuations 
are random, thus making it impossible to predict future prices, forming the basis of the 
weak form EMH. The EMH assumes that all information is disseminated to the market 
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simultaneously, that all investors are rational, and that stocks exhibit a random walk 
(non-predictable in nature). Fama (1965) further explained that the assumption around 
the rate of flow of information varies, resulting in three forms of the EMH. First is the 
strong form EMH, in which information is disseminated and received by market 
participants simultaneously and fully reflected in share price. Second is the semi-
strong form EMH wherein all public information is incorporated into stock prices 
immediately. Thus, there is no potential to earn excess returns purely on public 
information. However, there is plausibility for share prices to be inaccurate due to 
private information which has not become publicly available yet. Consequently, 
fundamental analysis would have limited use as there are assumed to be other market 
participants who have access to private information. Third is the weak-form EMH 
which posits that today’s stock prices are not affected by past prices, therefore 
technical analysis would not be useful for generating excess returns. Only public 
information is incorporated into share prices but follows a ‘random’ walk. This 
suggests that if there are any major news announcements regarding a stock, it will be 
reflected immediately in the stock price. However, any other public and private 
information will not be reflected in the price. Therefore, the only fundamental analysis 
that would be useful is to determine undervalued or overvalued stocks to improve the 
chance of making excess returns in the long run.  
Nevertheless, subsequent research has found evidence against the EMH to 
indicate that markets may not be fully informationally efficient, resulting in financial 
market volatility, and so impacting investor returns. A large volume of empirical 
literature exists on financial market volatility and its impact on stock return. Previous 
studies have shown this relationship by employing daily return data to measure 
volatility across various markets such as the United States and Australia (Kreutzmann 
2010; O’Shea et al. 2008). Though the studies identified a positive relationship 
between the number of information disclosures and stock return volatility, the 
relationship was identified to be insignificant as the return data employed in each study 
was of daily frequency. While some financial markets adjust to information disclosed 
at high frequencies, these studies failed to accurately capture information about 
volatility throughout the day, which would otherwise be captured in intraday data. 
Therefore, to capture the intraday volatility, other studies such as Worthington and 
Higgs (2008), Kalev et al. (2004) and Nguyen (2010) adopted intraday returns to 
increase the accuracy of measuring the impact of information disclosures on stock 
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volatility. These other studies were able to successfully gain an insight into the pattern 
and persistence of volatility between five-minute, half-hour, hourly, half day and daily 
intervals. Nguyen (2010) in particular showed that the effects of public information 
arrivals on stock return volatility become stronger as sampling frequencies increase 
from the one-day interval to the half-hour interval.  
2.3. Application of GARCH Models in Observing Volatility  
Mandelbrot (1963) was the first to observe specific patterns of volatility and volatility 
persistence. Such observations where referred to as ‘volatility clustering’ where, ‘large 
changes tend to be followed by large changes and small changes tend to be followed 
by small changes’ (Mandelbrot 1963, p. 418). The consistent following of large or 
small changes in volatility over time was referred to as ‘volatility persistence’. More 
simply, volatility persistence refers to the fact that the volatility today will provide an 
indicate of the volatility tomorrow, and the volatility in future periods. Alberg, Shialit 
and Yousef (2008) posited that volatility clustering and leptokurtosis (observations 
which are clustered together resulting in a higher peak/kurtosis compared to a normal 
distribution) are commonly observed in financial time series data. Within the series of 
volatility clusters, the ‘leverage effect’ is observed which occurs when stock prices are 
negatively correlated with changes in volatility. This simply means that when stock 
prices increase, volatility is lower than that of stock price decreases, in which high 
volatility is observed. To first measure stock price volatility, Engle (1982) proposed to 
model time-varying conditional variance using autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) processes using lagged disturbances. Engle (1982) 
developed the ARCH model when he observed high autocorrelations in squared 
returns, thus implying that volatility in previous periods were related to volatility in 
the current period.  
However, later studies found that the ARCH model was not the best for 
modelling time-varying conditional variance as it required a high order (i.e. higher lag 
lengths) to capture the dynamic behaviour of conditional variance. This is because in 
the ARCH model, the next period’s variance only depends on the last period’s squared 
residual. Thus, if a crisis occurred, causing large residuals, it would not be able to 
model the persistence of volatility which is commonly seen after a crisis, such as the 
GFC. It was also found that ARCH models required too many parameters to model 
stock price volatility. Thus, the generalised autoregressive heteroskedasticity 
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(GARCH) model was introduced to deal with this problem. The GARCH (p,q) model 
introduced by Bollerslev (1986) was more parsimonious than the ARCH model as it 
reduced the number of estimated parameters from infinity to two, therefore a better fit 
for modelling time series data that exhibits heteroskedasticity and volatility clustering.  
2.4. Public and Private Information Arrivals 
2.4.1. Public Information Arrivals 
This section explores the various public information proxies used within GARCH 
models, to model the impact of public information arrivals on stock return volatility.  
Clark (1973) was the first to explore the relationship between trading volume 
and volatility. He coined this relationship as the mixture of distribution (MDH) 
hypothesis which posits that stock prices and trading volume changes are driven by 
the same underlying information arrival process and therefore volume and volatility 
are correlated (Clark 1973). Since then, numerous studies have been undertaken to 
investigate the robustness of this hypothesis by applying it as a proxy for public 
information arrivals. Rahman, Lee and Ang (2002) investigated whether a GARCH 
(1,1) model that allows for time varying variance is a sufficient method to represent 
intraday stock return as other studies such as Kreutzmann (2010) and O’Shea et al. 
(2008) were unable to find a strong relationship between information disclosures and 
daily stock returns. Rahman, Lee and Ang (2002) employed intraday stock return data 
at the five-minute interval. This study also used trading volume as the information 
proxy, measured as the number of trades executed in each five-minute interval. The 
authors found that the GARCH (1,1) specification was an adequate method to 
represent intraday stock return volatility. With the addition of trading volume as an 
explanatory variable, the intraday return series remained persistent, which holds true 
for both contemporaneous and lagged volume.  
Worthington and Higgs (2008) used a GARCH (1,1) model to examine the 
relationship between news arrival and intraday return volatility in ASX 50 listed 
stocks. The study examined data for the period December 2002 to March 2003 and 
based its methodology on the MDH originally proposed by Clark (1973). Worthington 
and Higgs (2008) used trading volume as the proxy for information arrival where an 
increase in trading volume would signify an increase in information arrivals, thus 
causing greater stock return volatility. Their study found that there is strong persistence 
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of volatility across all 50 ASX listed stocks. However, the limitation of using trading 
volume as a proxy to represent public information arrival is that it does not provide 
insight into the informational content of the disclosures released in the market. This 
implies that trading volume cannot provide a differentiation between how much of the 
change in trading volume is attributed to public information and how much is caused 
by private information. As a result, it is not possible to determine how much of the 
trading volume due to public information alone causes stock return volatility.  
Kalev et al. (2004) employed a GARCH (1,1) model to investigate how firm-
specific announcements impacted market volatility through high frequency trading 
from January 1995 to March 2000. The study used the bid-ask spreads of the five most 
actively traded stocks on the ASX (BHP Billiton, National Australia Bank, News 
Corporation, Western Mining Corporation and Woolworths). The proxy employed to 
measure firm specific public information was news announcements published on the 
ASX. Since volatility is higher in the early trading period due to pre-open trading, the 
study included a dummy variable to account for the opening volatility in the first half-
hour interval. The study identified a positive and significant relationship between firm 
specific public announcements and conditional variance of stock returns. Even with 
the inclusion of the dummy variable, the GARCH model still identified both a positive 
and significant relationship between firm-specific news announcements and stock 
return volatility for the five stocks. Although Worthington and Higgs (2008) and Kalev 
et al. (2004) were able to identify the existence and persistence of volatility, they were 
unable to determine the degree to which each type of news announcement can cause 
stock return volatility. This can be explained by the fact that trading volume as a proxy 
simply aggregates all types of information and assumes that each piece of information 
has the same impact on stock return volatility.  
In another paper, Edmonds and Kutan (2002) investigated the effect of various 
types of public macroeconomic news announcements on stock returns using the Nikkei 
225 index. Two separate studies were conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that 
disaggregated information provides greater accuracy in GARCH models. The first 
study, the control, involved an aggregated model in which all announcements were 
grouped together and modelled against stock returns. The second study involved a 
disaggregated model in which announcements were disaggregated into balance of 
payments (BOP), balance of trade (BOT), Consumer Price Index (CPI), Real GDP 
(gross domestic product), International Reserves, the unemployment rate and 
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Industrial Production (IP). Each type of announcement was then included as a separate 
dummy variable in the model. The study was further grouped into four subperiods 
1990–1993, 1994–1995, 1996–1997 and 1998–1999 - to determine whether the impact 
of announcements was prominent in specific periods. The first study found that Real 
GDP announcements had a significant effect on stock return volatility during the 
1990–1993 time period. Additionally, BOP and IP announcements were significant 
during 1996–1997 (crisis period) and all other macroeconomic announcements were 
not significant. However, the second study found that there was a significant but 
negative relationship between Real GDP announcements and stock return volatility. 
Additionally, 26 out of 31 BOP announcements were significant (11 positive and 15 
negative), 36 out of 47 BOT announcements were significant and 36 out of 42 CPI 
announcements were significant. It appears that when the aggregated model was used, 
the negative and positive effects seemed to cancel each other out, leading to a net effect 
of insignificance. The same results were found in the aggregated models across all 
subperiods. However, in the disaggregated model, the results indicate significant 
coefficients for more than 50% of the announcements. These results highlight the 
inaccuracy of estimates when using the aggregated model. Overall, the results 
highlight the importance of disaggregating announcements when estimating volatility 
in stock prices. 
The limitation associated with Kalev et al. (2004) and Edmonds and Kutan 
(2002) is that both papers employ news headlines from financial news media outlets 
as the proxy for public information arrivals. Nguyen (2010) pointed out that this results 
in three constraints when measuring public information arrivals accurately. Firstly, this 
type of information is not centrally released, which could result in prior trading 
occurring any point before it is released on central exchanges (including post trading 
sessions and the pre-open trading period). Secondly, the information is not time-
stamped, preventing its application in intraday analysis. This would result in the 
inability to accurately measure volatility throughout the day. And lastly, the 
information may not be directly sourced from the company; therefore, the accuracy of 
the news announcement could be questionable. Nguyen (2010) utilised ASX 
announcements as an appropriate proxy for public information arrival because it 
addresses the above limitations. The author notes that the ASX operates in a highly 
regulated environment which is monitored by two independent regulatory agencies –
ASIC and the Reserve Bank of Australia. The ASX is the central body for release of 
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all financial and company information related to any security listed on the securities 
exchange. Moreover, all information (particularly announcements) are time-stamped 
at one-minute intervals, allowing for a more accurate measure of public information 
for intraday analysis. Similarly, the ASX has a strict disclosure regime which requires 
all listed companies to disclose information on the ASX first before any other outlets.  
2.4.2. Accounting for scheduled and unscheduled public information  
DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997) used the GARCH (1,1) model to investigate the 
impact of scheduled and unscheduled news announcements on the volatility of foreign 
exchange markets for the Japanese Yen and US dollar. Their study measured the 
impact of news arrival on volatility at two different times: before and after news 
arrival, using three categories of news. The categories include scheduled 
macroeconomic news, unscheduled economic policy news and unscheduled interest 
rate reports. The study also used an ‘hour of the day’ dummy variable to capture the 
magnitude and significance of differences in hourly volatility. An additional dummy 
variable used was the ‘vacation effect’ which allowed for volatility to differ in the first 
hour of trading after the market had reopened after a weekend or public holiday. The 
study found that scheduled macroeconomic news caused a large increase in foreign 
exchange rate volatility, which continued to increase (at a decreasing rate) into the next 
10-minute time interval. The study also found that both types of unscheduled 
announcements had a positive impact on foreign exchange rate volatility, but the 
volatility was not as high compared to scheduled announcements.  
Although Edmonds and Kutan (2002) and Nguyen (2010) increased the 
accuracy of their models through disaggregated announcements, both studies suffered 
from a similar limitation. The accuracy of their models was reduced by the fact that 
the authors did not distinguish between scheduled and unscheduled announcements 
within each of the categories, as demonstrated by DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997). 
However, DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997) also fell short in the areas that Edmonds 
and Kutan (2002) and Nguyen (2010) were able to address as their study did not 
disaggregate scheduled macroeconomic news, unscheduled economic policy news, or 
unscheduled interest rate reports into their separate categories. The segregation of each 
macroeconomic and firm-specific announcement into categories is important as it was 
found that different types of macroeconomic announcements have varying effects on 
volatility (Edmonds & Kutan 2002). 
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Across each of the above studies, the proxy adopted by Nguyen (2010), i.e. 
ASX announcements, proved to be the most accurate at measuring the relationship 
between firm specific public information arrivals and stock return volatility. The 
driving force for this was the benefit of ASX announcements being centrally released 
and time-stamped, providing a more timely and accurate measure of public 
information at the firm level. Furthermore, compared to the other previously discussed 
studies, Nguyen (2010) adopted an asymmetric model to measure this relationship, i.e. 
E-GARCH, which will be explored in the next section. However, the limitation of this 
specific study is that it failed to capture the effects of scheduled and unscheduled 
announcements, which was demonstrated by Edmonds and Kutan (2002) to have 
varying effects on volatility. Consequently, it is important to ensure that when 
measuring stock return volatility on an intraday basis, the accuracy of the 
informational content should be considered. Thus, not only should public information 
be split into scheduled and unscheduled announcements, but it should also be further 
categorised into type of scheduled of unscheduled announcements. An example is the 
segregation of scheduled dividend announcements (e.g. quarterly, semi-annually) and 
unscheduled dividend announcements (special dividends), as they would not have the 
same impact on stock return volatility.  
While each of the studies reviewed have illustrated that a relationship exists 
between information disclosures and market volatility, they all fall short in capturing 
the nature of each type of announcement, i.e. good or bad news (other than Nguyen 
(2010)). Each type of announcement may indeed cause stock market volatility; 
however, the traditional GARCH (1,1) model fails to capture the degree to which each 
type of announcement impacts stock market volatility depending on whether the 
information is classified as good or bad news. To address this, the following section 
discusses recent studies conducted that incorporate the asymmetric response of 
markets to good and bad news. 
2.5. Asymmetric GARCH Models  
Although the studies above all use GARCH (1,1) models to capture volatility and 
leptokurtosis, they all assume that the financial data consists of a symmetric 
distribution. However, a limitation of the GARCH model is that it does not take into 
consideration the sign (positive or negative) of the value of past errors. As a result, the 
previous studies were unsuccessful in capturing the asymmetric response of volatility 
27 
to market shocks caused by good and bad news i.e. the leverage effect. In the case of 
financial time series data, good news and bad news have differing effects on stock 
return volatility. Therefore, a number of extensions were proposed to model these 
leverage effects. The main extensions include exponential GARCH (Nelson 1991), 
Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (GJR) GARCH (Glosten, Jagannathan & Runkle 
1993) and asymmetric power GARCH (APGARCH) (Ding, Granger & Engle 1993). 
2.5.1 Exponential Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (E-
GARCH) Model 
Nelson (1991) used the E-GARCH method to capture the leverage effects found in 
financial markets. These are asymmetries in the response of volatility to positive or 
negative returns, instigated and perpetuated by good or bad public news. The power of 
the E-GARCH model lies in its ability to capture asymmetries through its logarithmic 
function of the conditional variance, so that even if the parameters are negative, the 
conditional variance will always be positive. Within this model, the leverage effect is 
exponential, rather than quadratic. Consequently, the model is not required to 
artificially impose non-negativity constraints, which are commonly observed in 
traditional GARCH models. Human and Ibiwoye (2010) applied the E-GARCH model 
to examine the volatility of the daily returns in Nigerian insurance stocks. The study 
comparatively applied the GARCH (1,1) model and E-GARCH (1,1) model and 
identified that the E-GARCH model was more suitable in modelling stock price returns 
as it outperformed the traditional GARCH specification. This was achieved by using 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) evaluation measure and the best model, E-
GARCH was found to have the lowest AIC. The study identified that E-GARCH was 
the best model to represent the Nigerian insurance market because insurance stock 
returns were found to be exponentially volatile during the study period. This illustrates 
that there was a combination of positive and negative returns, instigated by good or 
bad news. At a time when the Nigerian financial system was undergoing reforms in 
conjunction with investors being more informed about insurance stocks in their 
portfolios. As a result, the E-GARCH specification fit the data well because the model 
identified the greatest number of stocks as significant and also produced the lowest 
AIC. The results provide two important conclusions, with the first being that the ability 
to capture asymmetric volatility due to good and bad news is important in increasing 
the accuracy of financial market modelling. The second is that financial data across 
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each economy and each index can be similar or widely differentiated. This means that 
there is no universal asymmetric GARCH that can capture all types of asymmetric 
financial data, which justifies the existence of various other forms of asymmetric 
GARCH models.  
In a similar study, Kutan and Aksoy (2004) employed both GARCH (1,1) and 
E-GARCH (1,1) specifications to examine the effect of public information arrival on 
stock market returns and volatility in an emerging, high inflation economy (i.e. 
Istanbul Stock Exchange). Both GARCH and E-GARCH models were employed to 
determine which model performed best in explaining the volatility of Nigerian 
insurance stocks. The public information proxy employed was macroeconomic news 
announcements such as CPI, BOT and GDP. The results of the study suggest that, with 
the exception of the Financials sector, no evidence was found to ascertain that nominal 
returns increase in response to bad inflation news. Additionally, the results suggested 
that public information is reflected in the stock price, supporting the semi-strong form 
of the EMH. The study also illustrated that public information arrivals have a 
significant impact on market volatility depending on the type of announcements and 
the nature of the news (i.e. good or bad). The results indicate that the market is more 
sensitive to GDP, BOT and the Tourism and Construction sectors, and is more 
sensitive the day prior to the announcement release (because they are scheduled 
announcements). Additionally, it was found that CPI, GDP and BOT announcements 
were more sensitive to bad news than to good news. Kutan and Aksoy (2004) conclude 
that public information impacts both investor returns and market volatility by 
signalling the arrival of new information. This causes investors to re-balance their 
portfolios, thus instigating market volatility.  
Bauwens, Omrane and Giot (2005) also used the E-GARCH specification to 
investigate the impact of nine categories of scheduled and unscheduled news 
announcements on the Euro/US Dollar return volatility. The authors adopted an event 
study using high frequency data, where they analysed the pre-announcement, 
contemporaneous and post-announcement reactions. With respect to the news release, 
the study found that the release of scheduled news led to a pre-announcement increase 
in volatility. This was attributed to speculative trades, informed trades or the ‘closing’ 
of some trades to avoid any ‘surprises’ from the announcement, in order to secure 
profits. The pre-announcement timeframe applied in the study was between 15 minutes 
and 60 minutes. However, the pre-announcement volatility was significantly lower 
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when unscheduled announcements were released. In the contemporaneous period, the 
volatility level adjusts from the higher levels experienced in the pre-announcement 
period. In the post-announcement period, the changes in volatility were found to be 
the smallest.  
Nguyen (2010) also applied an E-GARCH (1,1) specification to examine how 
public information arrivals affected stock return volatility of individual firms on the 
ASX. Previous literature has focused on using news announcements as a proxy for 
public information arrivals. However, the limitation associated with the flow of time-
stamped news at the firm level is that news announcements are not centrally released, 
and different news sources disseminate public information at varying rates. Therefore 
Nguyen (2010) used a time-stamped proxy for public information (i.e. ASX 
announcements) to increase the accuracy of measuring private information arrivals and 
stock return volatility for intraday data. The study found a positive relationship 
between public information arrivals and intraday stock return volatility for individual 
firms. The benefit of using time-stamped intraday data was that is enabled the author 
to identify that the effects of public information became weaker as sampling frequency 
changed from the intraday to daily interval. However, the limitation of using E-
GARCH in each of the results presented in this subsection is that the effects of positive 
innovations (information releases) relative to negative innovations on volatility remain 
fixed over time.  
2.5.2 Glosten, Jagannathan & Runkle Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GJR-GARCH) Model 
Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) developed the GJR-GARCH model as an 
alternative model to E-GARCH. Similar to E-GARCH, the GJR-GARCH model also 
has the ability to capture the leverage effects through examining the impulse of 
negative shocks, which are larger than the impulse of positive shocks (Dutta 2014). 
Another feature of the GJR-GARCH model lies in the way it measures the leverage 
effect. A normal distribution is symmetric in nature, treating both tails as asymptotic 
and equal. However, in financial time series forecasting, particularly in hedging 
decisions, the left tail is given importance because it represents future losses, which 
are expected to be hedged. Moreover, the return tails are also not symmetric and not 
smooth, but in fact, are leptokurtic and have fat tails (Ding, Granger & Engle 1993). 
Therefore, to accommodate for these properties, the GJR-GARCH model assigns more 
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weighting to the left tail (Yoon & Lee 2008). The GJR-GARCH model incorporates 
the leverage effect by assigning a weight of 0 or 1. If the error is positive, a weight of 
0 will be assigned and if the error is negative, a weight of 1 will be assigned. This 
weighting allows the model to capture negative returns more precisely (Ramasamy & 
Munisamy 2012). 
Several studies have been undertaken to test the ability of the GJR-GARCH to 
successfully measure the leverage effect across various financial markets. Engle and 
Ng (1993) investigated the stock return volatility for Japanese stocks and their results 
were consistent with results identified by Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993). In 
a related study, Brailsford and Faff (1993) applied the GJR-GARCH model and found 
that it performed better than standard GARCH models, using Australian stock return 
data. Brailsford and Faff (1996) further investigated the forecasting ability of the GJR-
GARCH model and identified that the GJR-GARCH model was superior to the 
standard GARCH (1,1) model. Therefore, the authors extended the study to determine 
whether a higher order of GJR-GARCH (p,q) had a better capability of forecasting 
stock returns for Australian stocks, in contrast to the GJR-GARCH (1,1) model. After 
employing various orders of GARCH (p,q) and GJR-GARCH (p,q) for Australian 
stocks, the higher order GJR-GARCH (3,1) model was preferred to all others.  
In contrast, some of the studies that employed GJR-GARCH produced poor 
forecasts of conditional variance. Alberg, Shalit and Yosef (2008) empirically 
analysed the mean return and conditional variance of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 
(TASE) indices using GARCH, E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH and APGARCH models. 
Each of these asymmetric models were applied to investigate which one possessed the 
greatest forecasting capability for the TASE indices. To improve the fit of the GARCH 
and E-GARCH models into international markets, Harris et al. (2004) used a skewed 
generalised Student’s t-distribution to incorporate the skewness of data and leverage 
effects found in daily return data. For the TA100 index, the E-GARCH model provided 
better forecasts compared to the APGARCH and GJR-GARCH models. However, 
with respect to the TA25 index, conflicting results were produced, rendering it 
impossible to reach a general conclusion. The conclusion of their study is twofold. The 
first is that asymmetric models (E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH and APGARCH) 
outperform the standard GARCH model and the second is that among the asymmetric 
models tested, the E-GARCH skewed Student-t model outperformed GJR-GARCH 
and APGARCH, for the TA100 index, specifically.  
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In contrast, Alberg, Shalit and Yosef (2008), Donaldson and Kamstra (2005) 
employed GJR-GARCH (1,1) to forecast stock return volatility for international 
markets. Their results showed that the GJR-GARCH model produced a better forecast 
in comparison to GARCH (1,1) and E-GARCH (1,1) models. Pilbeam and Langeland 
(2015) investigated whether various specifications of GARCH models were able to 
forecast volatility in the foreign exchange market. The study employed both symmetric 
and asymmetric models to highlight the advantage of asymmetric models in being 
better able to capture the leverage effect. The following currency exchange pairs were 
employed in each of the models: USD/JPY, USD/CHF, USD/GBP and USD/EUR. 
The results of the study are surprising as they are contrary to what is commonly 
observed in the literature. It was found that even though the E-GARCH (1,1) model 
allows for good and bad news to have varying effects on volatility, it was ranked 
second last in three out of the four foreign exchange pairs. Surprisingly, the standard 
GARCH (1,1) specification performed the best, followed by GJR-GARCH. 
2.5.3 Asymmetric Power Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (APGARCH) Model 
The asymmetric power GARCH (APGARCH) model was developed by Ding, Granger 
and Engle (1993). The APGARCH model amalgamates the flexibility of a varying 
exponent with the asymmetry coefficient in order to account for the leverage effect 
(Laurent 2004). In this model, the conditional standard deviation, which is raised to a 
power (positive exponent), is ‘a function of the lagged conditional standard deviations 
and lagged absolute innovations raised to the same power’ (Roncoroni, Fusai & 
Cummins 2015, p. 709). What makes the APGARCH model unique lies in the fact that 
it is based on a stable distribution, rather than a normal distribution. This allows the 
model to better describe the peak, heavy tails (i.e. excess kurtosis) and volatility 
clustering characteristic of financial data, in addition to the leverage effect (Xu et al. 
2011).  
Ding (2011) assessed the ability of the APGARCH model to forecast and 
capture conditional volatility features commonly identified in financial markets 
including fat tails, volatility persistence, asymmetry and the leverage effect. To test for 
the abovementioned features, Ding investigated the forecasting ability of the 
APGARCH model using a normal distribution, Student’s t-distribution (Bollerslev 
1986) and skewed Student’s t-distribution. Ding’s study employed this methodology 
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across two major indices, i.e. S&P 500 Daily Index and MSCI Europe Index. 
Consistent with Bollerslev (1986), the study identified that the Student t-distribution 
captured the excess kurtosis and fat tail features. However, the skewed Student t-
distribution also captured the leverage effects, and so was deemed as a better fit. Using 
the AIC and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to identify the best performing 
model, the study found that for the S&P 500 index, the APGARCH (1,1) model 
performed best, and for the MSCI Europe Index, the APGARCH (0,1) performed the 
best. Ding (2011) utilised the Log Likelihood, AIC and BIC to conclude that these 
models were the best fit for the data because the skewed Student t-distribution had a 
larger likelihood and smaller errors in comparison to the normal distribution and 
Student t-distribution. Additionally, they produced the lowest AIC and BIC values.  
2.6. Private Information Arrivals  
The strong form EMH states that in an efficient market, all available information will 
be reflected in stock prices as all users obtain information simultaneously. This would 
imply that private information cannot be accessed by users in the market. Subsequent 
research has found evidence against the strong form EMH to indicate that private 
information arrivals do exist through examining analyst recommendations and changes 
in trading volume during periods where public information has not been released. 
Additionally, current literature has focused on classifying an entire index as either 
strong form, semi-strong form or weak form efficient. However, each sector may 
experience varying levels of efficiency depending on the impact of private information 
proxies on sectoral return volatility. At present, the literature has been quite limited in 
measuring private information and its effect on sectoral return volatility. The limited 
literature is partly explained by the difficulty in being able to apply an appropriate 
proxy to measure private information, as it carries limitations in accuracy. Although 
there have been limited studies in this area, each of which has its own individual 
drawbacks, some studies have established a link between private information arrivals 
and stock return volatility. Previous studies have placed great focus on using analyst 
buy/sell recommendations and trading volume as the proxy for private information 
signals, yielding an array of varying results. Due to the inconclusive and conflicting 
nature of the results, it remains an area of further research to help better identify more 
accurate measures of private information.  
33 
2.6.1. Analyst Recommendations as a Proxy for Private Information Arrivals  
Bradley et al. (2014) used Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S estimates to analyse the 
informational content of analysts’ recommendations relative to management guidance 
and earnings announcements. The purpose of using I/B/E/S estimates was to gain an 
understanding of the impact of analysts’ recommendations on stock return volatility 
on an intraday basis (i.e. 30-minute returns). The I/B/E/S rating system uses a 
quantitative system from 1 to 5 to indicate its recommendation. Specifically, 1 = 
strong buy, 2 = buy, 3 = hold, 4 = underperform, 5 = sell. The benefit of this system is 
that analysts employ current company financial data to forecast future earnings of 
publicly listed companies. Based on these forecasts and available key metrics such as 
price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio and return on equity (ROE), analysts provide a 
recommendation between 1 and 5. The additional benefit of this I/B/E/S rating system 
is that it allowed users to access various forecasts from many analysts.  
In a similar study, Jegadeesh and Kim (2009) investigated whether sell-side 
analysts herd around the consensus when providing stock recommendations. This 
study used the consensus recommendation as the proxy to measure private 
information. In this context, a consensus recommendation involves providing to users 
a recommendation based on the average recommendation a range of analysts who 
examined the same stock. The proxy is measured by an Upgrade – if stock price is 
forecasted to increase; a Downgrade – if stock price is forecasted to decrease; and No 
Revision to the recommendation. Investigating the herding effect involved measuring 
the difference between each broker’s recommendations and the average 
recommendation across all brokers. If there is an incentive to herd, recommendations 
will move towards the consensus. The study found that when larger brokerage houses 
provided sell recommendations, smaller brokerage houses had a tendency to amend 
their recommendations to match the larger brokerage house. This indicates that 
analysts’ recommendations move towards the consensus recommendations.  
Barber et al. (2001) also employed a similar type of proxy to represent private 
information. Their study used Zacks Investment Research Database to document the 
impact of analysts’ recommendations on the ability of investors to generate excess 
returns. An additional objective of the research was to investigate whether changes in 
recommendations cause returns to diminish. This database operates in a similar way 
to the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S system, which provides analyst recommendations 
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using the following: 1 = strong buy, 2 = buy, 3 = hold, 4 = sell, 5 = strong sell. The 
recommendation is provided on a similar basis to the consensus recommendation used 
by Jegadeesh and Kim (2009). It involves compiling the recommendations from 12 
out of the 20 largest U.S. brokerage firms and applying an average rating to provide to 
users.  
However, a common limitation exists with the private information proxies used 
by Bradley et al. (2014), Jegadeesh and Kim (2009) and Barber et al. (2001). The 
limitation of using buy/sell or upgrade/downgrade recommendations is that analysts 
have a tendency to herd with respect to providing the same recommendation as other 
analysts, thereby strengthening the credibility of their recommendation. The results 
from Jegadeesh and Kim (2009) have proved that this herding phenomenon does exist. 
The drawback of herding is that it results in a bias recommendation, which may not 
necessarily be provided by analysts’ own individual interpretation of the company 
fundamentals. This herding behaviour is prominent with sell-side analysts (i.e. 
downgrading stocks) for two reasons, with the first being that analysts are more 
reluctant to stand out from other brokerage firms when they convey negative 
information. The second is that if larger brokerage firms are providing sell 
recommendations, the remaining smaller brokerage firms capitalise on the opportunity 
to obtain commissions through transactions costs associated with selling the stock.   
Theoretical models by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Trueman (1994) also 
predict that analysts without a known reputation will herd because of concerns 
regarding their future career or because of their desire to intimate other analysts by 
indicating that they have superior stock-picking abilities. This was evident in the 
results presented by Barber et al. (2001), where ‘Zacks Recommendations’ data 
showed a significantly higher amount of buy recommendations compared to sell 
recommendations. This indicates that there is a reluctance among analysts to provide 
sell recommendations, thus formulating bias in the recommendation.  
The limitations common to these studies would be less prominent with analyst 
price targets, as analysts are required to provide an exact dollar amount with respect 
to the price they forecast the stock to reach. Herding would be less prominent with 
price targets, as it would be more easily identifiable by individuals, thus weakening 
their confidence in analysts providing recommendations. Individuals would be able to 
identify herding as brokerage firms would provide very similar or the same price target 
as other brokerage firms. As each brokerage firm does not have the exact same level 
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of information as its counterparts, it would be difficult to reach the exact same price 
target, as each analyst would arrive at the price target differently. A further limitation 
of using analyst recommendations is that it causes varying level of reactions in 
investors as each investor reacts to a buy/hold/sell recommendation differently. This 
reduces the accuracy of the private information proxy, causing variable reactions in 
trading volumes and subsequently stock return volatility. For example, if a brokerage 
firm provided a buy recommendation, an investor does not have enough information 
in the recommendation to consider the risk-to-reward relationship, which is essential 
in investment decision-making. However, if a price target was issued on the stock to 
increase from $8.00 to $8.10, the investor can now consider the following the risk-to-
reward relationship in their decision by comparing the riskiness of the stock (based on 
fundamentals such as ROE and P/E ratio) to the potential return i.e. 10 cents per stock.  
2.6.2. Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) Model as A Proxy for Private 
Information Arrivals 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) developed one of the first measures of private information 
known as probability of informed trading (PIN). Their paper aimed to find evidence 
against the EMH, through observing trade size, and to measure its effect on security 
prices. They argued that ‘if markets are efficient, why does trade size/quantity affect 
security prices?’ (Easley & O’Hara 1987, p. 69) The authors’ empirical results 
indicated that large trades (block trades), in comparison to small trades, are made 
during times in which prices are unfavourable, resulting in a subsequent price increase. 
The results also indicated that block trades have persistent price effects, with 
transaction prices being lower after block selling and higher after block buys. These 
results showed that trade size was able to indicate the existence of informed trading, 
suggesting that some market participants had access to more information about the 
market than others – i.e. private information. Easley and O’Hara (1987) regarded this 
observed phenomenon as the ‘liquidity effect’ and defined this effect as the change in 
security prices, which changes with trade size, depending on the absolute size of the 
trade. The authors’ termed this price-trade relationship as PIN, in that if more block 
trades are made during periods in which prices are unfavourable, consequently 
increasing the security price, there is a higher probability of informed trading, i.e. high 
PIN. The presence of more block trades in these circumstances would indicate a higher 
probability that informed traders undertaking large trades on securities with 
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unfavourable prices, have access to private information. An advantage of the PIN 
model is that it can measure asymmetric information in financial markets. 
Additionally, PIN may provide some analysts with the privilege of enjoying 
information regarding the value of a stock, whilst other analysts merely provide 
recommendations based on public news. Thus, the risk that an uninformed analyst may 
face an informed counterpart in the market is an important determinant of security 
prices. Hence, measuring the probability that a counterpart enjoys asymmetric 
information (PIN), allows an analyst to correctly price a security and subsequently 
provide an accurate recommendation to investors. 
Easley, Hvidkjaer & O’Hara (2010) further expanded the use of PIN by 
examining the potential profits of trading stocks. The authors investigated whether 
taking a long position in high PIN stocks or short position in low PIN stocks had the 
potential to earn significant abnormal returns. The results indicated that PIN failed to 
completely explain the returns of high and low PIN stocks. PIN was only able to 
capture abnormal returns for high PIN stocks, as they were associated with larger 
capitalisation companies, therefore consisted of clear block trades. However, PIN 
failed to successfully capture the potential of low PIN stocks to generate abnormal 
returns. This is because they were associated with smaller capitalisation companies, 
rendering it difficult to identify clear block trades. Therefore, the model was not able 
to capture the impact of private information on the ability of small capitalisation stocks 
to generate abnormal return. Hu (2016) also argued that in theory, the PIN model 
identifies information events based on the absolute order flow imbalance. However, in 
practice, the PIN model may produce a poor description of the data, thereby affecting 
the manner in which it actually identifies private information. This is because the PIN 
model is only able to capture block trades, rather than all informed trades which are 
driven by private information. Hu (2016) argued that Easley and O’Hara (1987) were 
only able to find a relationship between trade size and price changes but were unable 
to prove that the block trades were instigated by informed traders with private 
information. Although Easley and O’Hara (1987) had suggested that the order 
imbalance could explain the block trades, indicating the existence of private 
information, it was not conclusively proven in the study. Hu (2016) and Kim and Stoll 
(2014) found that order imbalance was not indicative of the existence of private 
information during announcements, specifically earnings announcements. In fact, 
turnover/liquidity was found to be the main driver of block trades, rather than order 
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imbalance. Both studies found that almost all days with higher than average turnover 
were directly related to days with private information events. The PIN model is limited 
to the fact that it assumes all high turnover/liquidity days are private information 
events, as it groups all sources of variation in turnover (e.g. disagreement and calendar 
effects) under the umbrella of private information arrivals, which is not the case.  
2.6.3. Trading Volume as A Proxy for Private Information Arrivals  
Kyle (1985) first undertook a theoretical examination of the link between private 
information, trading volume and stock return variances. He modelled a market with 
three classes of traders: (i) informed investors who trade strategically to maximise 
profits from private information; (ii) random liquidity traders whose buy/sell orders 
arrive randomly and exogenously; and (iii) specialists who possess no private 
information, but trade by learning price and volume changes. In a related study, 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) extended Kyle’s (1985) work by incorporating a fourth 
trader class known as a ‘discretionary liquidity trader’. Traders in this class are 
described to have no private information but have some discretion over the timing of 
trades. Both Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) were able to establish that 
trading volume is related to private information. They established that discretionary 
liquidity traders and informed traders will cluster, as classes groups prefer to trade 
when markets are thick. This clustering causes the stock return variance to increase 
and reach its highest peak when trading is most active. However, random liquidity 
traders and informed traders will trade during inactive periods and when markets are 
thin. These results are contrary to the findings of Easley and O’Hara (1987), who 
identified that all informed traders, block trade (creating an increase in trading volume) 
when markets are thin, i.e. unfavourable prices. 
Based on Kyle’s (1985) theoretical framework, Boussaidi (2013) used trading 
volume as a proxy for private information to investigate the relationship between 
private signals and stock return volatility in the Tunis Stock Exchange. More 
specifically, the author investigated whether overconfident investors overreact to 
private signals in the market, and therefore trade excessively (increasing trading 
volume) and cause price deviation and excessive volatility. To measure the periods in 
which private signals existed, the periods in which no public information was 
announced were isolated. The ‘private information period’ was set to begin one month 
after the last public announcement and end one day before the next public 
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announcement. These parameters were specifically set to ensure that the reaction of 
investors to public announcements were not captured in the results. The results 
indicated that the model was able to establish positive causality between trading 
volume and return volatility. The weakness of this model is that this causality was 
found for one-third of the stocks. Additionally, the model establishes the start of the 
‘private information period’ one month after each public announcement. However, this 
is only plausible for announcements which are scheduled in nature, as it clear that some 
stocks have announcements (scheduled and unscheduled) which are released more 
frequently than one per month. Therefore Boussaidi’s (2013) model would not be able 
to capture unscheduled announcements as there is no way to predict the frequency of 
their disclosure for each individual stock.  
In a separate study, Kacperczyk and Pagnotta (2017) used trading volume to 
determine whether market-based signals revealed the trading behaviour of privately 
informed investors. The aim of this study was to investigate whether these market-
based signals were more prominent in either stock markets or options markets, or both. 
The results identified information-related abnormal trading volume in options markets. 
This indicates that trading volume is more informative in options markets compared 
to stock markets. Kacperczyk and Pagnotta (2017) justify their conclusion based on 
Black (1975), who first suggested that options might play an important role in price 
discovery. This is because informed traders would prefer options over stocks, due to 
their embedded leverage. The review thus reveals that trading volume would not be an 
ideal proxy to represent private information for ASX 200 stocks.  
2.6.4. Morningstar Stock Star Ratings 
Morningstar is an investment research and management firm, founded by Joe 
Mansueto in 1984 to provide investors with commentary and recommendations 
regarding mutual funds and individual stocks. At present, Morningstar is one of the 
most highly regarded investment research firms across the industry, along with its 
major competitors such as Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. Morningstar provides 
investment research to Australia, North America, Asia and Europe, for individuals and 
institutional investors. It offers this research on a wide range of data covering stocks, 
mutual funds, indexes, futures, options, commodities, precious metals, foreign 
exchange and Treasury (Morningstar 2018a). Only one year after Mansueto founded 
the company, Morningstar launched its currently well-known Morningstar rating 
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system for mutual funds, adopting the common rating system of one star to five stars. 
In 2001, Morningstar expanded their rating system to also cover individual stocks, 
which used the same rating system as the Morningstar mutual fund ratings. The 
independently provided stock ratings were driven by the expected return to investors, 
with a 5-star rating indicating that the expected return is significantly higher than the 
stock’s cost of capital.  
An extensive body of literature has investigated the value of investment advice 
and stock ratings systems. Metrick (1999) analysed the equity-portfolio 
recommendations provided in investment newsletters. However, no evidence of 
superior stock-picking ability of investors was identified. Additionally, the study 
found no evidence to suggest that an abnormal return was achieved based on the 
recommendations provided. In a related study, Dewally (2003) investigated the origins 
and quality of investment advice provided on major online newsgroups, by examining 
their return characteristics. The study found that stock recommendations contained an 
overwhelmingly large imbalance of buy ratings compared to sell ratings. In fact, the 
buy to sell ratio was 7:1. The study was also unable to identify a relationship between 
stock recommendations and above-market returns in the short and long term. There 
has also been a large body of work related to analysing the value of stock rating 
systems. Some early studies such as Black (1976), identified that portfolios consisting 
of top-rated stocks recommended by Value Line yielded significant abnormal returns 
from 1965 to 1970. However, a similar study by Hall and Tsay (1988) performed for 
the period 1976 to 1982, concluded that top rated stocks did not provide abnormal 
returns.  
Since its inception, there have been numerous studies on Morningstar’s fund 
ratings system. Examples of such studies include Blake and Morey (2000), who found 
predictive power in mutual fund ratings, particularly low rated funds. This finding is 
consistent with the leverage effect identified in financial data, where investors are 
more sensitive to bad news. In a similar study, Del Guericio and Tkac (2008) found a 
significant relationship between mutual fund flows and upgrades/downgrades to the 
fund’s Morningstar ratings. Morey and Gottesman (2006) examined the ability of 
Morningstar individual stock ratings to predict future fund performance from 2002 to 
2006. The study employed four different performance metrics (Sharpe ratio, single-
index alpha, 4-index alpha and a conditional alpha) to identify a relationship between 
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ratings and fund returns. The study found that higher rated funds significantly 
outperformed lower rated funds.  
From 2001 onwards, the Morningstar individual stock rating system has been 
given more attention to determine whether it has the same level of predictive power as 
the Morningstar mutual fund rating system. Bolster, Trahan and Wang (2016) were the 
first to evaluate the performance of portfolios using Morningstar’s stock star rating 
system for stocks. The authors created portfolios consisting of stocks with specific 
Morningstar ratings through two methods: a simple arithmetic average or equal 
weighted return for stocks within the portfolio of a particular rating for the entire 
sample period (2001–2012). These portfolios were then evaluated using the Fama-
French four-factor regression model. The results indicated that Morningstar’s ratings 
were effective in distinguishing between overvalued (1-star) and undervalued (5-star) 
stocks. The 5-star portfolio earned an annualised return of 13.66% whilst the 1-star 
portfolio earned 8.44%. Bolster, Trahan and Ebrahimi (2017) further examined the 
nature and impact of individual stock ratings from Morningstar. The authors found that 
when stock ratings are upgraded, they experience abnormal returns and when stock 
ratings are downgraded, they experience negative abnormal returns. The study also 
found that not only do changes in stock ratings affect the returns after being announced 
but the abnormal return also appears to have a persistence of 30 days. To date, Bolster, 
Trahan and Wang (2016) and Bolster, Trahan and Ebrahimi (2017) have been the only 
studies to examine the relationship between Morningstar’s individual stock ratings and 
investor returns. However, no such study, has attempted to understand the extent to 
which the change (upgrade/downgrade) in Morningstar star ratings as a proxy for 
private information causes stock return volatility on a sectoral level.  
2.7. Conclusion 
A review of the various literature reveals the need to undertake the current study as no 
similar study has been conducted in the Australian market. Although the literature does 
reveal that return volatility exists due to the various proxies employed, this research 
aims to improve the accuracy of the proxies utilised, to further improve the models. 
Further, the review shows that the utilisation of macroeconomic news announcements 
and firm–specific announcements for a small sample of stocks provides a limited 
understanding of the impact of public information at the sectoral level. Additionally, 
limitations of private information proxies such as I/B/E/S estimates, PIN models, 
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trading volume and Morningstar fund ratings have been presented and evaluated. The 
evaluation uncovers the need to implement alternative proxies to measure private 
information in order to understand its true effect on return volatility. Furthermore, this 
research is warranted by the fact that there is a limited number of studies examining 
volatility at a sectoral level. This will contribute to the understanding of the 
informational efficiency of each ASX sector.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the theoretical framework 
underpinning the empirical methodology developed for this study. The first half of the 
chapter discusses the various asymmetric GARCH models in the context of the 
theoretical framework, followed by the justification of the models adopted in this 
study. The second half explains the empirical methodology employed, consisting of 
two sets of empirical tests. The first set of tests uses E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH and 
APGARCH models to estimate the asymmetric volatility of each stock in the sample. 
The second set of tests employs a series of panel data regressions to examine the impact 
of private and public information on sectoral return volatility utilising various 
information proxies. Please refer to Appendix 1A for a graphical representation of the 
methodology. 
3.2. Theoretical Framework 
This research’s theoretical foundation is primarily that of understanding the 
determinants of sectoral return volatility through the EMH. The study examines the 
presence of the strong form EMH using the stocks listed on the ASX 200, through a 
sectoral perspective. As previously discussed, Fama (1970) posits that in an efficient 
market, prices should fully and accurately reflect all available information. He further 
segregated market efficiency into weak form, semi-strong form and strong form. This 
study however examines the strong form EMH as it is concerned with measuring both 
private and public information.  
As indicated earlier, the major purpose of the study is to empirically investigate 
the extent to which private and public information impact sectoral return volatility. To 
achieve this objective, a number of asymmetric GARCH models and panel regressions 
are utilised to test for the strong form EMH. Specifically, the following hypotheses are 
proposed to address the objective of this study.  
1. Investigate whether private information (analyst price targets and Morningstar 
stock star ratings) positively impact sectoral return volatility. This process 
enables the researcher to test the following hypotheses: 
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 Hypothesis 1a (H0): Private information disclosures do not impact 
sectoral return volatility; thus, investors would simply rely on public 
information for their investment decisions, i.e. fundamental analysis.  
 Hypothesis 1b (HA): Private information disclosures do impact sectoral 
return volatility; thus, investors would seek private information proxies 
to generate excess returns and/or minimise capital losses.  
2. Investigate the extent to which public information (ASX announcements) 
impact sectoral return volatility. As a consequence, the following hypotheses 
are specified: 
 Hypothesis 2a (H0): Public information disclosures do not impact 
sectoral return volatility; thus, the market does not fully reflect public 
information. 
 Hypothesis 2b (HA): Public information disclosures do impact sectoral 
return volatility; thus, the market does reflect public information.   
3.2.1. Market Volatility and Models – GARCH Models  
Some models of volatility follow the assumption that the conditional volatility of assets 
is symmetric in nature, implying that positive and negative innovations have the same 
impact on volatility. However, when estimating the volatility of financial asset returns 
in equity markets, this assumption is not highly likely (Anderson et al. 2001). Hamilton 
& Lin (1996) demonstrates that volatility is higher during market contractions in 
comparison to market expansions. During market contractions, there is a high 
frequency of bad news flowing through financial markets, instigating higher volatility 
relative to good news. This phenomenon is also observed when estimating volatility 
for financial asset returns, which is known as the leverage effect (Rodríguez & Ruiz 
2012). With respect to financial asset returns, greater volatility is expected when stock 
prices fall, and lower volatility is expected when stock prices rise.  
The GARCH (1,1) model was introduced by Bollerslev (1986) and provides a 
more flexible lag structure than ARCH. However, as GARCH (1,1) cannot capture the 
leverage effect, it is not an appropriate model to estimate return volatility for stocks. 
The constraint imposed in the GARCH (1,1) model is that it cannot differentiate 
between positive and negative parameters, hence it undertakes the assumption that all 
parameters are positive (Alberg, Shalit & Yousef 2008). This drives the model to 
assume that good news and bad news have the same impact on volatility. However, 
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based on the leverage effect, it is evident that this is not the case in financial time series 
data (Anderson et al. 2001). Therefore, to improve the accuracy of the model and to 
aid in answering the objectives of this research, asymmetric GARCH-type models are 
employed to represent this data, namely, the E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH and 
APGARCH models. These three asymmetric models relax the non-negative constraint 
on parameters, but they differ in their method of accommodating the leverage effect 
(i.e. asymmetry) based on their assumptions. This can be further explained by each 
model’s news impact curve (NIC), which measures how new information is 
incorporated into estimates of volatility based on whether good or bad news is released 
(Engle & Ng 1993). 
3.2.2. Asymmetric GARCH Models Compared  
To understand how each model accommodates the leverage effect, reference is made 
to the NIC for each asymmetric model. Pagan and Schwert (1990) and Engle and Ng 
(1993) employed the NIC to compare the various asymmetric models through plotting 
the relationship between conditional volatility and the associated positive/negative 
shocks. To model this relationship, the authors categorised the error term 𝜀௧ (i.e. stock 
return shocks) from the mean equation collectively as ‘news’. Therefore, a positive 𝜀௧ 
indicates an unexpected stock price increase, denoting good news arrival; whereas a 
negative 𝜀௧ indicates an unexpected stock price decrease, suggesting bad news arrival. 
Additionally, a large value of |𝜀௧ | would indicate that the news arrival is significant, 
suggesting that the unexpected price change is large. Based on this understanding of 
volatility, the following seminal models were developed.  
3.2.2.1. ARCH and GARCH Models 
Engle’s (1982) ARCH model: 
 𝑟௧ =  𝜇 + 𝜀௧   (3.1) 
 𝜀௧ଶ = 𝑧௧𝜎௧ (3.2) 
 𝑧௧  ~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝐷(0,1)  
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𝜎௧ଶ = 𝛼଴ + ෍ 𝛼௜𝜀௧ି௜ଶ
௣
௜ୀଵ
 (3.3) 
Where: 
r୲ = dependent variable; 
μ = intercept coefficient for each 𝑖; 
ε୲ = error term 
𝜎௧ଶ = conditional variance 
𝛼௜ = measures the size of the shock in the previous period 𝑖.  
However, due to the restrictive nature of the ARCH model, Bollerslev (1986) 
employed the GARCH (p,q) model. This model dealt with the large lag structure 
required by the ARCH model to capture the dynamic behaviour of conditional 
variance. The GARCH (1,1) model has been the most commonly used specification 
across volatility studies. The GARCH model is mathematically expressed as:  
 
𝜎௧ଶ = 𝛼଴ + ෍ 𝛼௜𝜀௧ି௜ଶ
௤
௜ୀଵ
+  ෍ 𝛽௝𝜎௧ି௝ଶ
௣
௜ୀଵ
 (3.4) 
where 𝜎௧ଶ is the conditional variance, 𝛼଴, 𝛼௜,௝ and 𝛽 are non-negative parameters and 
𝛼 > 0, to ensure that the conditional variance remains positive. The disadvantage of 
this model is that it does not address the stylised nature of financial asset returns, i.e. 
asymmetry. The NIC for the GARCH model appears to be quadratic and symmetric in 
nature, implying that good news and bad news have the same impact on volatility 
(Alfreedi, Isa & Hassan 2012). However various studies have shown this to not be the 
case with respect to financial asset returns, as it does not capture the leverage effect 
(Dutta 2014; Hentschel 1995; Alberg, Shalit & Yousef 2008). 
3.2.2.2. E-GARCH Model 
Nelson (1991) proposed the E-GARCH model to tackle the limitations of the GARCH 
model, in order to capture the leverage effect. The E-GARCH model is specified as 
follows:  
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𝑙𝑛 (ℎ௧) = 𝛼଴ + 𝛽ln(ℎ௧ିଵ)  + 𝛾
𝜀௧ିଵ
ඥℎ௧ିଵଶ
+ 𝛼ଵ  ቎
|𝜀௧ିଵ|
ඥℎ௧ିଵ
− ඨ
2
𝜋
 ቏ (3.5) 
Where: 
ℎ௧ = the conditional volatility at interval t  
𝛼଴ = the intercept for the variance 
𝛽 = the coefficient for the natural logged GARCH term, which measures the 
magnitude and persistence of the volatility 
ln(ℎ𝑡−1) = the logged GARCH term  
𝛾 ఌ೟షభ
ඥ௛೟షభ
 = the size of the asymmetric volatility. The sign of γ determines whether 
the volatility is positive or negative and the value of γ determines the size of the 
shock (Brooks 2014).  
቎ 𝜀೟షభ
ට௛೟షభమ
− ටଶ
గ
 ቏ = the parameter which captures the absolute value of the previous 
period volatility shocks (this replaces the ARCH term). 
The E-GARCH model captures the asymmetric volatility in the model through 
‘gamma’ (γ). The sign of γ determines whether the volatility is positive or negative 
and the value of γ determines the size of the shock (Brooks 2014).  
If γ = 0, the model is symmetric, thus no asymmetric volatility.  
If γ < 0, negative shocks have a larger impact on volatility compared to positive 
shocks. 
If γ > 0, positive shocks have a larger impact on volatility compared to positive 
shocks.  
Engle and Ng (1993) concluded that the E-GARCH model is superior to the original 
GARCH model in two ways:  
1. The E-GARCH model accommodates for positive (good news) and negative 
(bad news) shocks to reflect different effects on volatility. 
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2. The E-GARCH model allows larger shocks (big news) to have a larger effect 
on volatility.  
Both improvements captured by the E-GARCH model are effects which are frequently 
observed in financial asset returns. The E-GARCH model exhibits a different NIC 
compared to the GARCH model, which exhibits a quadratic NIC. The E-GARCH 
model captures the leverage effect by exhibiting an exponentially increasing NIC on 
both sides (i.e. upon arrival of good and bad news). In addition, the E-GARCH NIC 
slightly weights negative shocks greater than positive shocks. Figure 3.1 graphically 
represents how the E-GARCH NIC exponentially increases in response to negative 
shocks, relative to positive shocks, as compared to the original GARCH model:  
Figure 3.1 – Comparison of GARCH and E-GARCH news impact curve 
Source: Engle & Ng 1993 
3.2.2.3. GJR-GARCH Model  
Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle’s (1993) GJR-GARCH model which is also referred 
to as Zakonian’s (1994) Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) model, introduced another 
method of capturing asymmetric effects by including an additional term in the 
equation. The GJR-GARCH model is similar in nature to the TGARCH model, in that 
both include the squared residual terms to accommodate the asymmetric effect. In 
many cases, they are considered the same method as they become equivalent by simply 
rearranging their formulas. The GJR-GARCH model is specified as follows:  
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𝝈𝒕𝟐 =  𝜶𝟎 + ෍(α𝟏𝜺𝒕ି𝒊𝟐 + 𝜹𝜺𝒕ି𝒊𝟐
𝒒
𝒊ୀ𝟏
𝒅𝒕ି𝒊) + ෍ β𝒋𝝈𝒕ି𝒋𝟐
𝒑
𝒋ୀ𝟏
 (3.6) 
Where:  
𝜎௧ଶ = the conditional forecasted variance in time t 
𝛼଴ = constant  
αଵ𝜀௧ି௜ଶ  = GARCH term which captures the symmetric volatility 
β௝𝜎௧ି௝ଶ  = parameter which captures the persistence of volatility.  
𝑑௧ି௜ = 1 if 𝜀௧ି௜ ଶ  < 0; (bad news) – dummy variable  
𝑑௧ି௜ = 0 if 𝜀௧ି௜ ଶ  > 0 (good news) – dummy variable 
The additional term 𝜹𝜺𝒕ି𝒊 𝟐 𝒅𝒕ି𝒊 accommodates for the impact that different past shocks 
have on the current conditional variance (asymmetry term). If 𝛿 is positive, there exists 
a negative leverage effect. A negative shock (𝜀௧ି௜ ଶ  < 0) would cause the conditional 
variance to increase and a positive shock (𝜀௧ି௜ ଶ  > 0) would cause the conditional 
variance to decrease. Referring to the NIC in Figure 3.2, the GJR-GARCH curve, 
although quadratic, shows a steeper but steadier rate of increase in conditional variance 
when negative shocks occur in contrast to the E-GARCH curve (Hentschel 1995). 
However, the E-GARCH NIC increases the conditional variance exponentially in 
response to a negative shock. The GJR-GARCH captures asymmetry (as shown in the 
NIC) through the steeper slope on its negative side relative to its positive side. 
Therefore, this model assumes that negative shocks have a larger effect on volatility 
than positive shocks (Engle & Ng 1993). The GJR-GARCH model further assumes 
that negative shocks will have a larger effect on volatility over a shorter period 
compared to E-GARCH (which exponentially increases).  
Moreover, the GJR-GARCH model does have advantages over the standard 
GARCH and E-GARCH models. The E-GARCH model employs the natural logarithm 
of conditional variance, which can cause convergence problems due to the complex 
exponential formula, as the lag order increases (Degiannakis & Xekalaki 2004). This 
convergence issue still has not been resolved in this model, which is the reason 
researchers tend to favour the GJR-GARCH and other asymmetric models.  
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Figure 3.2 – Comparison of GJR-GARCH and E-GARCH news impact curve  
 
Source: Jiang & Xia 2018 
3.2.2.4. APGARCH Model 
Ding, Granger and Engle (1993) also employed the asymmetric power GARCH 
(APGARCH) model to capture the leverage effect. This model nests as many as seven 
other ARCH extensions as special cases, such as ARCH (Engle 1982), GARCH 
(Bollerslev 1986), Taylor (1986)/Schwert’s (1990) GARCH, GJR-GARCH (Glosten, 
Jagannathan & Runkle 1993), TGARCH (Zakonian 1994), NARCH (Higgins & Bera 
1992) and Log-ARCH (Geweke (1986) & Pentula (1986)). The specification of the 
model is as follows:  
 
𝝈𝒕𝜹 =  𝜶𝟎 +  ෍ α𝒊
𝒒
𝒊ୀ𝟏
(|𝜺𝒕ି𝒊| − 𝜸𝜺𝒕ି𝒊)𝜹 + ෍ β𝒋𝝈𝒕ି𝒋𝜹
𝒑
𝒋ୀ𝟏
 (3.7) 
Where: 
𝜎௧ఋ  = the conditional standard deviation  
𝛼଴ = constant  
α𝒊 = GARCH term which captures the symmetric volatility  
𝛾𝜀௧ି௜ = parameter which accommodates the leverage effect. If 𝛾 > 0, then past 
negative shocks have a large effect on current volatility relative to past positive 
shocks (Hentschel 1995).  
𝛿 = the varying exponent. If a large negative shock is followed by another 
negative shock, the APGARCH model will account for this by estimating current 
volatility to be higher in the previous period. This causes volatility clustering. 
The model also requires 𝛿 > 0, where 𝛿 plays the role of a Box-Cox 
transformation of the conditional standard deviation (𝜎௧). The Box-Cox 
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transformation helps to linearise the nonlinear model by parameterising the non-
linearity in the conditional standard deviation (Hentschel 1995). 
β௝𝜎௧ି௝ఋ  = parameter which captures the persistence of volatility.  
The APGARCH model is similar to the GJR-GARCH model, but APGARCH utilises 
conditional standard deviation instead of conditional variance. Additionally, the 
conditional standard deviation is raised to a power (positive exponent), which allows 
previous negative shocks to have a larger impact on current volatility, resulting in a 
narrower NIC, compared to the standard GARCH, E-GARCH and GJR-GARCH 
models. This provides more flexibility in modelling the memory of volatility while 
maintaining its parsimonious nature. The strength of the APGARCH model lies in its 
ability to ‘couple the flexibility of a varying exponent with the asymmetry coefficient’ 
(Laurent & Peters 2001, p. 454), to accommodate the leverage effect.  
3.2.3. Model Selection 
Based on the models described in section 3.2.2, the APGARCH model does appear to 
provide the highest predictive power. However, it is important to note that since each 
stock is tested individually when undertaking GARCH modelling, it cannot be 
assumed that each stock’s asymmetric volatility will behave the same way in response 
to information. Therefore, the study cannot simply employ the APGARCH model 
across all stocks. Moreover, the nature of the data suggests that although private and 
public information proxies may cause asymmetric volatility for each stock, there is no 
observable way to confirm which asymmetric model is superior for each individual 
stock until modelling is performed. Therefore, this study will employ three asymmetric 
GARCH models to ensure robust results. The nature of the data is described as follows:  
Firstly, analyst price targets can fluctuate by several cents or dollars, 
depending on the research analysts’ perception of future company performance. The 
three asymmetric models mentioned would be appropriate to capture this effect on 
return volatility. However, when price targets are downgraded continually, 
APGARCH may appropriately capture this effect as it emphasises previous negative 
shocks having a larger effect on current volatility compared to previous positive 
shocks. This phenomenon is likely to be observed when analysts increase (or decrease) 
their price target, which may lead other analysts to upgrade (or downgrade) their price 
targets, accordingly. Jegadeesh and Kim (2009) discuss this herding behaviour through 
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theoretical models proposed by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Trueman (1994). 
These authors predict that analysts without a known reputation will herd because of 
concerns regarding their future career or because of their desire to intimate other 
analysts by indicating that they have superior stock-picking abilities. This behaviour 
can cause price targets to become skewed either lower or higher or herd towards a 
consensus. The update in the price target depends on existing price target updates 
provided by other analysts as well as the analyst’s expectations of future stock 
performance. The general process of each analyst decreasing their price targets may 
cause investors to react negatively, resulting in stock sell-offs and increasing return 
volatility. However, in some cases price targets may not be continually downgraded, 
therefore the APGARCH model may not be appropriate. In this case, the E-GARCH 
or GJR-GARCH models may be appropriate to capture the negative impact of single 
event downgrades of price targets on return volatility.  
Secondly, Morningstar stock star ratings may experience a similar effect if 
Morningstar upgrades or downgrades their stock star rating. All three asymmetric 
models have the ability to capture the leverage effects expected from stock rating 
upgrades and downgrades. The APGARCH model is suitable to capture the effects of 
repeated stock downgrades on return volatility. The APGARCH model assumes that a 
downgrade in the stock star rating followed by another downgrade, would increase 
return volatility in future periods i.e. leverage effect. This is due to the expectation that 
repeated rating downgrades, would cause investors to sell their holdings to minimise 
their portfolio losses. The APGARCH model accounts for this effect by assuming that 
previous negative shocks (i.e. stock star rating downgrades) will have a larger impact 
on current return volatility, compared to past stock star rating upgrades. However, as 
for analyst price targets, the E-GARCH and GJR-GARCH models may be more 
suitable to capture single event downgrades in Morningstar stock star ratings.  
Thirdly, ASX announcements may also cause stocks to experience the leverage 
effect thereby deeming all three asymmetric models appropriate. If an announcement 
is interpreted negatively by investors, it is expected that there will be a large sell-off 
of the stock, thus increasing stock return volatility. Moreover, while each ASX 
announcement type is interpreted differently by investors, they can be grouped into 
scheduled and non-scheduled announcements. The significance of this grouping is:  
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 Negative shocks caused by non-scheduled announcements are expected to 
have a larger negative impact on return volatility compared to positive non-
scheduled announcements.  
 The same relationship can be ascertained for scheduled good and bad news. 
However, the size of the leverage effect may be smaller than non-scheduled 
announcements because investors are informed about scheduled 
announcements (DeGennaro & Shrieves 1997).  
3.2.4. Justification of the Method 
The E-GARCH model is an appropriate model to employ as Nguyen (2010) has shown 
that it captures the asymmetric effect in ASX 200 stocks. The E-GARCH model 
achieves this by removing the constraints imposed by the GARCH (1,1) model, thus 
enabling asymmetric effects of both positive and negative shocks on return volatility 
to be captured. The GJR-GARCH (TGARCH) model improves the E-GARCH model 
by placing emphasis on negative shocks having larger effects on volatility in 
comparison to positive shocks. The threshold set by the model is zero to separate the 
impact of past negative shocks. The APGARCH model improves on the E-GARCH 
and GJR-GARCH models by estimating volatility higher in the current period if 
followed by a previous negative shock. However, it will not estimate volatility higher 
in the current period if followed by a previous positive shock. This is because 
consecutive negative shocks tend to have a larger impact on volatility, compared to 
consecutive positive shocks.  
In the context of ASX 200 stocks, the APGARCH model is a widely used 
model due its assumption that past negative shocks have larger effects on current 
volatility, compared to past positive shocks. This phenomenon has been well 
documented by many studies such as Ding, Granger and Engle (1993), Hentschel 
(1995), Giot and Laurent (2004) and Pan and Zhang (2006). These studies have all 
shown that APGARCH best captures the stylised nature of financial asset returns, i.e. 
fat tails (leptokurtosis) and asymmetry in volatility. However, these studies model the 
volatility of an entire index or at the firm level and therefore utilised the highest 
performing model as only a single APGARCH model was employed. However, the 
current study models volatility separately for each stock and employs a panel 
regression for each Australian GICS sector. This is because of the wide range of 
industries and sectors on the ASX, where it is expected that sectors experience 
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different degrees of volatility, as investor reactions vary based on information 
disclosures. Although it would be convenient to employ the APGARCH model for its 
high power, it cannot be assumed that it will accurately capture the effect of good and 
bad news on the volatility of every stock in each GICS sector. Consequently, it is 
difficult to strictly choose a single model as the ‘best model’ to forecast asymmetric 
volatility across each GICS sector, as each model encapsulates different assumptions 
surrounding the measurement of the leverage effect. This implies that E-GARCH, 
GJR-GARCH and APGARCH are all relevant asymmetric models. As all the 
asymmetric models capture the leverage effect in slightly different ways, it is more 
reasonable to investigate their predictive power by estimating volatility models for 
every stock in the sample, rather than the entire index, and ascertain the most powerful 
forecasting model for each case. 
3.2.5. Consideration of Other Asymmetric Models  
There are various other asymmetric models developed since Bollerslev’s (1986) 
GARCH model, which have been employed to understand patterns of asymmetric 
volatility in response negative and positive shocks. The integrated GARCH 
(IGARCH) model is one such model that also captures asymmetry, but it places 
emphasis on the volatility persistence of the shock after it has occurred (i.e. how long 
the shocks last). The IGARCH model implies that when a positive or negative shock 
occurs, the effects remain persistent (i.e. long memory) whereas in the standard 
GARCH model, the impact of past shocks decay at an exponential rate. This means 
that after the shock has occurred, the effect of the shock will die out exponentially. 
However, these features are in sharp opposition. Empirical studies have also noted that 
the effect of previous shocks will persist but will decay at a slower rate (hyperbolic 
rate) over long lag lengths (Baillie, Bollerslev & Mikkelsen 1996; Baillie, Chung & 
Tieslau 1996; Yimo 2017).  
Therefore, to deal with this problem the fractionally integrated GARCH 
(FIGARCH) model was introduced, nesting the GARCH and IGARCH models 
(Baillie, Bollerslev & Mikkelsen 1996). FIGARCH is a better model to capture 
asymmetric volatility in financial asset returns, as it implies a long memory behaviour 
and a slow rate of hyperbolic decay of financial asset returns after a shock (Shi, 
Eisenberg & Lee 2009). However, incorporating the decay rate when measuring 
volatility is relevant when dealing with high frequency intraday data. Due to the 
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constraints of data availability, Morningstar stock star ratings and analyst price targets 
are only provided on a daily frequency. As a result, FIGARCH would not be an 
appropriate model to employ for this research. Another model is FIAPGARCH (Tse 
1998) which also has similar assumptions to FIGARCH. The FIAPGARCH model 
combines the strengths of FIGARCH such as long memory and hyperbolic decay, with 
APGARCH (emphasising previous shocks impacting currently volatility). This model 
is more suitable when modelling with high frequency data to capture intraday volatility 
persistence, hence it is not appropriate for the current study.  
3.3. Methodology  
The second half of this chapter discusses the empirical methodology utilised to test the 
hypothesis developed in Section 1.5 of Chapter 1. The aim of the employed 
methodology is to gain further insight into the informational efficiency of the 
Australian financial market, from a sectoral perspective. This section sets out two 
major empirical tests. Section 3.3.1 explains the first set of tests discussing the models 
utilised to estimate the asymmetric return volatility for each stock in the sample. 
Section 3.3.2 explains the second set of tests which employs panel data regressions to 
examine the impact of private and public information on sectoral return volatility 
through the utilisation of various information proxies. 
3.3.1. Estimation of Asymmetric Volatility  
This research applies three asymmetric models to estimate the asymmetric volatility 
for each stock in the sample from the ASX 200 index i.e. E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH 
and APGARCH. These models are similar to a certain degree; however, they differ in 
the way they measure volatility depending on the nature of the data. It cannot be 
assumed that the volatility of each stock will behave the same in response to private 
and public information, thus justifying the need to apply more than one asymmetric 
model. Additionally, employing multiple asymmetric models ensures that the 
estimation of stock return volatility is more reliable, hence robust (Kreinovich, 
Sriboonchitta & Huynh 2017, p. 601). The statistical program employed to estimate 
the stock return volatility for each stock was STATA version 14. STATA has a built-
in specification for E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH and APGARCH models which renders 
the estimation process more efficient. Sub-sections 3.3.1 – 3.3.4 highlight the various 
steps followed to select the most appropriate model for each stock.  
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3.3.1.1. Step 1: Optimal Lag Length  
Dahlvid & Granberg (2017) utilised an automatic loop to repeatedly estimate all 
regressions and directly transport all residuals to an Excel file. This automatic loop 
was employable because all models were run at the (1,1) specification. The fact that 
the study only applied E-GARCH and GJR-GARCH models using the (1,1) 
specification implies that the study only lagged the ARCH term by one period and the 
GARCH term by one period. This presents a limitation on the accuracy of the model, 
as each model is expected to perform the best at its optimal lag length. In the current 
study, it cannot be assumed that the lag length for each stock in the sample would 
perform optimally at a lag length of one. Therefore, before estimating the asymmetric 
volatility, the ‘optimal lag length’ was determined for the ‘returns’ of each stock. The 
lags were defined between one and four and the optimal lag length was chosen based 
on the lowest value of the following information criteria, provided by STATA: Final 
prediction error information criterion (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQIC) and Schwarz/Bayesian information 
criterion (SBIC). Since each stock has its own optimal lag length, the automatic loop 
could not be implemented. This meant that the asymmetric volatility for each stock 
was required to be estimated manually (Step 3).   
3.3.1.2. Step 2: Stationarity Testing for Daily Stock Return   
A stationary process is one in which the mean and variance remain constant over time, 
thus reverting to their natural trend path in the long run (Nason 2006). A non-stationary 
process is referred to as a ‘random walk’ due to the series ‘randomly’ moving upwards 
or downwards with no anticipated direction or trend (Redner 2001). This phenomenon 
is commonly seen with financial asset prices and using non-stationary time series data 
in financial models may produce unreliable and spurious results. To overcome this 
limitation, the time series data can be transformed to a stationary process by taking 
first differences.  
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was proposed by Said and Dickey 
(1984) to ascertain the stationarity of time series data. This test is preferred over the 
Dickey-Fuller test as it accommodates the optimal lag lengths which were determined 
previously in Step 1. The different lags also provide an added benefit of overcoming 
the problem of serial correlation. To confirm that the closing price for each stock was 
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stationary, the ADF test was computed for each stock’s closing price based on the 
following hypothesis:  
H0: daily closing prices are unit root 
H1: daily closing prices are stationary 
If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, this would confirm that closing prices are 
non-stationary and therefore require data transformation. To convert the closing prices 
to a stationary process, the first difference is taken, i.e. daily stock return. To confirm 
that the series has become stationary, the ADF test is employed again on the natural 
log of the daily returns, based on the following hypothesis:  
H0: daily stock returns are unit root 
H1: daily stock returns are stationary 
3.3.1.3. Step 3: Estimation of Asymmetric Volatility 
To estimate the asymmetric volatility, E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH and APGARCH 
models are estimated for each stock, at their optimal lag length (determined in Step 1). 
Each model is calculated using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with a 
Gaussian (normal) distribution. If any of the models do not achieve a maximum 
likelihood using the Gaussian distribution, the Student’s t-distribution is then 
employed to determine if the nature of the data follows a t-distribution (i.e. lower peak 
and fatter tails). In the case where the model does not achieve a maximum likelihood 
using the Student’s t-distribution, the ‘generalised error distribution’ (GED) is 
specified. This type of distribution allows ARCH to estimate the shape parameter of 
the distribution. The GED is commonly used when the distribution contains non-
normal errors.  
After several types of models have been estimated, the best fitting model is 
chosen based on the lowest AIC and BIC values (Hamadu & Ibiwoye 2010; Ding 
2011). It is important that the AIC and BIC selection criteria are strictly adhered to, as 
simply selecting a model on the basis of encapsulating the highest number of 
significant parameters would lead to ‘data-snooping bias’ (Lo & MacKinlay 1990). 
This method can lead to deceptive results, in which a model may indicate significant 
leverage effects when in fact the stock may not indicate large leverage effects, or the 
effects may even be nil (Barber & Lyon 1997).  
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In the case that a stock does not reach maximum likelihood under any of the 
GARCH-type models using any of the distributions (Gaussian, Student’s t or GED), 
the stock is removed from the sample. This would also indicate that the stock data does 
not fit the E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH or APGARCH model under the Gaussian 
distribution, Student’s t-distribution or GED. Additionally, the residuals of the best 
fitting models for each stock are stored separately, to be used to represent the volatility 
in the panel regression. A minimum of 381 GARCH-type models with varying lag 
lengths and distributions are estimated (127 stocks multiplied by three GARCH-type 
models).  
3.3.2. Panel Data Regression  
3.3.2.1. Step 1: Unit Root Test (Levin-Lin-Chu) for Explanatory Variables 
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) developed a unit root test which can be applied in panel 
data. The test is based on the assumption that individual observations in the panel have 
the same AR(1) coefficient, although it accommodates for individual effects, time 
effects and a time trend. This test effectively has the same purpose as the ADF test, 
but is applicable for panel data, rather than time series. Since the stationarity of the 
stock return was already confirmed in section 3.3.1.2, there is no requirement to retest 
stock returns as a panel. Therefore, the Levin-Lin-Chu test was employed for each of 
the analyst price targets and Morningstar stock star ratings to confirm that the variables 
are stationary. The ASX announcements were not subjected to unit root testing as they 
are dummy variables which are already stationary in nature, carrying a value of either 
one or zero. Based on the Levin-Lin-Chu test, the following hypothesis is used to test 
if the panels are unit root:  
H0: panels contain unit roots 
H1: panels are stationary  
3.3.2.2. Step 2: Multicollinearity (Correlation Matrix)  
A common method for examining whether data contains multicollinearity is through 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) method. However, because this method is only 
appropriate for time series data, it is irrelevant. A method to determine the existence 
of multicollinearity in panel data is to employ a ‘correlation matrix’. The correlation 
matrix calculates the correlation coefficient between each independent variable to test 
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for the presence of multicollinearity among independent variables. There is no set 
correlation coefficient which is followed to determine the maximum correlation 
coefficient to declare multicollinearity between variables. Thus, the current research 
employs a commonly followed correlation coefficient of 0.80 (Brooks 2014). A 
correlation coefficient produced by the correlation matrix which is greater than 0.80, 
would indicate multicollinearity. If multicollinearity is identified, judgement is made 
to remove one of the conflicting variables from the panel regression. However, if all 
correlation coefficients are below 0.80, no variables will be removed.  
3.3.2.3. Step 3: Lag Length 
Using the Levin-Lin-Chu test, each explanatory variable for the regression was lagged 
to the point of the AIC specified maximum lag length, until the test deemed the 
explanatory variable no longer stationary (i.e. p-value became statistically 
insignificant). A maximum lag length of 20 was set for all variables, which was 
adjusted to a higher lag length if the AIC chosen lag length for the variable was 20.  
3.3.2.4. Step 4: Panel Regression  
Panel data regressions are useful for determining whether several explanatory 
variables (ASX announcements, analyst price targets, Morningstar stock star ratings) 
affect the dependent variable (asymmetric volatility) over time. The benefit of a panel 
regression is that it allows the combination of time-series and cross-sectional data to 
be examined together (Brooks 2014). A panel regression is relevant for this research 
as the analysis is sectoral based. The panel regression model specified in this research 
will enable capture of the effect of ASX announcements, analyst price targets and 
Morningstar stock star ratings on a group of stocks within a GICS sector over time.  
Furthermore, the panel regression analysis will facilitate the verification of the 
following hypothesis for private information (analyst price targets and 
Morningstar stock star ratings):  
H0: Morningstar stock star ratings and analyst price targets for all stocks in the 
respective GICS sector are not significant in explaining the change in sectoral 
return volatility in the panel.  
H1: Morningstar stock star ratings and analyst price targets for at least one of the 
stocks in the respective GICS sector are significant in explaining the change in 
sectoral return volatility in the panel.  
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Similarly, the hypothesis for public information (ASX announcements) are 
listed as follows:  
H0: ASX announcements for all stocks in the respective GICS sector are not 
significant in explaining the change in sectoral return volatility in the panel.  
H1: ASX announcements for at least one of the stocks in the respective GICS sector 
are significant in explaining the change in sectoral return volatility in the panel.  
Mathematically, the impact of private and public information proxies on 
sectoral return volatility for each GICS sector is stated as: 
ℎ௜,௧ = 𝑐௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵ𝑇𝑂௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑆𝐷௜,௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑃𝐸𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ସ𝑄𝐴𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ହ𝑄𝐶𝐹𝑅௜,௧
+ 𝛽଺𝐼𝐶௜,௧ + 𝛽଻𝐴𝐴𝐷௜,௧ + 𝛽଼𝑁𝑂𝑀௜,௧ + 𝛽ଽ𝑆𝐸𝐴௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵ଴𝐷𝐴௜,௧
+ 𝛽ଵଵ𝑃𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଶ𝐶𝐴𝐷௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଷ𝑁𝑂𝐶௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵସ𝑂𝑇௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵହ𝐶𝐴௜,௧
+ 𝛽ଵ଺𝐿𝑇𝑆௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵ଻𝐴𝑆𝑋𝑄௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵ଼𝑊𝑆𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଽ𝐶𝑇𝐸௜,௧
+ 𝛽ଶ଴𝑃𝑇𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶଵ𝑀𝑆𝑅௜,௧ + 𝑒௜,௧ 
(3.8) 
Where: 
ℎ௜,௧ = return volatility of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡 
𝑐௜,௧ = minimum return volatility of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡, when changes in explanatory 
variables are zero. 
𝑇𝑂௜,௧ = takeover/scheme announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝑆𝐷௜,௧ = shareholder details announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝑃𝐸𝑅௜,௧ = periodic report announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝑄𝐴𝑅௜,௧ = quarterly activity report announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝑄𝐶𝐹𝑅௜,௧ = quarterly cash flow report announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝐼𝐶௜,௧ = issued capital announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝐴𝐴𝐷௜,௧ = asset acquisition and disposal announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝑁𝑂𝑀௜,௧ = notice of meeting announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝑆𝐸𝐴௜,௧ = stock exchange announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝐷𝐴௜,௧ = dividend announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
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𝑃𝑅௜,௧ = progress report announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝐶𝐴𝐷௜,௧ = company administration announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝑁𝑂𝐶௜,௧ = notice of call announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝑂𝑇௜,௧ = others announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝐶𝐴௜,௧ = chairman’s address announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝐿𝑇𝑆௜,௧ = letter to shareholders announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝐴𝑆𝑋𝑄௜,௧ = ASX query announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝑊𝑆𝑃௜,௧ = warrants and structured products announcement of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡  
𝐶𝑇𝐸௜,௧ = commitments test entity quarterly report announcement of firm 𝑖, in 
time 𝑡  
𝑃𝑇𝑅௜,௧ = price target change of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡. 
𝑀𝑆𝑅௜,௧ = change in Morningstar stock star rating of firm 𝑖, in time 𝑡. 
𝑒௜,௧ = stochastic term (return volatility not captured by the explanatory variables) 
The stock return volatility ℎ௜,௧ represents the asymmetric volatility in the model, which 
in turn is represented by the residuals generated from the best fitting models from 
asymmetric volatility estimation process (section 3.3.1.3). All the residuals (127 
residuals) for each stock are grouped and stacked together into their respective GICS 
sectors and a panel regression is regressed separately for each sector (total of 11 panel 
regressions).  
Most importantly, it is highlighted that there are various stocks in each sector, 
each of which consist of their own best fitting asymmetric GARCH model. The 
residuals from each of these models are regressed against ASX announcements, 
analyst price targets and Morningstar stock star ratings, over time. With these, the 
panel analysis provides the best option compared to the pooled regression. Pooled 
regression models cannot distinguish between the various stocks within each GICS 
sector, denying the heterogeneity or individuality which exists between each stock. 
With this limitation, this research does not carry out a pooled regression but instead, 
employ a fixed effects or random effects models for each sector. 
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3.4. Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models 
3.4.1. Fixed Effects Model  
The fixed effects model accommodates for heterogeneity by allowing each explanatory 
variable to have its own intercept value. The fixed effects model derives its name from 
the fact that although the intercept may be different for each variable, the intercept will 
remain fixed over time (Brooks 2014). Fixed effects models are used when there is an 
assumption that a factor specific to an individual explanatory variable may affect or 
cause bias in the predictor variable, therefore there is a need to control for it. The 
equation for fixed effects in a cross-section is expressed as:  
 𝑦௜௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥௜௧ + 𝜇௜ + 𝜀௜௧  (3.9) 
where 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝛽 is the coefficient of the 𝑥௜௧ independent variable, 𝜇௜ 
captures all variables that affect 𝑦௜௧ in the cross-section but is time-invariant, and 𝜀௜௧  
represents the error.  
In order to allow for the (fixed effect) intercept to vary among each variable, 
the ‘differential intercept dummy technique’ is implemented (Gujarati & Porter 2009, 
p. 597). This model is known as the ‘least-squares dummy variable’ (LSDV) model 
and is expressed as:  
 𝑦௜௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥௜௧ + 𝜇ଵ𝐷1௜ + 𝜇ଶ𝐷2௜ + 𝜇ଷ𝐷3௜+. . . +𝜇ே𝐷𝑁௜  (3.10) 
where D1 represents the dummy variable for all observations in the first variable. This 
model is typically referred to as the ‘one-way fixed effect’ model because it allows 
intercepts to differ across the explanatory variables. The ‘time effect’ can also be 
incorporated into the model if there is a belief that there are factors (not already 
included in the model) which could affect the explanatory variable over time such as 
technological changes or government regulation changes (Gujarati & Porter 2009, 
p. 598). Therefore, the model which allows fixed effects to exist in the time period 
dimension is expressed as:  
 𝑦௜௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥௜௧ + 𝜆௧ + 𝜀௜௧  (3.11) 
where 𝜆௧ represents the intercept for ‘time’. The inclusion of the ‘time effect’ allows 
the model to capture individual time fixed effects for each explanatory variable by 
including dummy variables. The LSDV model for period-fixed effects is expressed as:  
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 𝑦௜௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥௜௧ + 𝜆ଵ𝐷1௜ + 𝜆ଶ𝐷2௜ + 𝜆ଷ𝐷3௜+. . . +𝜆ே𝐷𝑁௜  (3.12) 
where D1 represents the dummy variable for the first time period. Combining the 
models from equations 3.10 and 3.12 allows for fixed effects in cross section as well 
as the time dimension, which is typically referred to as the ‘two-way fixed effects 
model’. The model is expressed as:  
 𝑦௜௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥௜௧ + 𝜇ଵ𝐷1௜ + 𝜇ଶ𝐷2௜ + 𝜇ଷ𝐷3௜+. . . +𝜇ே𝐷𝑁௜ +  𝜆ଵ𝐷1௜
+ 𝜆ଶ𝐷2௜ + 𝜆ଷ𝐷3௜+. . . +𝜆ே𝐷𝑁௜  
(3.13) 
The purpose of including the dummy variable is to account for the assumption 
that the explanatory variables are different and therefore have individual specific 
effects (i.e. different intercept for each variable). This means that each variable has 
individual factors which affect its relationship with 𝑦௜௧, which are not incorporated by 
the model. However, the difference between each stock is likely to be related to the 
other explanatory variables included in the model. It is important to include the dummy 
variable to avoid omitted variable bias in the slope coefficients of the independent 
variables (Gujarati & Porter 2009). However, the problem with the fixed effects model 
is that the inclusion of all the dummy variables can cause a loss in the degrees of 
freedom thereby causing the standard errors to increase (Brooks 2014). In contrast, the 
random effects model can be used to address this limitation; however, the random 
effects model also has an underlying assumption.  
3.4.2. Random Effects Model 
The random effects model is deemed superior to the fixed effects model as it has fewer 
parameters and thus less estimation is required, and the degrees of freedom are saved 
(Brooks 2014). The idea behind this model is that ‘if the dummy variables in the fixed 
effects model represent a lack of knowledge about the (true) model, why not express 
this ignorance through the disturbance term?’ (Gujarati & Porter 2009, p. 602). This is 
the underlying approach behind the random effects model, whereby the model allows 
each of the variables to have a common mean value for the intercept. However, the 
disadvantage of this model is that it assumes that the individual specific effect of each 
variables is uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. Supposing that this 
assumption is true, the random effects model allows the dummy variables to be 
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removed from the model (therefore saving degrees of freedom), without cause omitted 
variable bias in the coefficients (Gujarati & Porter 2009, p. 602).  
The random effects model is initially drawn from Equation 3.9 and is 
mathematically written as: 
 𝑦௜௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥௜௧ + 𝜇௜௧ (3.14) 
In this case, instead of regarding 𝑥௜௧ as a fixed variable, it is assumed to be a random 
variable which has a mean value 𝛽ଵ. Hence the intercept for an individual stock is 
expressed as:  
 𝛽ଵ௜ = 𝛽ଵ + 𝜀௜  (3.15) 
where 𝜀௜ represents the random error term and has a mean value of zero and a variance 
of 𝜎ఌଶ . This indicates that all variables in the model are affected by a larger group of 
variables, and thus they have a common mean value for the intercept (Gujarati & Porter 
2009, p. 602). Consequently, the individual differences in the intercepts for each stock 
are all reflected in the error term 𝜀௜. Combining equation 3.14 and 3.15, the random 
effects model is expressed as:  
 𝑦௜௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥௜௧ + 𝑤௜௧ 
where:                  𝑤௜௧ = 𝜇௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧ 
(3.16) 
According to Gujarati & Porter (2009), 𝑤௜௧ is the ‘composite error term’ which consists 
of two components: the first is 𝜀௜௧, which represents the ‘cross-section/individual-
specific error component’; and the second is 𝜇௜௧, which represents the ‘combined time 
series and cross-section error component’. This is sometimes referred to as the 
‘idiosyncratic term’, as it varies over cross section and time (Gujarati & Porter 2009, 
p. 603).  
3.5. Fixed Effects or Random Effects Model Selection? 
Determining whether the fixed effects and random effects model is the most 
appropriate specification can be achieved through Hausman’s specification test 
(Nakamura & Nakamura 1981). Formally, the test is as follows: 
H0: The random effects model is an appropriate model  
H1: The fixed effects model is an appropriate model 
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If the p-value is found to be significant, the fixed effects model is the appropriate 
model. This test will be carried out across each sectoral panel regression.   
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the theoretical framework which underpins the empirical methodology 
has been discussed, based on the strong form EMH. The first half provided a 
justification of the asymmetric GARCH models to be utilised in the study based on a 
comparison of the model assumptions and the nature of the data. Following this, the 
methodology employed to test the impact of ASX announcements, analyst price targets 
and Morningstar stock star ratings on stock return volatility was discussed. The 
empirical methodology used to test the informational efficiency of each GICS sector 
was set out. The chapter ended with a discussion regarding the appropriateness of fixed 
and random effects models in panel data modelling.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA DESCRIPTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a discussion of the dataset utilised to undertake testing of strong 
form market efficiency. This study utilises data from the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX), which consists of 2,256 publicly listed companies, focusing on the 
largest 200 stocks by market capitalisation, i.e. the ASX 200 index. With a total market 
capitalisation of $121,957 million, the ASX 200 was selected as it is employed as the 
investable benchmark for the Australian equity market and it meets the benchmarking 
needs of investment managers for portfolios characterised by larger size and liquidity 
(ASX 2018). The study utilises daily data from 2 January 2013 to 29 December 2017, 
inclusive. While it would be ideal to examine the changes in volatility during periods 
of financial crisis such as the 2008 GFC period, the study is limited to using data from 
2013 onwards. This is because Morningstar individual stock star ratings were only 
provided for a significant portion of ASX 200 stocks from 2013 onwards. Following a 
discussion of the variables utilised, the descriptive statistics are discussed based on the 
dataset. The chapter concludes with a series of preliminary tests carried out to ensure 
stationarity of the data, appropriate lag length specification for each stock and 
multicollinearity tests between explanatory variables.  
4.2. Data Selection 
As the study is concerned with sectoral return volatility, the ASX 200 stocks were 
selected by omitting any stocks that met the following criteria during the study period 
of 2013-2017:  
1. Stocks which were inactive.  
2. Stocks which did not have available stock price data. 
3. Stocks which were delisted. 
4. Stocks for which daily Morningstar stock star ratings were unavailable. 
5. Stocks for which daily analyst price targets were unavailable.  
After applying the selection criteria, a total of 127 stocks remained in the sample.  
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4.3. Stock Prices 
Daily closing stock prices for each company were obtained from the Thomson Reuters 
Eikon database. The study utilised the ‘adjusted daily closing price’ which adjusts the 
closing price to reflect dividends, stock splits and other corporate actions. It was vital 
to use adjusted daily closing prices for this study as it focuses on the volatility of 
returns. Therefore, it is important that the models do not capture any false increases or 
decreases in volatility (arising from other factors), which could lead to an 
overestimation of volatility. Each company had 1,264 observations (after adjusting for 
public holidays and weekends), with a total of 160,528 observations across 127 
companies. To test the stationarity of stock prices, the ADF test was employed where 
it was found that stock prices were not stationary. Therefore, to ensure stationarity of 
the data as well as its requirement for the E-GARCH and GJRGARCH models, first 
differences were taken. Following Stărică and Granger (2005), this was achieved by 
converting daily closing prices into log returns based on using the following data 
transformation process: 
 𝑅௧ = Log stock returns = ln ቀ
௉௥௜௖௘೟
௉௥௜௖௘೟షభ
ቁ (4.1) 
4.4. Analyst Price Targets 
Analyst price targets were obtained from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database. Due 
to the limitation that each analyst only released price targets daily, the study was 
limited to using daily data across all variables. As the study measures the volatility of 
stock returns (log returns), first differences of analyst price targets were also taken to 
ensure consistency when employing the panel regression framework. Therefore, the 
following data transformation was undertaken to yield the ‘price target changes’, 
mathematically expressed as: 
 PTR = Log price target changes = 
ln ቀ ்௔௥௚௘௧ ௉௥௜௖௘೟
்௔௥௚௘௧ ௉௥௜௖௘೟షభ
ቁ 
(4.2) 
4.5. Morningstar Stock Star Ratings 
Morningstar stock star ratings were obtained from the Morningstar Direct database. 
Morningstar defines the rating system by the following (Lamonica 2018):  
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 5 stars: ‘buy’ rating, which indicates that an investment has a high probability 
of appreciation relative to the current market price. Morningstar analysts 
indicate that the current market price indicates an excessively pessimistic 
outlook and expect the price to increase significantly.   
 4 stars: ‘accumulate’ rating, which indicates that there is potential for the 
stock to appreciate beyond the current market price.  
 3 stars: ‘hold’ rating, which indicates that investors are receiving a fair return 
on the investment and the stock is appropriately priced.  
 2 stars: ‘reduce’ rating, which indicates that investors should consider 
directing their investment elsewhere as they are unlikely to receive a fair 
return on their investment.  
 1 star: ‘sell’ rating, which indicates that an investment that has a high 
probability of depreciation relative to the current market price. Morningstar 
analysts indicate that the current market price indicates an excessively 
optimistic outlook and expect prices to decrease significantly, leaving the 
investor exposed to capital loss.  
The change in Morningstar stock star ratings is mathematically expressed as: 
4.6. ASX Announcements  
ASX Announcements were obtained from the Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium 
database for each stock during the study period. ASX announcements represent all the 
public information disclosures in the study. Each ASX announcement is categorised 
into its respective ASX announcement type (see Appendix 1B) and then categorised 
as either a scheduled or unscheduled announcement. Scheduled announcements refer 
to announcements where the public is aware of the announcement in advance (Chi 
2009). Unscheduled announcements refer to announcements in which the release time 
is not known by the public (Chi 2009). Therefore, periodic reports, quarterly reports, 
progress reports, chairman’s addresses, letters to shareholders and dividend 
announcements are all classified as scheduled announcements. Unscheduled 
announcements include takeovers, shareholders details, issued capital, asset 
 MSR = Change in Stock Star Ratings = ln ቀ ௌ௧௢௖௞ ௌ௧௔௥ ோ௔௧௜௡௚೟
ௌ௧௢௖௞ ௌ௧௔௥ ோ௔௧௜௡௚೟షభ
ቁ (4.3) 
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acquisitions and disposals, notice of meetings, company administration, notice of call, 
ASX queries, warrants and structured products, among others. Each announcement is 
represented as a dummy variable, which carries the value of 1 if an announcement 
occurs on a specific date and 0 if no announcement occurs.  
4.7. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the return, volatility, 
analyst price target change (PTR) and Morningstar stock star rating change (MSR) for 
each of the panel sectors.  
The statistics reveal that all sectors provided a positive mean for the return 
variable across the study period, with the highest mean recorded by the Information 
Technology sector. The Information Technology sector also produced the highest price 
target change (PTR) and Morningstar stock star rating change (MSR). Moreover, this 
sector recorded the lowest variability, measured by the standard deviation, for both 
PTR and MSR. This indicates that the Information Technology sector is an attractive 
sector to investors as it provides the highest return and the lowest risk.  
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Table 4.1 – Descriptive Statistics  
 
The mean values for analyst price target changes recorded a positive mean for 
all sectors except for the Energy sector. Additionally, the Energy sector also recorded 
the highest standard deviation for the volatility variable and the lowest mean for both 
MSR and PTR. Therefore, this sector would not be attractive to investors since it 
provides the highest risk but lowest overall return during the study period. This is 
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evident from the large fluctuations experienced in this sector from 2014 to 2016 caused 
by the volatility of oil and gas prices. The negative mean value for PTR and MSR 
recorded in the Energy sector indicates that over the long run, it has provided negative 
returns to investors. However, the Energy sector has started to produce significantly 
higher returns but only from mid-2016.  
The standard deviation for MSR is highest in the Materials sector; however, 
this sector provides the second-lowest mean MSR. This indicates that the Materials 
sector is not an attractive investment for users of Morningstar stock star ratings as it 
has the highest risk and one of the lowest returns. Additionally, the standard deviation 
is the highest for PTR in the Consumer Discretionary sector. However, it only provides 
the fifth highest PTR mean value, indicating that although there is a return generated 
by the utilisation of analyst price targets, it appears to be quite average relative to the 
return generated by other sectors utilising price targets. Consequently, investors would 
face a greater risk of experiencing negative returns when utilising analyst price targets 
and Morningstar stock star ratings in these sectors. Conservative investors should 
avoid these sectors as they would be considered higher risk investments.  
The kurtosis for each variable suggests that the daily stock returns, volatility, 
PTR and MSR for the 11 sectors are leptokurtic in nature. A leptokurtic distribution 
can arise when the data distribution is ‘larger than a normal distribution near zero and 
at large values of X, but smaller at intermediate values’ (Farhadi & Vvedensky 2010, 
p. 247). Therefore, leptokurtosis can be identified in a distribution when it consists of 
higher peaks and fatter tails than a normal distribution. This is caused by a large 
number of values clustering around the mean. The descriptive statistics indicate the 
existence of a leptokurtic distribution across all variables, indicated by the kurtosis 
being positive and greater than 3. 
4.8. Preliminary Testing 
4.8.1. Stationarity and Unit Root Tests 
4.8.1.1. Stock Returns (ADF Test) 
The ADF test was employed to ascertain the stationarity of the stock returns for each 
GICS sector. Although financial theory confirms that financial asset prices are non-
stationary, a preliminary ADF test was carried out to confirm this finding. The test 
revealed that the stock prices across all sectors were non-stationary in nature, 
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exhibiting a random walk behaviour. To overcome this problem, the first difference 
for each stock was taken i.e. taking the natural logarithm of the current stock price 
divided by the previous day stock price. After this data transformation was completed, 
the ADF test was carried out on the daily returns of the stock. The results of the ADF 
test are presented in Appendix 5A and indicate that the return for all stocks were 
identified as stationary.  
4.8.1.2. Analyst Price Targets Return and Morningstar Stock Star Ratings (Levin-
Lin-Chu Test)  
As the proxies were utilised for the panel regression, the ADF test was not an 
appropriate test to apply for panel data. Therefore, the Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) test was 
undertaken to ascertain the stationarity of the returns for the two private information 
proxies. To overcome the problem of non-stationarity, the first differences of both 
proxies were taken using the same method that was employed for stock returns. For 
analyst price targets, the natural logarithm of the current day price target was divided 
by the previous day price, yielding the ‘price target change’. The return for 
Morningstar stock star ratings was computed by taking the natural logarithm of the 
current day rating divided by the previous day rating. The Levin-Lin-Chu test was then 
carried out for the return of each proxy, which identified that ‘price target change’ and 
‘Morningstar rating change’ for all stocks were stationary. The results of this test are 
presented in Appendix 5B.  
4.8.2. Lag Length Selection  
4.8.2.1. Asymmetric GARCH models  
When employing asymmetric GARCH models to estimate stock return volatility, the 
optimal lag length for each model was first determined. Although the GARCH (1,1) 
type model is favoured in financial asset return studies, it is important to note that 
employing the optimal lag length is imperative in ensuring accurate forecasting results 
with low prediction error. In addition, it is important to ensure that the model does not 
have excessive lags as it can affect the parsimonious nature of the model (Javed & 
Mantalos 2013). Therefore, the maximum number of lags set for each stock was four 
and the optimal lag length was automatically chosen by STATA based on the lowest 
AIC and BIC values. Across all 127 stocks, 84 performed optimally at a lag length of 
one, 11 performed optimally at lag length two, 14 stocks at lag length three and 18 at 
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lag length four. These results indicate that nearly two-thirds of the stocks (i.e. 66%) 
follow a standard asymmetric GARCH (1,1) type model. The optimal lag length for 
each stock is reported in Appendix 2. 
4.8.2.2. Explanatory Variables (Analyst Price Targets, Morningstar Stock Star 
Ratings and ASX Announcements) 
Before the panel regression was carried out, the maximum lag length was determined 
for each explanatory variable. Using the Levin-Lin-Chu test, each explanatory variable 
was lagged one period at a time until a maximum lag length was reached, deeming the 
variable no longer stationarity i.e. statistically insignificant p-value. This process was 
undertaken for analyst price targets, Morningstar stock star ratings and ASX 
announcements for all 11 GICS sectors. The results revealed a range of lag lengths 
between 0 and 18 lags. However, the maximum lag determined by the test does not 
indicate that it is the optimal lag length, but rather defines a maximum point that the 
lag can be employed in the regression. Since this study utilises panel data, the optimal 
lag length was chosen for each explanatory variable based on the AIC specified 
optimal lag length, as part of the Levin-Lin-Chu test (Hurlin 2010).  
4.8.3. Multicollinearity Test (Correlation Matrix)  
Appendix 4 summarises the correlation matrix for the independent variables in each 
sector, which were utilised in the panel regression. The correlation matrix explains the 
degree to which the independent variables are interrelated, thus providing insight into 
whether the model may suffer from multicollinearity. As previously discussed, the 
maximum correlation coefficient in the study is set at 0.8000 (Brooks, 2014) before 
any cause of action is required. Based on all the correlation matrices, no values were 
found to exceed 0.8000, indicating that there is no multicollinearity amongst the 
independent variables. The largest correlation coefficient identified across all sectors 
was 0.6449, between the ‘notice of meeting’ announcement and ‘chairman’s address’ 
announcement in the Information Technology sector. There is an expectation that these 
announcements would be related as the notice of meeting announcement explains the 
details of an Annual General Meeting (AGM). Since the chairman’s address is made 
at the commencement of the AGM, it is reasonable to assume that these 
announcements are correlated. Although the correlation matrices indicate that there is 
a relationship between these announcements, it does not exceed the maximum value 
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of 0.8000. Therefore, it is confirmed that this panel regression does not suffer from 
multicollinearity and no adjustments were required for the dataset.  
4.9. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a description and justification of the index utilised in the study, 
the study time-period and the various data sources, including stock prices, analyst price 
targets, Morningstar stock star ratings and ASX announcements. An explanation of the 
data selection criteria was also provided, justifying the sample of stocks in the study. 
The following part of the chapter provided a brief discussion of the calculated 
descriptive statistics for each sector to indicate the leptokurtic nature of the data. The 
chapter concluded with a discussion of the preliminary tests carried out to ascertain 
the nature of the data adopted in the methodology. Stationarity and unit root tests were 
performed to confirm the stationary nature of the dataset in preparation for 
econometric modelling. This was followed by an explanation of the AIC and BIC 
specified optimal lag length selected for each stock between one and four. The final 
preliminary test involved the test for multicollinearity through a correlation matrix. 
The results indicated no multicollinearity was present between the explanatory 
variables in the model. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the results of the asymmetric GARCH 
models specified, the best fitting models and that of the panel regression. The chapter 
also analyses how public and private information affects sectoral return volatility 
based on the EMH. The chapter concludes by discussing the impact of the results on 
the current understanding of informational efficiency within the Australian market. 
5.2. Stock Return Volatility Estimation – Asymmetric GARCH Model 
Selection 
The asymmetric volatility was estimated for each stock by employing the E-GARCH, 
GJR-GARCH and APGARCH models based on the lag lengths discussed in the 
previous chapter. A total of 381 asymmetric GARCH models were estimated across 
the sample of 127 stocks (three asymmetric models per stock). The best fitting model 
for each stock was then selected based on the AIC and BIC statistics (Hamadu & 
Ibiwoye 2010; Ding 2011). Table 5.1 summarises the number fitted asymmetric 
GARCH models per sector. Table 5.2 summarises the size and sign of the asymmetry 
coefficients for each stock and the statistical significance for each coefficient. The 
stocks which were significant and those with a p-value less than 0.05 thus exhibited 
positive or negative leverage effects. The detailed results for all parameters estimated 
by the asymmetric GARCH models for each stock is included in Appendix 3A. 
Appendix 3B provides an example of the selection criteria applied to determine the 
best fitting model for each stock based on the AIC and BIC statistics.  
5.2.1. Distribution of Fitted Asymmetric GARCH models  
Looking at Table 5.1, it is important to note that the Student’s t-distribution 
APGARCH model fit the largest number of stocks. This model best suited 33 out of 
127 stocks in the sample. Such a result was expected based on the high power of the 
APGARCH model and the nature of financial asset returns exhibiting a t-distribution, 
as presented in Section 3.2. The E-GARCH model with a Gaussian distribution comes 
second, producing the best fit for 31 out of the 127 stocks. Similarly, the Gaussian 
GJR-GARCH model specifications best fit the data for 25 stocks. The only sector 
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which registered a higher number of fits to the GJR-GARCH model was the Real 
Estate sector, which suited seven of the fifteen stocks in the sector. This result indicates 
that stocks in the Real Estate sector do experience the leverage effect; however, the 
volatility increases at a steadier rate to that of the E-GARCH model, which 
exponentially increases in response to negative shocks. Most of the remaining stocks 
in the Real Estate sector best fit the Gaussian and Student’s t-distributed APGARCH 
model. A potential reason for a relatively large number of stocks exhibiting a Gaussian 
(normal) distribution (76 out of 127 stocks) may be due to the frequency of the data in 
the study. When modelling financial asset returns for higher frequency data, i.e. 
intraday returns, the distribution of returns is non-normal, indicating that their fatter 
tailers and higher peaks are quite apparent. However, for data points stretching over 
longer periods – e.g. days, months or years, the distribution begins to appear ‘normal’ 
(Mandelbrot & Hudson 2004). Due to the fact that analyst price targets and 
Morningstar stock star ratings were limited by the daily frequency, a significant 
number of stocks followed a normal distribution. The residuals for the best fitting 
models were utilised in the panel regression as the dependent variable to represent the 
stock return volatility of each stock in each sector. 
The results reveal that the best fitting models are not consistent across all 
sectors; rather, stocks in some sectors tend to fit one or two types of asymmetric 
models, whereas stocks in other sectors fit a wide range of asymmetric models. This 
is particularly prevalent in the Consumer Discretionary sector, where stocks appear to 
fit a range of the asymmetric GARCH models. Nonetheless, it must be noted that a 
particularly large concentration of stocks fit the APGARCH model. Eleven out of the 
eighteen stocks within this sector fit the APGARCH model, six of which suit the 
Student’s t-distribution. Similarly, five out of the seven stocks in the Consumer Staples 
sector also best fit the APGARCH model. Stocks in the Financials sector appear to suit 
all three asymmetric GARCH models. This indicates that there is no predictable 
pattern in which stocks exhibit the leverage effect in this sector.  
In the Health Care sector, eight out of the ten (80%) stocks in the sample fit the 
E-GARCH and the Student’s t-distributed APGARCH model. This indicates that the 
four stocks that suit the E-GARCH model experience an exponential increase in 
volatility when bad news is initially released. However, the four stocks which fit the 
Student’ t-distributed APGARCH model experience significantly higher volatility 
when followed by previous large negative shocks (bad news), causing greater negative 
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shocks in the current period. The fact that these four stocks fit the Student’s t-
distribution indicates that they represent a t-distribution, consisting of lower peaks and 
fatter tails. This is a common feature of financial asset returns. However, it is 
interesting to note that not all stocks in the same sector follow this same distribution. 
The four stocks which fit the E-GARCH model follow a Gaussian (normal) 
distribution. This distribution is only commonly seen when modelling asset prices, 
rather than asset returns (Brada, Ernst & Tassel 1966). The Gaussian E-GARCH 
model also fits 50% of the stocks in the Industrials sector, where again, a normal 
distribution is not commonly observed in financial asset returns (Andersen et al. 2001). 
However as previously discussed, this may be due to the frequency of the data.  
5.2.2. The Leverage Effect 
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the coefficients indicating leverage effects for each 
stock under each asymmetric GARCH model. The leverage effect refers to the 
asymmetric response of stocks to bad news or good news. A negative leverage effect 
relates to the negative correlation between the return of a stock and changes in 
volatility (Choi & Richardson 2016). In the context of asymmetric GARCH modelling, 
the negative leverage effect is where negative shocks (bad news) have a larger impact 
on future volatility relative to positive shocks (good news) (Rodríguez & Ruiz 2012). 
Positive leverage effects indicate positive shocks (good news) have a larger impact on 
future volatility relative to bad news. To determine whether leverage effects were 
present in the stocks for each sector, the selection criteria set out in the following 
sections was employed:  
5.2.2.1. E-GARCH Leverage Effect 
Based on the work by Nelson (1991), the asymmetric effects for the E-GARCH model 
(Equation 3.5) are captured by the statistically significant (p-value < α = 0.10) and 
negative sign of the 𝛾 coefficient. If these two conditions are met, the stock exhibits 
the leverage effect. However, if the p-value is significant but the 𝛾 coefficient is 
positive, this indicates that good news has a larger effect on stock return volatility in 
comparison to bad news. If no conditions are met, the stock is symmetric in nature. 
The asymmetry coefficient is represented in Appendix 3B as the ‘earch’ coefficient.  
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5.2.2.2. GJR-GARCH Leverage Effect 
Following Dutta (2014), the asymmetric effects in the GJR-GARCH model 
(Equation 3.6) are captured by the total of αଵ + 𝛿ଵ. A statistically significant value (p-
value < α = 0.10) and a coefficient which is positive (αଵ + 𝛿ଵ > 0) indicates that 
leverage effects are present in the stocks returns. However, if the p-value is significant 
but the coefficient is negative, then good news has a larger effect on stock return 
volatility compared to bad news. If no conditions are met, the stock is symmetric in 
nature. These coefficients are represented in Appendix 3B as ‘arch’ and ‘tarch’ 
coefficients, respectively.  
5.2.2.3. APGARCH Leverage Effect 
Based on Ding, Granger and Engle (1993), the asymmetric effects in the APGARCH 
model (Equation 3.7) are captured by the negative 𝛾 coefficient and is statistically 
significant (p-value < α = 0.10). If these two conditions are met, this indicates that the 
stock exhibits the leverage effect. If the p-value is significant but the coefficient is 
positive, then good news has a larger effect on stock return volatility. If no conditions 
are met, the stock is symmetric in nature. This coefficient is represented in 
Appendix 3B as ‘aparch_e’.  
5.2.3. Sectoral Analysis of the Leverage Effect  
Based on the results in Table 5.1 the Consumer Discretionary sector contained a 
relatively even distribution of asymmetric and symmetric stocks. Nine out the 17 
stocks exhibited negative leverage effects, wherein negative news caused higher stock 
return volatility in comparison to positive news. The remaining eight stocks exhibited 
symmetric effects, indicating that good and bad news had the same effect on stock 
return volatility. A similar result was found for the Consumer Staples sector. In the 
Health Care sector there was a relatively even distribution of asymmetric and 
symmetric stocks; however, of the four stocks indicating leverage effects, one stock 
exhibited positive leverage effects in which good news had a larger impact on stock 
return volatility relative to bad news. A similar result was identified in the Industrials 
sector: of the seven stocks which exhibited the leverage effects, one stock indicated 
positive leverage effects.  
However, this was not the case in the Energy, Telecommunications and 
Utilities sectors. The results indicate that 65% or more of stocks in these sectors 
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exhibited leverage effects, demonstrating that leverage effects are prominent in these 
sectors. The stocks which indicated leverage effects in the Energy, 
Telecommunications and Utilities sectors all exhibited negative leverage effects, 
where bad news had a larger impact on stock return volatility compared to good news. 
In the Financials and Real Estate sector, of the stocks exhibiting the leverage effects, 
two stocks exhibited the positive leverage effect while the remaining stocks exhibited 
a negative leverage effect. The Materials sector contained the largest number of stocks 
– five out of the 15 stocks – indicating positive leverage effects. Of these sectors, the 
Telecommunications and Utilities sectors showed 100% of stocks exhibiting negative 
leverage effects. It is also interesting to note that all stocks in both sectors were 
captured solely by the GJR-GARCH model, rather than a range of asymmetric 
GARCH models, which captured stocks in other sectors. This is an interesting finding 
as it indicates that the volatility resulting from news for the Telecommunications 
Services and Utilities sectors may be easier to predict. Since there is a better 
understanding of how these stocks behave in response to good and bad news in these 
sectors, it is expected that there would be lower volatility in the long run when public 
information is released. This suggests that there would effectively be less reliance on 
private information as investors are already informed about the future volatility of 
stocks in these sectors. Therefore, there would only be a small opportunity to generate 
excess returns due to volatility. This relationship will be further explored in 
Section 5.8.  
The Information Technology sector was the only sector in which no stocks 
indicated negative leverage effects. However, only one stock, TNE, showed positive 
leverage effects whereby good news caused higher volatility compared to bad news. 
However, the size of the 𝛾 coefficient (0.005) from Equation 3.5 indicates that the 
effect is not strong. This is an indication that most stocks in this sector react to good 
and bad news equally and as a result, the behaviour of volatility is the same for both 
types of news. Investors may choose to favour these types of stocks as short-term 
investments as there will not be excessive volatility during times in which bad news is 
released. Since volatility would not be excessive, investors may be less likely to rely 
on private information in this sector as there would be less opportunity to capitalise on 
the volatility. However, since the results still indicate that the stock is symmetric in 
nature, bad news will still impact the volatility. Therefore, some investors might 
capitalise on private information to determine the expected volatility after bad news to 
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take advantage of the best buying opportunity (i.e. a short-term decrease in the price 
caused by overselling) for long-term investments.  
 
 Table 5.1 – Number of fitted asymmetric GARCH models per sector 
 
SECTOR E-GARCH E-GARCH(t) E-GARCH(GED) GJR-GARCH GJR-GARCH(t) GJR-GARCH (GED) APGARCH APGARCH(t) 
APGARCH 
(GED) TOTAL 
Consumer Discretionary 2 2 0 2 1 0 2 6 3 18 
Consumer Staples 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 3 0 7 
Energy 2 0 0 1 0 0 2 3 0 8 
Financials 7 0 0 3 1 0 3 4 1 19 
Health Care 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 10 
Industrials 7 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 1 14 
Information Technology 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 5 
Materials 6 3 0 5 0 0 5 4 0 23 
Real Estate 1 0 1 7 0 0 5 1 0 15 
Telecommunication Services 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 4 
Utilities 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 4 
Total 31 8 1 25 2 0 20 33 6 127 
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Table 5.2 – Leverage effects  
Criteria to identify leverage effects  
E-GARCH - p-value < 0.10 and negative asymmetry coefficient to indicate leverage effects. 
GJR-GARCH - p-value < 0.10 and the positive asymmetry coefficient to indicate leverage effects. 
APGARCH - p-value < 0.10 and negative coefficient to indicate leverage effects. 
Legend: 
* indicates that positive shocks have a larger impact on stock return volatility compared to negative shocks. 
** indicates that negative shocks have a larger impact on stock return volatility compared to positive shocks. 
  No asterisk indicates no leverage effects. 
 
Sector  Stock  Asymmetry coefficient p-value 
Leverage 
effect? Best fitting model  Industry group 
Co
ns
um
er
 D
is
cr
et
io
na
ry
  
TME 0.0344112 0.804 No APGARCH (GED) Retailing 
ARB -0.7640122** 0.080 Yes APGARCH (GED) Automobiles & Components 
SUL -0.7785799** 0.007 Yes APGARCH (GED) Retailing 
IVC -0.0367895 0.784 No APGARCH (Student's t) Consumer Services 
AAD -0.3032605** 0.066 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Consumer Services 
HVN -0.1666594 0.172 No APGARCH Retailing 
SKC -0.7647841** 0.000 Yes APGARCH Consumer Services 
CWN -0.5950179** 0.008 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Consumer Services 
FLT -0.0302235 0.752 No APGARCH (Student's t) Consumer Services 
DMP -0.0198303 0.877 No APGARCH (Student's t) Consumer Services 
NVT -0.1320402 0.401 No APGARCH (Student's t) Consumer Services 
PMV -0.0650683** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH Retailing 
SWM -0.012289** 0.046 Yes E-GARCH Media 
ALL -0.0201265 0.533 No E-GARCH (Student's t) Consumer Services 
JBH 0.0166000 0.688 No E-GARCH (Student's t) Retailing 
TAH 0.1201105** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Consumer Services 
FXJ 0.0505000 0.480 No GJR-GARCH Media 
SGR 0.9731** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH (Student's t) Consumer Services 
Co
ns
um
er
 S
ta
pl
es
 
MTS -0.1234536** 0.047 Yes APGARCH Food & Staples Retailing 
BKL -0.0302829 0.784 No APGARCH (Student's t) Household & Personal Products 
WES -0.5125413** 0.060 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Food & Staples Retailing 
TWE -0.2539874** 0.088 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Food, Beverage & Tobacco 
CCL -0.0014609 0.934 No E-GARCH Food, Beverage & Tobacco 
GNC 0.7441894** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Food, Beverage & Tobacco 
WOW -0.0671779 0.429 No APGARCH Food & Staples Retailing 
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Table 5.2 continued 
Sector  Stock  Asymmetry coefficient p-value 
Leverage 
effect? Best fitting model  Industry group 
En
er
gy
 
OSH -0.9361875** 0.000 Yes APGARCH Energy 
WOR -0.7149457** 0.000 Yes APGARCH Energy 
CTX -0.0067575 0.966 No APGARCH (Student's t) Energy 
WPL -0.2540085** 0.071 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Energy 
ORG -0.553084** 0.033 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Energy 
STO -0.049343** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH Energy 
BPT -0.0195961** 0.039 Yes E-GARCH Energy 
WHC 0.9476999** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Energy 
Fi
na
nc
ia
ls
 
NAB -0.513093** 0.000 Yes APGARCH Banks 
BOQ 0.8140* 0.000 Yes APGARCH Banks 
NHF -0.3358162** 0.000 Yes APGARCH Insurance 
MFG 0.0059* 0.081 Yes APGARCH (GED) Diversified Financials 
IAG -0.5094197 0.109 No APGARCH (Student's t) Insurance 
SUN -0.8196502** 0.000 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Insurance 
QBE 0.0099982 0.939 No APGARCH (Student's t) Insurance 
IFL 0.1817968 0.155 No APGARCH (Student's t) Diversified Financials 
BEN 0.0936536** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Banks 
PTM 0.5372111** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Diversified Financials 
PPT 0.9337377** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Diversified Financials 
AMP 0.8920858** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH (Student's t) Insurance 
CBA -0.051975** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH Banks 
WBC -0.0426205** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH Banks 
ANZ -0.030466** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH Banks 
MQG -0.0432236** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH Diversified Financials 
ASX 0.0035322 0.620 No E-GARCH Diversified Financials 
CGF -0.0118445 0.394 No E-GARCH Diversified Financials 
JHG -0.1148458** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH Diversified Financials 
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Table 5.2 continued 
Sector  Stock  Asymmetry coefficient p-value 
Leverage 
effect? Best fitting model  Industry group 
H
ea
lth
 C
ar
e 
RMD 0.0281* 0.000 Yes E-GARCH 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services 
RHC -0.0675125** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services 
SHL 0.0195658 0.038 No E-GARCH 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services 
ANN -0.0370103** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services 
COH -0.0059800 0.916 No E-GARCH (Student's t) 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services 
FPH 0.9624637** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services 
CSL -0.0836161 0.507 No APGARCH (Student's t) 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotechnology & 
Life Sciences 
PRY -0.0336975 0.814 No APGARCH (Student's t) 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services 
SRX -0.0736218 0.608 No APGARCH (Student's t) 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotechnology & 
Life Sciences 
SIG 0.1936071 0.285 No APGARCH (Student's t) 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services 
In
du
st
ria
ls
 
QAN -0.3786842** 0.000 Yes APGARCH Transportation 
MND -0.2110654 0.172 No APGARCH (GED) Capital Goods 
BXB -0.2705443 0.335 No APGARCH (Student's t) 
Commercial & 
Professional 
Services 
SEK -0.0282056 0.816 No APGARCH (Student's t) 
Commercial & 
Professional 
Services 
MMS -0.4342876 0.279 No APGARCH (Student's t) 
Commercial & 
Professional 
Services 
AZJ 0.8526189** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Transportation 
DOW -0.0686783 0.792 No GJR-GARCH 
Commercial & 
Professional 
Services 
TCL -0.0848426** 0.002 Yes E-GARCH Transportation 
SYD -0.0429478** 0.002 Yes E-GARCH Transportation 
CIM -0.0289057** 0.008 Yes E-GARCH Capital Goods 
SVW -0.0431195 0.117 No E-GARCH Capital Goods 
ALQ -0.0400686** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH 
Commercial & 
Professional 
Services 
QUB -0.0077103 0.622 No E-GARCH Transportation 
GWA 0.1696* 0.000 Yes E-GARCH Capital Goods 
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Table 5.2 continued 
Sector  Stock  Asymmetry coefficient p-value 
Leverage 
effect? Best fitting model  Industry group 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 TNE 0.0057* 0.001 Yes E-GARCH Software & Services 
REA -0.0313703 0.109 No E-GARCH (Student's t) Software & Services 
CPU -0.5690344 0.187 No APGARCH (Student's t) Software & Services 
IRE 0.0460065 0.805 No APGARCH (Student's t) Software & Services 
CAR 0.0041451 0.966 No GJR-GARCH Software & Services 
M
at
er
ia
ls
 
NCM -0.2378981** 0.024 Yes APGARCH Materials 
AWC 0.2364354* 0.056 Yes APGARCH Materials 
ILU -0.0002211 0.999 No APGARCH Materials 
DLX 0.4667409* 0.000 Yes APGARCH Materials 
IPL 0.0311292 0.922 No APGARCH (Student's t) Materials 
ABC 0.3912241* 0.034 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Materials 
MIN -0.1279814 0.531 No APGARCH (Student's t) Materials 
OZL -0.7022526** 0.002 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Materials 
SFR -0.9705009** 0.000 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Materials 
AMC -0.0039503 0.736 No E-GARCH Materials 
JHX -0.0179705** 0.038 Yes E-GARCH Materials 
BLD -0.0596283** 0.000 Yes E-GARCH Materials 
FBU -0.0019604 0.791 No E-GARCH Materials 
IGO -0.0215454** 0.050 Yes E-GARCH Materials 
CSR -0.0017308 0.947 No E-GARCH Materials 
ORI 0.0168638 0.641 No E-GARCH (Student's t) Materials 
NUF -0.0336954** 0.011 Yes E-GARCH (Student's t) Materials 
RRL -0.0281487 0.111 No E-GARCH (Student's t) Materials 
BHP 0.8814182** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Materials 
RIO 0.8516785** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Materials 
FMG 0.6841335** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Materials 
BSL -0.8825955* 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Materials 
BKW -0.1442773* 0.015 Yes GJR-GARCH Materials 
Re
al
 E
st
at
e 
GMG 0.1236946 0.235 No APGARCH Real Estate 
GPT -0.4849572** 0.002 Yes APGARCH Real Estate 
ABP -0.6970685** 0.000 Yes APGARCH Real Estate 
BWP 0.1384891* 0.062 Yes APGARCH Real Estate 
AOG -0.1855103** 0.000 Yes APGARCH Real Estate 
SKI -0.2850797** 0.047 Yes APGARCH (GED) Real Estate 
LLC -0.853578** 0.007 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Real Estate 
TPM 0.0321726 0.816 No APGARCH (Student's t) Real Estate 
CNU -0.3550275** 0.009 Yes APGARCH (Student's t) Real Estate 
AGL -0.0970815 0.600 No APGARCH (Student's t) Real Estate 
VCX 0.0564037* 0.030 Yes E-GARCH Real Estate 
CQR 0.0026085 0.909 No E-GARCH (GED) Real Estate 
TLS -0.0290377** 0.093 Yes E-GARCH (Student's t) Real Estate 
SGP 0.1182246 0.519 No GJR-GARCH Real Estate 
DXS 0.9495903** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Real Estate 
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Table 5.2 continued 
Sector  Stock  Asymmetry coefficient p-value 
Leverage 
effect? Best fitting model  Industry group 
Te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
es
 
MGR 0.612276** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Telecommunication Services 
CHC 0.9207401** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Telecommunication Services 
IOF 0.9017623** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Telecommunication Services 
GOZ 0.6638369** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Telecommunication Services 
U
til
iti
es
 CMW 0.9152028** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Utilities 
SPK 0.5919745** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Utilities 
APA 0.9717909** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Utilities 
AST 0.9456542** 0.000 Yes GJR-GARCH Utilities 
5.3. Panel Regression Results 
A panel data regression was carried out for each GICS sector under the fixed effects 
and random effects models. The most appropriate model was chosen for each sector 
using the Hausman specification test. Table 5.3 summarises the results of the Hausman 
test, which indicates the appropriate model chosen for the panel regression, i.e. fixed 
effects or random effects model. The null hypothesis is that the random effects model 
is appropriate, and the alternate hypothesis is that the fixed effects model is 
appropriate. If the p-value is less than α = 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the 
fixed effects model is deemed most appropriate. The Hausman specification test 
revealed a p-value of 1.000 for each sector, indicating the p-value was greater than α 
= 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for this test, confirming that 
the random effects model is the appropriate panel regression model for each sector. 
With the random effects model, it is assumed that the individual specific effect of one 
explanatory variable is uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables in the model. 
In this case, the random effects model assumes that the individual factors affecting the 
volatility of each stock, such as news that Sirtex Medical Ltd (SRX) was facing a class 
action against the business, are uncorrelated to analyst price targets, Morningstar stock 
star ratings and ASX announcements for other stocks.  
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Table 5.3 – Hausman specification test 
Sector  Hausman Test              (p-value) 
Model Chosen (Fixed 
Effect/Random Effects) 
Consumer Discretionary  1.0000 Random Effects  
Consumer Staples 1.0000 Random Effects  
Energy 1.0000 Random Effects  
Financials  1.0000 Random Effects  
Health Care 1.0000 Random Effects  
Industrials 1.0000 Random Effects  
Information Technology 1.0000 Random Effects  
Materials 1.0000 Random Effects  
Real Estate 1.0000 Random Effects  
Telecommunication Services 1.0000 Random Effects  
Utilities 1.0000 Random Effects  
In addition to confirming the appropriateness of the random effects model, the 
Hausman test provides information regarding model misspecification due to 
endogeneity. The null hypothesis for this case is that there is no correlation between 
the endogenous variable and the errors in the panel regression. Since the Hausman test 
did not reject the null hypothesis, the random effects model was chosen as the 
appropriate model, confirming no correlation between the endogenous variable and 
the errors in the panel regression. The results of the panel regression indicate that the 
private information proxies and public information proxies have varied effects on 
sectoral return volatility in each sector.  
Appendix 6 summarises the panel regression results for each GICS sector 
based on the random effects model. The panel regression measured the impact of 
analyst price targets, Morningstar stock star ratings (private information) and ASX 
announcements (public information) on sectoral return volatility. The results indicate 
that all models were highly significant at 1%, all of which had a p-value of zero. 
However, each sector experienced varied responses in volatility to changes in analyst 
price targets, Morningstar stock star ratings and ASX announcements.  
5.3.1. Private Information and Sectoral Return Volatility Results 
The results of the panel regressions shown in Appendix 6 indicate that all sectors 
presented statistically significant coefficients at the 1% significance level. This means 
that the volatility of at least one stock in each of the GICS sectors has either been 
positively or negatively impacted by private information (analyst price targets and 
Morningstar stock star ratings). This finding highlights the importance of appreciating 
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that all types of private information are not treated equally, and that they do not play 
the same role in every sector. This indicates that informational efficiency is not 
constant in an entire index, but rather, varies across sectors. Since private information 
does impact the sectoral return volatility of ASX 200 firms, investors should aim to 
capitalise on this information to generate excess portfolio returns.  
5.3.1.1. Analyst Price Targets (PTR) Results 
The findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between PTR and sectoral 
return volatility. When analyst price targets increased (or decreased), there was a 
subsequent increase (or decrease) in the volatility of returns. Table 6.5 in Appendix 6 
shows that analyst price targets have the largest impact on sectoral return volatility in 
the Health Care sector. A 1% increase in the price target (i.e. an upgrade in the price 
target) results in an increase in sectoral volatility by 0.92%. This highlights that price 
targets play a large role in the investment decision making process for investors in the 
Health Care sector. A potential reason for this could be that, during the study period, 
the Health Care sector generated the highest year-on-year return. Since 2013, the 
Health Care sector has produced a five-year return of 19.89% and a one-year return of 
44.62%. This has been the highest return generated by far across all GICS sectors. 
Thus, investors will likely have an optimistic outlook on the future performance of the 
stocks within this sector and may seek those which are undervalued based on price 
targets, to generate excess returns.  
With the continuing increase in the size of Australia’s ageing population 
attributable to technological advances and improvements in healthcare, it appears 
highly likely that the Health Care sector will prosper in the future. It could be 
postulated as a result of this sector soaring over the last five years, investors have a 
bullish outlook regarding its future performance. Thus, investors will be more likely 
to utilise private information to generate excess returns. Additionally, as the Health 
Care sector provides a subpar dividend yield of 1.42% (ASX 2018c), it is evident that 
investors purchase stocks in this sector to capitalise on stock price growth (growth 
investors) rather than on the dividend (income investors). Therefore, it is reasonable 
to assume that investors have a vested interest in investing in stocks possessing a price 
target greater than their initial purchase price. It should be also noted that within the 
Health Care sector, every 1% decrease in the price target caused a 0.92% decrease in 
volatility. This indicates that investors do not undertake panic selling and maintain an 
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optimistic outlook regarding the future performance of the Health Care sector, despite 
a cut in analyst price targets.  
The Consumer Staples and Industrials sectors (Tables 6.2 and 6.6 in 
Appendix 6, respectively) followed a similar pattern to the Health Care sector, 
exhibiting the second largest impact of analyst price targets on sectoral return 
volatility. The results indicate that for every 1% increase in the price target, there is a 
0.50% increase in sectoral return volatility in both sectors. The results for both sectors 
are rather surprising as Consumer Staples has a five-year return of only 3.58%, yet half 
of the volatility is related to changes in price targets. Similarly to Health Care, this 
sector also exhibited a significant increase in return of 22.6% in the 2018 financial 
year (FY18). Therefore, it appears that investors are becoming bullish on future 
performance of Consumer Staples stocks and expect higher long run growth. 
Therefore, as half of the changes in the volatility are resultant from price targets, 
investors appear to be relying on price targets to inform their investment decision to 
help generate higher returns. If stocks in the Consumer Staples sector continue to 
deliver results which are above investor expectations, the sector would be expected to 
follow the same pattern as the Health Care sector i.e. exhibit an increase in the reliance 
on price targets. The Industrials sector has produced a five-year return of 10.65% but 
this has remained relatively consistent over time, with a slight decrease in FY18 to 
7.18%. For this reason, investors appear to be quite content with consistently relying 
on price targets to inform their investment decisions. 
Although the Information Technology sector (Table 6.7 in Appendix 6) 
produced the second-largest five-year return, analyst price targets do not appear to 
have had as large an effect on sectoral return volatility. However, a 1% increase in 
price target does still increase sectoral return volatility by 0.36%. A potential reason 
for the lower reliance on price targets is because this sector only produced an average 
return of 3.06% from 2014 to 2016. However, since 2017, the returns of this sector 
have generated a significantly large return of 34.89%. As stocks in this sector have 
only recently started to produce significant returns, the reliance on price targets appear 
to be growing. If the sector is capable of producing returns and meeting investor 
expectations in future years, it would be expected that the reliance on price targets 
would increase, as it has in the Health Care sector. Therefore, it would be beneficial 
for current investors to consider utilising price targets for stocks in the Information 
Technology sector to generate excess returns in the long run.  
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Within both the Financials and Materials sectors (Table 6.4 and 6.8 in 
Appendix 6, respectively), a 1% increase in the price target caused a 0.40% increase 
in sectoral return volatility. The Materials sector produced a five-year return of 3.40% 
and in FY18, the return was 12.02%. This indicates that the yearly return has been 
above average, which appears to follow a similar pattern to the Information 
Technology sector. Therefore, to capitalise on this consistent growth rate, it would be 
beneficial for current investors to consider utilising price targets to aid their investment 
decisions for stocks in the Materials sector.  
The Financials sector produced a five-year return of 2.85%, but in FY18 the 
return fell to -1.72%. These results appear to be contradictory to the relationship 
identified in the Health Care, Industrials, Consumer Staples and Information 
Technology sectors. In the Financials sector, the results indicate that even though the 
returns were subpar, some investors still appear to rely on analyst price targets. This 
may be due to a behavioural factor in which investors believe that retail banks have a 
lower chance of becoming bankrupt in Australia based on their resilience during the 
2008 GFC. An additional factor was that the Rudd Government legislated to guarantee 
all bank deposits, in an effort to prevent foreign banks from gaining an advantage over 
Australian banks (Schwartz & Tan 2016). As such, although not poised to experience 
the same degree of growth rates as the Health Care sector, analysts appear to indicate 
that the Financials sector will continue to generate stable profits in the long run. 
Additionally, the dividend yield of 5.49% in this sector is one of the highest across all 
GICS sectors (ASX 2018c). Based on these factors, investors may continue to utilise 
price targets (when they undergo price target updates), to either purchase a stock at a 
discount due to the stock being oversold, or to simply identify an opportune time to 
increase their current holdings. Overselling is expected to be a common occurrence in 
banking stocks as the Financials sector data indicated that 12 of the 19 stocks exhibited 
negative leverage effects, where bad news has a larger impact on volatility compared 
to good news. Thus, investors would likely anticipate such occasions to obtain stocks 
at a cheaper price. This has been evident through the various legal issues that the 
Commonwealth Bank (CBA) has experienced in the last couple of years. In April 
2017, CBA’s share price was trading at approximately $87, but in August 2018 its 
share price was hovering around $75. The substantial decline in the company’s share 
price was attributable to the substantial media coverage and news releases pertaining 
to CBA’s involvement in breaching the Corporations Acts 2001 (Cth) which has led 
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to ASIC’s investigations into CBA’s involvement in money laundering and the Royal 
Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
industry. This information may cause uncertainty for some investors, however at the 
same time, analysts believe that the business is still profitable in the long term, as 
indicated by the price targets relative to current prices. Therefore, it appears that 
investors turn to analyst price targets to determine whether the stock price is still 
expected to increase, despite the considerable amount of negative news. Investing in 
the Financials and Materials sectors may also be favoured by investors as they are the 
two largest GICS sectors, covering 31.5% and 16.8% of the entire ASX 200 index, 
respectively (ASX 2018c).  
The results of the Energy sector (Table 6.3 in Appendix 6) revealed that a 1% 
increase in the price target caused a 0.27% increase in sectoral return volatility. The 
results indicate that analyst price targets are statistically significant but do not have a 
high degree of influence on sectoral return volatility for the Energy sector. This may 
be as a result of Energy stocks having experienced many fluctuations during 2014 to 
2016, causing investor uncertainty regarding their long-term performance. In August 
2014, the Energy sector reached its peak since the start of the study period and 
produced returns significantly higher than the ASX 200 index. In January 2015, the 
Energy sector returns fell to producing similar returns to the ASX 200 index. They 
continued to deplete through to January 2016 caused by the consistent falling oil and 
gas prices (Janda 2016). The consistent decrease in returns of the Energy sector may 
have deterred long term investors from investing in this sector in the first place, 
resulting in a lower reliance on analyst price targets. However, a major portion of the 
0.27% change in sectoral volatility may have been attributed to price targets being 
utilised by investors from 2017 onwards, as the Energy sector’s return significantly 
increased to approximately 35%. This could be an indication that much of the reliance 
on price targets is due to the sector’s performance in 2017. This would appear 
reasonable as the 0.27% volatility is slightly lower than the Information Technology 
sector (0.36%) which produced a similar return in FY18 (34.89%). This is illustrated 
in Appendix 6. 
The Consumer Discretionary, Telecommunications Services, Utilities and Real 
Estate sectors (Tables 6.1, 6.10, 6.11, 6.9 in Appendix 6, respectively) exhibited the 
weakest relationship between analyst price targets and sectoral return volatility. The 
Consumer Discretionary sector showed that a 1% increase in the price target increased 
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sectoral return volatility by only 0.19%. This is an indication that investors do not 
place much reliance on price targets in this sector to aid their investment decisions. 
Such a finding seems to be an anomaly as the Consumer Discretionary sector has 
provided a five-year return of 8.38% and in FY18, the return was 16.1%. Considering 
that analyst price targets do not have a large effect on sectoral return volatility, it may 
indicate that most investors either rely on other forms of private information or public 
information to make their investment decisions in this sector. The result could also 
suggest that Consumer Discretionary stocks are typically held over the long term, due 
to the lower volatility in this sector (caused by less buying and selling) during the study 
period. A potential reason for the buy-and-hold strategy could be due to the consistent 
returns of 9% generated by the sector coupled with the dividend yield of 3.14% from 
2013 to 2017 (ASX 2018c). This presents the Consumer Discretionary sector as a 
better alternative for long-term investment compared to earning interest in a traditional 
interest-bearing savings account.  
The results of the Real Estate sector indicate a statistically significant, 
however, minor impact regarding analyst price targets on sectoral return volatility. 
Additionally, Real Estate was the only sector in which analyst price targets did not 
impact sectoral return volatility immediately. Based on the results of the panel 
regression, there was a one-day lag before analyst price targets were reflected in the 
sectoral return volatility. The results demonstrate that for every 1% increase in the 
price target, sectoral return volatility increased one day later by 0.14%. The minor 
impact of analyst price targets is likely due to the average performance of the sector. 
The Real Estate sector produced a five-year return of 5.4%, which is only slightly 
better than the average market return of 4.4% produced by the ASX 200 index. In 
comparison to other higher performing sectors such as Health Care, the Real Estate 
sector generates relatively average returns. These average returns are due to a 
combination of the softening real estate market across major cities in Australia over 
the last few years and the tightening of banks’ lending criteria. Therefore, it appears 
that most investors may either not be optimistic about this sector’s future performance 
or may be employing a ‘buy-and-hold’ strategy, resulting in less reliance on analyst 
price targets. Moreover, Deo, Spong and Varua (2017) found that the Australian Real 
Estate sector exhibited a higher degree of market efficiency post GFC compared to 
other GICS sectors, indicating all available information is reflected in the market. 
Therefore, it is expected that private information would not play a significant role in 
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affecting volatility in the Real Estate sector as the market already fully reflects both 
private and public information, thus rendering the need for analyst price targets 
redundant. Deo, Spong and Varua’s (2017) study is consistent with the findings of this 
research, which identified that the Real Estate sector is least affected by changes in 
analyst price targets hence would not be useful for generating excess returns from this 
sector.   
Moreover, both the Telecommunications Services sector and the Utilities 
sector demonstrated a small impact resulting from analyst price targets on sectoral 
return volatility. The results show that for every 1% increase in the price target, 
sectoral return volatility increased by 0.24%. The low reliance on price targets in the 
Telecommunications Services sector could be attributed to the extremely poor return 
produced. The five-year return was -8.33% and in FY18, the return deteriorated 
substantially to -16.98%. Over the last five years, consumers and businesses’ have 
moved towards mobility and wireless services, which has come at the expense of wired 
services (Lo 2018). However, the issue faced by telecommunication companies is that 
wired services have typically generated higher profit margins (Lo 2018). The growth 
in wireless services has been offset by the decrease in wired revenue, causing an 
overall decline in the sector’s profit margins (Lo 2018). This has seriously impacted 
stock prices across the sector. Additionally, the rise in competition has placed pressure 
on telecommunication companies to offer cheaper priced plans to remain competitive 
in the market and retain market share (Lo 2018). Therefore, there is a likely probability 
that investors would refrain from purchasing stocks in this sector. As a result, the need 
for analyst price targets is relatively redundant, hence the diminutive impact of analyst 
prices on sectoral volatility is an expected result. The incentive which could potentially 
catalyse a retention of investors in this sector is the high dividend yield of 6.13% (ASX 
2018c), which is the highest across all sectors. This attractive dividend yield acts to 
retain income investors to generate dividends over the long term, thus meaning there 
is minimal use for analyst price targets. A potential reason for why there is still a slight 
degree of reliance on analyst price targets may be attributable to investors deciding to 
increase their current holdings and identify an opportune moment to undertake such 
an action.  
Similarly, while the Utilities sector has produced a five-year return of 8.18%, 
in 2017 the return was only 2.57%. However, the problem with this sector is that the 
returns are volatile. From 2013 to 2017, the yearly returns were -2.50%, 9.80%, 
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16.94%, 14.09% and 2.57%, respectively. As well as indicating volatility, these returns 
show that the sector’s performance has also been declining since 2015. Therefore, 
based on the direction that returns are moving, investors are unlikely to invest in this 
sector if they are looking for long-term stock price growth. As a result, it would be 
expected for there to be minimal reliance on analyst price targets. Similar to the 
Telecommunications Services sector, the small portion of volatility in the Utilities 
sector caused by price targets may be resultant from income investors who are attracted 
by its sizeable dividend yield of 5.23%. Nevertheless, since both the 
Telecommunications Services and Utilities sector are not expected to experience 
exponential growth in the near future, it is expected that the impact of analyst price 
targets on sectoral return volatility will remain small.  
5.3.1.2. Morningstar Stock Star Ratings Results  
The results of the panel regression are quite interesting for Morningstar stock star 
ratings, as they reveal that investors interpret changes to ratings differently compared 
to changes in analyst price targets. It was found that an increase (or decrease) in the 
analyst price target caused an increase (or decrease) in the sectoral return volatility, 
which may have been catalysed by the large volume of purchasing. However, the 
converse relationship was identified with Morningstar stock star ratings. The results 
demonstrate that an increase (or decrease) in the rating caused a decrease (or increase) 
in sectoral return volatility. Another general observation noted is that the extent to 
which Morningstar stock star ratings impact sectoral return volatility was smaller than 
price targets. Across all sectors, the impact of Morningstar stock star rating upgrades 
caused a decrease in volatility, ranging between 4.8% and 8.3%. When compared to 
analyst price targets which impacted volatility between the range of 14% and 91%, it 
is a clear indication that Morningstar stock star ratings do impact sectoral return 
volatility, though that impact is minimal. Although the impact may not be as 
significant, the relationship is nonetheless interesting as the results highlight that 
investors react differently to different types of private information proxies. This is seen 
in Appendix 6.  
Morningstar stock star ratings had the largest effect on sectoral return volatility 
in the Energy sector (Table 6.3 in Appendix 6). For every upgrade in the Morningstar 
stock star rating, sectoral return volatility decreased by 8.3%. Likewise, this 
demonstrates that each time the rating was downgraded, the volatility increased by 8%. 
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This indicates that the Energy sector is the most sensitive to Morningstar rating 
downgrades and the least sensitive to upgrades. From the perspective of an investor 
utilising Morningstar stock star ratings as an investment aid, there would be a likely 
probability that they would choose not to invest in this sector. This is based on the 
assumption that investors are risk averse by nature. The Energy sector may be sensitive 
to downgrades given the significant volatility in the price of Energy stocks during 2014 
and 2017. Due to the large decline in the returns of Energy stocks during 2015 and 
2016, compared to the returns of 35% in FY18, investors appear to be cautious of 
recent volatility, hence may exhibit a higher degree of sensitivity to bad news. This 
uncertainty is largely driven by the significant decline in oil prices from 2015–2016 
followed by the subsequent rise in 2017 (Janda 2016). This appears to be a cyclical 
trend, where oil prices rose from US$18 per barrel in 1998 to US$28 in 2000, and 
declined to US$25 in 2002, with another rise in price to US$97 in June 2008, then a 
decline to US$62 in January 2009. This was followed by a rise to US$105 in April 
2011 and a subsequent fall to US$43 in January 2016 (IBISWorld 2018a). Since 2016, 
oil prices have been steadily increasing, with the current price at approximately US$65 
per barrel (IBISWorld 2018a). Thus, the volatility of crude oil prices has directly 
impacted the return of Energy stocks and consequently, investors are not only wary 
about subsequent cyclical price declines but are likely to increase their reliance on 
private information to secure gains and hedge against any potential future losses.  
The Industrials sector (Table 6.6 in Appendix 6) was the second-largest sector 
impacted by Morningstar stock star ratings. The findings demonstrate that each 
upgrade (downgrade) in the Morningstar rating caused a decrease (increase) in sectoral 
return volatility by 6.7%. This was closely followed by the Health Care, Materials and 
Financials sector volatility of 6.5%, 6.4% and 6.4%, respectively (Tables 6.5, 6.8 and 
6.4, respectively, in Appendix 6). The Morningstar ratings in the remaining sectors 
presented a similar impact on volatility, all sitting within the range of 4.5% and 5.9%. 
Sectors which appear to be the least affected by Morningstar ratings are Real Estate 
(4.5%), Consumer Discretionary (4.8%) and Utilities (4.9%) (Table 6.9, 6.1 and 6.11, 
respectively in Appendix 6). Consequently, these sectors were also the least affected 
by analyst price targets, indicating that investors seek both types of private information 
in the same sectors, although the degree of reliance on each differs significantly.  
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5.3.1.3. Which is the Preferred Proxy? 
From the discussion of the results in the preceding sections, a fundamental conclusion 
can be drawn with respect to analyst price targets and Morningstar stock star ratings. 
The proxies have been shown to have either a minimal or rather significant impact on 
sectoral return volatility. Each proxy was also found to affect the size of volatility 
differently depending on the sector. For example, in the Health Care sector, analyst 
price targets had a 91.2% impact on the changes in sectoral return volatility. However, 
in the Real Estate sector, analyst price targets only had a 14.6% impact on changes in 
sectoral return volatility. Although Morningstar stock star ratings did not have as large 
an impact on sectoral return volatility, their effects were still varied across each sector. 
In the Energy sector, Morningstar stock star ratings had the largest impact of 8.3% on 
sectoral return volatility and in the Real Estate sector they had the smallest impact of 
4.5% on sectoral return volatility. Hence, it cannot be claimed that they do not have 
any influence on investors’ financial decisions. The fundamental relationships 
demonstrated by the two proxies can be summarised as follows: 
1. Changes in analyst price targets significantly impact sectoral return volatility. 
An increase in the price target resulted in an increase in sectoral return 
volatility, potentially due to investors purchasing stocks or increasing their 
current holdings. Additionally, the degree to which price targets impact 
volatility varied significantly depending on the GICS sector. 
2. An upgrade in the Morningstar stock star rating had a statistically significant 
though minor impact on sectoral return volatility. The ratings did influence 
sectorial return volatility to a certain degree, but it was not as consequential as 
price targets. The degree to which Morningstar stock star ratings impacted 
sectoral return volatility was dependent on the GICS sector, although the 
difference was marginal.  
Based on the conclusions drawn above, both proxies possess their own 
benefits; however, price targets appear to provide more superior informational content 
to investors. This resulted in investors placing a heavier reliance on them, relative to 
the Morningstar stock star ratings. This could be because when a price target is 
increased or revised, it provides an investor with a prospective expected return based 
on their initial investment. However, with Morningstar stock star ratings, a ‘buy’ 
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recommendation does not specifically provide foresight of the growth prospects of the 
stock, thus imparting less informational content to investors. Such a notion implies 
that there is little indication to the investor of the degree of future growth potential of 
the stock, therefore it is not deemed to be an ideal piece of private information. The 
results of this study lend support to the findings of Brav and Lehavy (2003) who found 
that price targets provide a high degree of informational content and that the degree of 
any revisions made in the recommendation reflected the analysts’ uncertainty of the 
sector’s overall prospects. Additionally, Francis and Soffer (1997) found that investors 
react to ‘buy’ recommendations, but they could not identify any statistical evidence to 
show whether investors react to ‘sell’ recommendations. However, as demonstrated 
by Black (1976), Christie (1982) and findings of the current study, investors do react 
in a negative manner to unfavourable news thus instigating volatility. However, the 
degree of volatility is dependent on the type of information proxy that is being utilised 
(this study focused on two).  
5.3.2. Public Information and Sectoral Return Volatility Results  
Appendix 6 illustrates the results pertaining to the public information proxy, i.e. ASX 
announcements. It is seen that some ASX announcements do impact sectoral return 
volatility across all sectors, but the effect is not substantial. The ASX Query (ASXQ) 
announcements were the greatest contributor to sectoral return volatility within the 
Telecommunications Services sector and also were significant at the 1% significance 
level. The results highlight that when an ASX Query announcement was made in the 
Telecommunications Service sector (Table 6.10 in Appendix 6), the sectoral return 
volatility decreased by 13.5%. Upon further examination, it was found that these types 
of announcements specifically refer to the response from companies who have had 
‘price queries’ from the ASX. Under the ASX Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rules 
3, a price query refers to a question raised by the ASX, about the reason behind a 
significant change in a company’s stock price despite no significant or market sensitive 
news being released (ASX 2018a). The results indicate that when a company in the 
Telecommunications Services sector provides a well-documented response to a 
significant change in the stock price, investors react accordingly, resulting in a 
significant decrease in volatility. This finding is consistent with Drienko and Sault’s 
(2013) findings noting that volatility increases leading up to an ASX query but 
decreases after the query has been answered, which is usually on the same trading day.  
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Such a finding also is consistent with the results exhibited by the Financials  
(-1.5%) and Health Care (-1.9%) sectors (Tables 6.4 and 6.5 in Appendix 6, 
respectively). The Financials and Health Care sectors show that ASXQ 
announcements are statistically significant, although the size of the decrease in sectoral 
return volatility is minor. However, an opposing relationship was identified between 
ASXQ announcements and sectoral return volatility in the Consumer Discretionary, 
Consumer Staples, Industrials and Real Estate sectors (Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.6 and 6.9 in 
Appendix 6, respectively). The findings posit that when an ASXQ announcement is 
released, sectoral return volatility increases by 1.3%, 2.3%, 2% and 1.6%, respectively. 
In addition to this announcement type being unscheduled, the increase in volatility can 
be attributed to the fact that these sectors do not only consist of price queries, but can 
also contain an ‘appendix query’, ‘director’s interest notice query’ and/or an ‘aware 
query’. The numerous queries within these sectors appear to cause investors to react 
negatively, thus catalysing higher volatility due to uncertainty. This may be a result of 
a change in a director’s interest in the company (potentially due to profit taking or 
exercising stock options), causing an increase in investors’ uncertainty as they may 
question the reason behind the director’s decision. However, it should be noted that 
the degree to which these types of announcements impact volatility is relatively low, 
i.e. less than 2%.  
It appears that there is no observable pattern regarding the number of 
announcements or specific types of announcement which have the largest effect on 
sectoral return volatility. Each sector appears to encapsulate a unique set of ASX 
announcements, which affects the sectoral return volatility to varying extents. These 
results highlight the importance of examining the impact of public information on 
sectoral return volatility, as one type of announcement in a specific sector may not 
have the same (or any) effect on volatility in another sector. This was observed in 
Stock Exchange announcements (SEA) in the Consumer Discretionary, Energy and 
Health Care sectors. SEA in the Health Care sector was identified to have the second-
largest impact on sectoral return volatility, at -5.8%. Such a finding indicates that when 
a SEA was made, sectoral return volatility decreased by 5.8%. Upon further 
investigation, it was found that many of the announcements related to ‘market updates’ 
and ‘trading halts’. Based on ASX Listing Rule 17, a company is entitled to request a 
trading halt for a maximum of two trading days. However, if additional days are 
required, the company will need to apply for a ‘voluntary suspension of trading’. Based 
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on the ASX announcements, most companies in the Health Care sector appeared to 
recommence trading one or two days after the trading halt commenced. To examine 
the impact of the trading halt being lifted on volatility, an additional regression was 
employed for the Health Care sector (Table 6.5 in Appendix 6). The results indicated 
that on the second day (usually the day trading re-commenced), volatility increased by 
4.9%. This finding is consistent with Fama (1989), who noted that trading halts do not 
reduce but merely postpone volatility to the period after the trading halt has been lifted. 
However, it was interesting to note that on the third day after lifting the trading halt, 
volatility fell by 2.0%, indicating that market volatility gradually calms down days 
after a trading halt has been lifted.  
Takeover/Scheme of Arrangement announcements in the Health Care sector 
were identified as the ASX announcement type to have the third-largest impact on 
sectoral return volatility. The results indicate that when such an announcement is 
made, volatility decreases by 4.2%. Such a result is surprising, as, traditionally, 
Takeover/Scheme of Arrangement announcements cause an increase in volatility, 
either positively or negatively (Smith et al. 1997). Upon further examination, it was 
found that only one non-sensitive market announcement in this sector was made during 
the study period which related to significant changes to a company’s board. As the 
informational content of this announcement is not a typical Takeover announcement, 
it cannot be generalised that all Takeover announcements within this sector would 
decrease volatility by 4.2%.  
5.3.2.1. Scheduled and Unscheduled Public Information  
Table 5.4 summarises the number of scheduled and unscheduled ASX announcements, 
which were statistically significant at 5%. The classification of scheduled and 
unscheduled announcements has been documented in Appendix 1B and the detailed 
results for each ASX announcement was tested as part of the panel regression found 
in Appendix 6. The results demonstrate a higher number of statistically significant 
unscheduled announcements across all sectors in comparison to scheduled 
announcements. This indicates that unscheduled announcements have a larger impact 
on sectoral return volatility relative to scheduled announcements. This is because 
investors who observe an unscheduled announcement for the first time do not have 
any prior insight into the informational content in the announcement. The only 
exception to this was the Energy sector in which one announcement was significant 
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for both scheduled and unscheduled announcements. This demonstrates that investors 
likely perceive unscheduled ASX announcements equally to scheduled 
announcements in the Energy sector. 
The smaller number of scheduled announcements affecting sectoral return 
volatility was expected. A potential reason for why only between one and three 
scheduled announcements were statistically significant is due to price run-ups. A price 
run-up typically occurs when there is a temporary increase in the price of a stock 
leading up a periodic or scheduled announcement, but the price remains the same or 
slightly decreases post-announcement (Chan 2003, Heaton & Lucas 1999). This is 
attributable to investors who anticipate the contents of the announcements to improve 
their chances of generating excess returns. In some cases, a higher level of volatility 
before an announcement may also be due to investors holding informational content 
about the upcoming announcement (informed investors) undertaking investment 
decisions (Jarrell & Poulsen 1989). However, not all scheduled and unscheduled 
information is expected to cause the same effect on volatility. Bauwens, Omrane and 
Giot (2005) identified higher volatility in scheduled announcements compared to 
unscheduled announcements in the pre-announcement period. These findings were 
also consistent with the findings of Nikkinen and Sahlström (2001). However, these 
announcements were related to macroeconomic news announcements. It is interesting 
to note that volatility around macroeconomic announcements exhibits a contrasting 
behaviour to firm specific announcements. Although the underlying reason cannot be 
confirmed, it may because firm-specific scheduled announcements are more easily 
predictable than macroeconomic scheduled announcements. For example, it would be 
easier to predict that a company will provide a periodic report detailing the actual 
earnings because ‘earnings guidance’ figures are usually provided months before the 
release of the annual (periodic) report. Since investors do not expect the earnings to 
materially change during this time, they may undertake investment decisions before 
the announcements, thereby causing pre-announcement volatility. Moreover, a 
dividend announcement would also be relatively easy to predict as investment research 
firms such as UBS and Morningstar provide reminders to financial markets of 
upcoming dividend dates. Additionally, if a company has a history of paying a higher 
dividend yield, it is likely to continue paying a similar dividend in future periods, and 
thus is less likely to cause a surprise to investors. This is consistent with the results of 
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the study which indicated a minor impact of divided announcements on volatility 
across all sectors ranging between 0.18% to 0.57%.  
Table 5.4 – Summary of scheduled and unscheduled ASX announcements that are 
statistically significant at 5%  
Sector Unscheduled  Scheduled  
Consumer 
Discretionary  5 1 
Consumer Staples 5 1 
Energy 1 1 
Financials 4 3 
Health Care 3 1 
Industrials 6 1 
Information 
Technology 4 1 
Materials  4 3 
Real Estate 4 3 
Telecommunication 
Services 6 1 
Utilities 4 1 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter provided an in-depth analysis of the various asymmetric GARCH models 
and panel regressions undertaken to answer the research questions of this study. The 
results indicated that private information plays a larger role in affecting sectoral return 
volatility, relative to public information. The first half of the chapter provided a 
discussion of how sectoral return volatility is affected by analyst price targets and 
Morningstar stock star ratings, as a proxy for private information. More specifically, 
it concluded that analyst price targets and Morningstar stock star ratings have varying 
impacts on sectoral return volatility. Analyst price targets caused the largest effect on 
sectoral return volatility. The Health Care sector was the most affected by analyst price 
targets and also produced the highest returns. In contrast, the Real Estate sector was 
least affected by analyst price targets relative to the average returns produced by the 
sector. However, Morningstar stock star ratings did not play as large a role in affecting 
sectoral return volatility. Morningstar ratings only impacted volatility between 4.8% 
and 8.3%, while analyst price targets affected volatility between 14% and 91%.  
101 
The second half of this chapter examined the impact of public information 
(ASX announcements) on sectoral return volatility. The results indicated that each 
ASX announcement has a different impact on volatility across each sector. ASXQ, 
SEA and Takeover/Scheme of Arrangement announcements had the largest impact on 
volatility across the sectors. However public information was demonstrated to have 
only minor effects on sectoral return volatility relative to private information.  
Therefore, based on the results identified in the study the following conclusions 
have been drawn:  
1. Stating that the market is ‘strong form’ efficient implies that prices incorporate 
all private information and public information. On the other extreme, stating 
that the market is inefficient implies that any random piece of information can 
be utilised to generate excess returns (Brailsford, Heaney & Bilson 2011, 
p. 309). Therefore, market efficiency is a matter of degree, as the market can 
be partially efficient or inefficient. This research supports this underlying 
concept, indicating that the market is efficient to a certain degree.  
The results of the research indicate that analyst price targets and 
Morningstar stock star ratings as proxies for private information do affect 
sectoral return volatility albeit to different degrees. The research demonstrated 
that analyst price targets affected sectoral return volatility to a larger extent 
than Morningstar stock star ratings. Analyst price targets caused between 
14.5% and 91.2% of sectoral return volatility while Morningstar stock star 
ratings were only responsible for between 4.5% and 8.3% of volatility across 
the sectors. However, neither proxy, individually or in combination, was 
responsible for 100% of changes in sectoral return volatility, demonstrating 
that it cannot be stated with certainty that the market is ‘strong form efficient’. 
Since the private information proxies do not capture 100% of sectoral return 
volatility, the study cannot conclude that the market is fully efficient, but rather 
partially informationally efficient. For example, approximately 91% of 
volatility in the Health Care sector was explained analyst price targets, 
indicating that this sector contains the highest degree of informational 
efficiency.  
Public information, proxied by ASX announcements, had a minor effect 
on sectoral return volatility relative to private information. This further 
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supports the conclusion that the market cannot be strong form efficient as all 
public information was not reflected. These findings suggest that there are 
other types of private and public information which affect sectoral return 
volatility though have not been captured by the proxies used in this study.  
2. Informational efficiency is not consistent across all GICS sectors. This research 
has shown that the extent to which private and public information impact 
sectoral return volatility varies across each sector. The results indicate that 
analyst price targets were responsible for 91% of the changes in sectoral return 
volatility within the Health Care sector, demonstrating a higher degree of 
informational efficiency. In contrast, in the Real Estate sector, analyst price 
targets only affected sectoral return volatility by 14.5%, demonstrating a lower 
degree of information efficiency. Moreover, the results indicate that 
Morningstar stock star ratings also have variable effects across sectors. 
Morningstar stock star ratings had the largest impact on the Energy sector, 
causing 8.3% of the changes in sectoral return volatility. In contrast, the Real 
Estate sector was least affected with only 4.5% of the changes in sectoral return 
volatility being explained by Morningstar ratings. This is an indication that 
analyst price targets and Morningstar stock star ratings play a different role in 
each sector and investors utilise different sources of private and public 
information in each sector to aid their investment decisions.  
Moreover, public information had a varied impact on volatility across 
sectors. The ASXQ announcement had the largest effect in the 
Telecommunications Services sector, i.e. 13.5%, while across all other 
statistically significant sectors, the impact ranged from 1.3% to 2.3%. Although 
the findings suggest the presence of strong form EMH, the results indicate that 
the market is only efficient to a certain extent and the remaining sources of 
volatility are unknown. The sources may be other forms of private information 
not explored in this study or speculative traders causing volatility in prices.  
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
6.1. Research Summary  
This research endeavoured to provide a balanced investigation into the informational 
efficiency of sectors within the Australian economy. The underlying aim of the study 
was to gain insights into not only the way information is interpreted by the market, but 
to better understand the effect of different types of information on return volatility. To 
address this objective, a panel regression analysis was carried out to ascertain the 
impact of analyst price targets, Morningstar stock star ratings and ASX announcements 
on sectoral return volatility.  
Several key findings were identified in each of the panel regressions. The first 
was the identification of a positive and significant relationship between analyst price 
targets and sectoral return volatility. The findings suggest that analyst price targets 
play a differing role in each sector, with the most substantial impact observed in the 
Health Care sector and the smallest in Real Estate. This indicates that informational 
efficiency is not consistent across all GICS sectors; rather, there are varying degrees 
of efficiency. Since price targets were highly reflected in the Health Care sector 
(91.9%), it can be said that this sector has a higher degree of information efficiency as 
investors tend to react to this information instantaneously, causing volatility. However, 
the price targets only have a small impact on the Real Estate sector (14.6%), indicating 
a lower degree of information efficiency in this sector. The lower impact indicates that 
the remaining volatility in this sector is affected by private information proxies other 
than price targets. Further, a positive relationship was identified between sectors 
producing higher returns in recent years and the increased reliance on analyst price 
targets. This presents investors with an opportunity to take advantage of analyst price 
targets in sectors that exhibit higher growth rates, in order to generate excess returns. 
This information would not only benefit individual investors but also superannuation 
and managed funds. Since both industries focus on generating excess returns for their 
clients, employing price targets may help in re-balancing portfolios to specific GICS 
sectors. More specifically, since the volatility pertaining to the Health Care sector was 
heavily influenced by analyst price targets, this may be of concern for regulators. 
Within the Australian financial market, regulators have continually implemented 
measures to increase information transparency and prevent excessive price 
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fluctuations, yet it appears that the Health Care sector is still exceedingly affected by 
private information. Such a finding is consistent with the fact that this sector has been 
the highest performing sector on the ASX over the last five years, as the firms within 
the sector have capitalised on the increase in Australia’s ageing population.  
The second key result was the identification of the impact of Morningstar stock 
star ratings on sectoral return volatility. The results indicated that Morningstar ratings 
had a statistically significant effect on sectoral return volatility, but the size of the 
effect was minor relative to analyst price targets. This is an indication that investors 
do not place heavy reliance on Morningstar stock star ratings when making their 
investment decisions. This may be due to the lack of informational content received in 
ratings, compared to price targets. Nonetheless, an interesting relationship was 
identified regarding how investors react to different types of private information. 
When analyst price targets were increased (decreased), the volatility increased 
(decreased). However, when Morningstar ratings were upgraded (downgraded), the 
volatility decreased (increased). These results indicate that investors appear to be more 
optimistic when utilising analyst price targets, while investors utilising Morningstar 
ratings may undergo panic selling when ratings are downgraded. 
The third key finding identified was the relationship between public 
information and sectoral return volatility. The results indicated that some ASX 
announcements did impact sectoral return volatility; however, there was no specific 
announcement type which was statistically significant across all sectors. Additionally, 
it was found that the impact of ASX announcements on volatility was minimal relative 
to private information measures, with the highest impact of 13% caused by ASXQ in 
the Telecommunications Services sector. Moreover, the findings demonstrated a 
higher number of statistically significant unscheduled announcements compared to 
scheduled announcements. Of the 11 unscheduled announcements, between one and 
six significant announcements impacted sectoral return volatility, with the higher 
proportion of sectors indicating a range between 4 and 6 statistically significant 
announcements. However, of the eight scheduled announcements, between one and 
three announcements were statistically significant in explaining sectoral return 
volatility. These findings suggest that unscheduled ASX announcements impact 
sectoral return volatility to a higher degree than scheduled announcements, due to the 
unpredictability of the announcements. The lower degree of volatility resulting from 
scheduled announcements is also an expected result, as many investors usually 
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undertake investment decisions before an announcement in anticipation of its contents. 
This would cause a temporary increase in price, and therefore in volatility, leading up 
to the announcement, commonly referred to as a ‘stock price run-up’.  
6.2. Implications of the Research  
6.2.1. Retail Investors 
This research has the potential to provide an alternative avenue of information for retail 
investors in financial markets. A large majority of current retail investors rely on the 
advice of financial advisors to undertake their investment decisions. They employ 
these services as they believe that they do not have a firm understanding of volatility 
in financial markets. Although in some cases, retail investors pay for investment advice 
but do not take advantage of it (Bhattacharya et al. 2012). This means that they have 
effectively paid for this service but do not change their stock portfolio allocations 
because they believe that the investment advice is biased (Nagy & Obenberger 1994). 
The disadvantage of using financial advisors is the on-going agency costs associated 
with their services. This cost is recognised in the form of commission which is borne 
by the retail investor through brokerage costs and annual advisory fees. In many cases, 
the fees associated with obtaining this service can erode the capital gains made by 
investors and potentially leave investors in a negative investment position (De Bondt 
& Thaler 1995). Although retail investors have access to online trading platforms 
where brokerage costs are significantly cheaper and include no annual fees, their lack 
of knowledge of the financial markets instils a concern within individuals of 
potentially losing their wealth through uninformed investing.  
The results of the study indicated that analyst price targets and Morningstar 
stock star ratings are an effective tool in aiding investment decisions, particularly for 
retail investors who are looking to generate excess returns and avoid costly brokerage 
and advisory fees. Analyst price targets in particular have shown to significantly 
impact sectoral return volatility, which retail investors can use as a tool to help them 
generate excess returns. Moreover, this study has highlighted that analyst price targets 
impact volatility to a higher degree in the Health Care, Industrials and Consumer 
Staples sectors. This is an indication that retail investors who are looking to generate 
excess returns through analyst price targets should consider these three sectors as 
potential investments. The Real Estate sector was least impacted by analyst price 
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targets, therefore should be a sector to consider for longer term investment. These 
insights will enable retail investors to gain confidence in the ability of private 
information to aid their investment decisions. The results of this research indicate that 
investing through analyst price targets can be a better and potentially cheaper 
alternative to a financial advisor.  
6.2.2. Superannuation Industry  
The results presented in this study will greatly benefit retail and industry 
superannuation funds and SMSF investors. Managed superannuation funds present 
individuals with investment options ranging from conservative, balanced and high 
growth (high risk). Superannuation funds classify each option based on the asset class 
that is being invested in. Conservative options typically consist of a higher allocation 
of ‘cash and fixed interest’ and lower allocations of Australian stocks. In contrast, 
higher growth options with higher risk, consist of a higher allocation of Australian 
stocks relative to ‘cash and fixed interest’. With Australian stocks, superannuation 
funds classify investment in this group as a single risk factor, i.e. high. However, this 
research demonstrated that each sector responds differently to private information and 
accordingly experiences varying levels of volatility. This study found that the sectors 
which experience the greatest volatility in response to analyst price targets also 
experience the highest growth. Therefore, each sector has a different level of risk 
attached and higher risk sectors generate higher returns. Superannuation funds can use 
analyst price targets to classify certain GICS sectors as higher or lower risk and present 
further investment options to individuals. This is important for individuals as some 
would still like to invest in Australian stocks to generate higher returns than a typical 
interest-bearing savings account, but prefer limited exposure to risk. If investors are 
looking for a higher return generating sector, the Health Care sector would be 
appropriate. This investment alternative would be appropriate for younger individuals 
who possess a longer investment horizon, due to the high associated risk. However, if 
investors prefer to invest in a sector with lower risk yet a significant dividend yield, 
the Financials sector would be appropriate. If investors prefer very little risk and a high 
dividend yield, yet little chance of long-term growth, the Utilities and 
Telecommunications Services sectors would be preferable. This investment alternative 
would be more appropriate for investors who are closer to retirement. Moreover, 
private information proxies also can provide significant benefits to individuals who 
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hold a SMSF. Analyst price targets would be useful to aid individual SMSF investors 
in determining the appropriate percentage allocation of wealth to certain sectors, 
depending on their risk appetite.   
6.2.3. Capital Market Regulators  
The findings of this research will also be of interest to capital market regulators, by 
focusing on ways to minimise market volatility. During the 2008 GFC, regulators in 
the United States employed ‘circuit breakers’ in the form of trading halts to minimise 
volatility due to panic-selling. This was an effective tool in restricting panic-selling 
and prevented excessive volatility in financial markets. If another financial crisis were 
to occur in Australia causing excessive market volatility, regulators could impose 
circuit breakers to minimise the volatility. However, the findings of this research 
indicate that not every sector needs to have circuit breakers imposed, only specific 
sectors. Since analyst price targets and Morningstar stock star ratings caused the 
largest volatility in the Health Care, Consumer Staples and Industrials sectors, circuit 
breakers would be appropriate for these sectors. However, in the Real Estate and 
Consumer Discretionary sectors the impact was minor, thus it would not be useful to 
introduce circuit breakers in these sectors. The use of circuit breakers would not only 
be useful during an economic crisis, but during any financial period. Regulators may 
introduce circuit breakers within sectors exhibiting excessive volatility for an extended 
period of time in an effort to minimise the impact of volatility on shareholder returns.   
Regulators may also impose restrictions on the ability of research firms to 
provide analyst price target recommendations for specific sectors, during volatile 
periods. This study has indicated that 91.1% of the changes in volatility are caused by 
analyst price targets, during a normal financial period (2013–2017). The reliance on 
price targets may increase during periods of financial crisis due to investor uncertainty 
over future stock prices. Since analysts’ expectations of future prices is likely to 
significantly drop during a crisis period, investors may undergo panic-selling, causing 
further volatility. If a restriction is placed on the Health Care sector, for example, it 
will likely minimise its short-term volatility.  
6.3. Limitations of the Study  
This study, like many others, does contain its limitations, which could present areas 
for further research. The following limitations were identified within this study:  
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1. This study has not separated market sensitive from non-sensitive ASX 
announcements. It is expected that market sensitive announcements would 
have a larger effect on sectoral return volatility (O’shea et al. 2008). As an 
example, within the ‘dividend’ announcements there are various sub-
announcements. Thus, a ‘dividend alteration’ announcement would be 
classified as market sensitive, while a ‘dividend pay date’ would be non-
sensitive. There is an expectation that both types of sub-announcements would 
have varying impacts on sectoral return volatility. Another example is an 
‘ASXQ announcement’ which contains many sub-announcements, including 
an ‘ASX query’ and a ‘response to ASX query’. An ASX query is not 
considered market sensitive as it is usually the ASX enquiring about recent 
price fluctuations, which should not have a large impact on the stock price. 
However, the response to the ASX query is expected to cause significant 
volatility depending on the nature of the response.  
2. The stock return volatility in the sample was measured on a daily basis rather 
than an intraday basis. Therefore, the study was not able to capture intraday 
volatility, which literature has shown to be prominent. However, to ensure 
consistent of data frequency, intraday data could not be used because  
Morningstar stock star ratings and analyst price targets were only available at 
the daily frequency. 
3. The ‘asset acquisitions and disposals’ ASX announcements were classified as 
one type of announcement. However, it is unlikely that investors respond to 
acquisitions in the same manner they would to disposals. Acquisitions are 
usually seen to exacerbate an increase in volatility as they are signs of growth 
in the business, such as the acquisition of ‘The Good Guys’ by JB Hi-Fi and 
iiNet by TPG in September 2015. However, the volatility is not expected to be 
the same from a disposal such as the divestment of Bonikro mine by Newcrest 
Mining Ltd for $81 million in 2017. This disposal caused a short-term spike in 
the share price which then gradually decreased again through to April 2018.  
4. The econometric model developed in this study employs a panel regression 
which cannot distinguish between the impacts of good news and bad news on 
sectoral volatility. Although this effect is found within individual stocks as part 
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of the asymmetric GARCH modelling, the panel regression does not capture 
this effect. Hence, the panel regression model assumes symmetry of data.  
6.4. Recommendations for Further Areas of Research  
There are numerous recommendations regarding further areas of research. As this 
study did not utilise intraday stock return data, it was unable to capture the volatility 
that occurs throughout the day resulting from information releases. This is an 
important area for further research as public information has been found to cause 
sectoral return volatility within the first few hours after an announcement. As such, it 
would be expected that private information would have a similar effect. Thus, if a time-
stamped private information proxy was utilised, future research could provide further 
insights into how long private information takes to be interpreted by the market by 
measuring the volatility and the persistence of the volatility throughout the day. This 
would provide an added benefit to investors who want to capitalise on short-term gains.  
Moreover, this research cannot claim with certainty that an increase in price 
targets causes an increase in buy orders and a decrease in Morningstar ratings are due 
to panic sell orders. Therefore, further research could obtain the ‘order book’ for each 
GICS sector and analyse the buying and selling patterns after each type of proxy is 
released in association with the volatility changes. This would provide justification for 
the cause of the increase in volatility when analyst price targets increase and increase 
in volatility when Morningstar stock star ratings are downgraded. This will provide 
investors with greater knowledge of the informational content of private information 
proxies.  
Additionally, trading volume could be considered as an explanatory variable 
in the panel regression. The inclusion of intraday trading volume will allow the 
examination of the extent to which volatility resulting from private information, is 
caused by institutional investors or retail investors. This split of trading volume by 
institutional and retail investors can be sourced from the Thomson Reuters Eikon 
database. This information would be useful to superannuation and managed funds as 
it would provide information pertaining to whether institutional investors, individual 
investors or both are responsible for the volatility across each GICS sector. This may 
also provide insight into whether herding behaviour exists or is prominent in certain 
sectors of the ASX 200 index. 
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6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed summary of the findings identified within this 
research and its implications for the informational efficiency of the Australian 
economy. Moreover, the limitations of the study based on data constraints have been 
discussed and its potential impact on the results. Despite these limitations, the results 
of the research still successfully encapsulate the impact of private information proxies 
on sectoral return volatility. The chapter concluded with a discussion on the 
recommendations for further research, which are based on the limitations identified.  
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APPENDICES 
Key to variables in Appendix 4 and Appendix 6: 
PTR change in price target 
MSR change in Morningstar stock star rating 
AAD asset acquisition and disposal announcement 
ASXQ ASX query 
CA chairman’s address 
CAD company administration announcement 
CTE commitments test entity quarterly report 
DA dividend announcement 
IC issued capital announcement 
LTS letter to shareholders 
NOC notice of call announcement 
NOM notice of meeting 
OT other announcement 
PER periodic report 
PR progress report 
QAR quarterly activity report 
QCFR quarterly cash flow report 
SD shareholder details 
SEA stock exchange announcement 
TO takeover/scheme announcement 
WSP warrants and structured products announcement 
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Appendix 1A: Empirical Methodology Flow Diagram 
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Appendix 1B: List of ASX Announcements 
 
Primary 
Code Announcement Type 
Scheduled/Unscheduled 
Announcement 
01 Takeover/Scheme of Arrangement Unscheduled 
02 Shareholder Details Unscheduled 
03 Period Report Scheduled 
04 Quarterly Activity Report Scheduled 
05 Quarterly Cash Flow Report Scheduled 
06 Issued Capital Unscheduled 
07 Asset Acquisition and Disposal Unscheduled 
08 Notice of Meeting Unscheduled 
09 Dividend Scheduled 
10 Stock Exchange Unscheduled 
11 Progress Report Scheduled 
12 Company Administration Unscheduled 
13 Notice of Call Unscheduled 
14 Other Unscheduled 
15 Chairman’s Address Scheduled 
16 Letter to Shareholders Scheduled 
17 ASX Query Unscheduled 
18 Warrant Unscheduled 
19 Commitments Test Entity Quarterly Report Scheduled 
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Appendix 2: Stock Return Volatility Lag Length  
Sector ASX Code Lag Length  
Consumer Discretionary CWN 1 
Consumer Discretionary FLT 1 
Consumer Discretionary DMP 1 
Consumer Discretionary PMV 1 
Consumer Discretionary SKC 1 
Consumer Discretionary ARB 1 
Consumer Discretionary SUL 1 
Consumer Discretionary AAD 1 
Consumer Discretionary ALL 1 
Consumer Discretionary SGR 1 
Consumer Discretionary HVN 1 
Consumer Discretionary JBH 1 
Consumer Discretionary NVT 1 
Consumer Discretionary SWM 1 
Consumer Discretionary IVC 2 
Consumer Discretionary FXJ 3 
Consumer Discretionary TAH 4 
Consumer Discretionary TME 4 
Consumer Staples MTS 1 
Consumer Staples WES 1 
Consumer Staples TWE 1 
Consumer Staples CCL 1 
Consumer Staples GNC 1 
Consumer Staples BKL 2 
Consumer Staples WOW 4 
Energy ORG 1 
Energy OSH 1 
Energy CTX 1 
Energy WHC 1 
Energy WOR 1 
Energy STO 1 
Energy BPT 1 
Energy WPL 3 
Financials CBA 1 
Financials MQG 1 
Financials ASX 1 
Financials BEN 1 
Financials MFG 1 
Financials WBC 1 
Financials ANZ 1 
Financials NAB 1 
Financials JHG 1 
Financials PTM 1 
Financials NHF 1 
Financials PPT 1 
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Sector ASX Code Lag Length  
Financials AMP 2 
Financials IAG 3 
Financials SUN 3 
Financials QBE 3 
Financials BOQ 3 
Financials CGF 4 
Financials IFL 4 
Health Care RHC 1 
Health Care COH 1 
Health Care PRY 1 
Health Care SIG 1 
Health Care SHL 1 
Health Care ANN 1 
Health Care SRX 1 
Health Care CSL 2 
Health Care FPH 2 
Health Care RMD 3 
Industrials SYD 1 
Industrials QAN 1 
Industrials GWA 1 
Industrials TCL 1 
Industrials BXB 1 
Industrials CIM 1 
Industrials SVW 1 
Industrials DOW 1 
Industrials ALQ 1 
Industrials QUB 1 
Industrials MND 1 
Industrials MMS 1 
Industrials AZJ 3 
Industrials SEK 4 
Information Technology CPU 1 
Information Technology CAR 1 
Information Technology IRE 1 
Information Technology REA 1 
Information Technology TNE 4 
Materials NCM 1 
Materials BLD 1 
Materials BSL 1 
Materials ORI 1 
Materials IGO 1 
Materials CSR 1 
Materials AMC 1 
Materials JHX 1 
Materials ABC 1 
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Sector ASX Code Lag Length  
Materials NUF 1 
Materials OZL 1 
Materials RRL 1 
Materials SFR 1 
Materials ILU 2 
Materials FBU 2 
Materials MIN 2 
Materials DLX 2 
Materials BHP 4 
Materials RIO 4 
Materials FMG 4 
Materials AWC 4 
Materials IPL 4 
Materials BKW 4 
Real Estate SGP 1 
Real Estate CMW 1 
Real Estate ABP 1 
Real Estate BWP 1 
Real Estate GOZ 2 
Real Estate GMG 3 
Real Estate GPT 3 
Real Estate CHC 3 
Real Estate IOF 3 
Real Estate CQR 3 
Real Estate DXS 4 
Real Estate VCX 4 
Real Estate MGR 4 
Real Estate AOG 4 
Telecommunication Services TLS 1 
Telecommunication Services TPM 1 
Telecommunication Services CNU 1 
Telecommunication Services SPK 4 
Utilities SKI 1 
Utilities APA 1 
Utilities AGL 2 
Utilities AST 3 
 
 
 Appendix 3A: Asymmetric Volatility Estimations (E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH and APGARCH)  
Table 3A.1 – Consumer Discretionary sector 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) E-GARCH (Student's t-distribution) (if applicable) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons AIC BIC earch earch_a E-GARCH cons 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
ALL 
          
  
-0.02013 0.186167 0.864645 -1.10793 1.599684 
-6876.35 -6845.5 
          0.533 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 
TAH                           
CWN                           
FLT                           
SGR                           
HVN                           
DMP                           
JBH 
            0.016635 0.219908 0.656727 -2.74797 1.306217 
-6644.05 -6613.2 
            0.688 0.001 0.000 0.026 0.000 
PMV 
-0.06507 0.085373 0.956787 -0.34729 
-6709.04 -6883.33 
              
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002               
SKC                           
NVT                           
TME                           
ARB                           
FXJ                           
IVC                           
SUL                           
AAD                           
SWM 
-0.01229 0.042377 1.000344 0.004437 
-5773.521 -5747.811 
              
0.046 0.000 0.000 0.694               
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 Table 3A.1 continued (Consumer Discretionary sector) 
Stock 
Name 
GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) GJR-GARCH (Student's t-distribution) (if applicable) 
arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC arch garch tarch cons 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
ALL                           
TAH 0.120111 0.006221 0.377238 9.76E-05 
-7229.33 -7203.62 
              
 0.000 0.805 0.100 0.000               
CWN                           
FLT                           
SGR             0.034305 
-
0.02482 0.973108 1.58E-06 0.862648 -7078.3 -7047.45 
             0.005 0.048 0.000 0.238 0.000 
HVN                           
DMP                           
JBH                           
PMV                           
SKC                           
NVT                           
TME                           
ARB                           
FXJ 0.235081 -0.0022 0.050472 0.000366 
-6119.56 -6093.85 
              
 0.000 0.851 0.480 0.000               
IVC                           
SUL                           
AAD                           
SWM                           
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 Table 3A.1 continued (Consumer Discretionary sector) 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Gaussian distribution) APGARCH (Student's t-distribution) (if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power AIC BIC aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
ALL                               
TAH                               
CWN               0.04331 -0.59502 0.959592 0.000565 0.675791 0.938484 
-7124.14 -7088.15 
               0.001 0.008 0.000 0.499 0.010 0.000 
FLT               0.205564 -0.03022 0.129405 2.65E-05 2.523849 1.297598 
-6646.5 -6610.5 
               0.002 0.752 0.347 0.801 0.012 0.000 
SGR                               
HVN 0.146937 -0.16666 0.415781 0.018581 0.793919 
-6735.47 -6704.62 
                
 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.486 0.022                 
DMP               0.221818 -0.01983 0.285732 0.000984 1.64447 0.730948 
-6339.24 -6303.24 
               0.000 0.877 0.064 0.684 0.011 0.000 
JBH                               
PMV                               
SKC 0.111916 -0.76478 0.783554 0.002117 0.974772 
-7267.52 -7236.67 
                
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.139 0.000                 
NVT               0.244152 -0.13204 0.311349 0.004612 1.16309 0.670278 
-6900.55 -6864.56 
               0.000 0.401 0.029 0.559 0.007 0.000 
TME                               
ARB                               
FXJ                               
IVC               0.147367 -0.03679 0.780485 0.004334 0.754584 1.059848 
-7395.79 -7359.79 
               0.000 0.784 0.000 0.495 0.021 0.000 
SUL                               
AAD               0.167635 -0.30326 0.689107 0.005776 0.924078 0.318806 
-6458.98 -6422.98 
               0.000 0.066 0.000 0.369 0.001 0.103 
SWM                               
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 Table 3A.1 continued (Consumer Discretionary sector) 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (GED distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1nshape AIC BIC 
ALL                 
TAH                 
CWN                 
FLT                 
SGR                 
HVN                 
DMP                 
JBH                 
PMV                 
SKC                 
NVT                 
TME 0.189182 0.034411 0.07305 0.000159 2.008979 0.197304 
-7161.23 -7125.24 
 0.002 0.804 0.656 0.656 0.041 0.000 
ARB 0.034722 -0.76401 0.950962 6.79E-05 1.336929 0.269847 
-7155.36 -7119.37 
 0.060 0.080 0.000 0.626 0.004 0.000 
FXJ                 
IVC                 
SUL 0.041368 -0.77858 0.923255 0.003681 0.639389 0.038331 
-6810.41 -6774.42 
 0.019 0.007 0.000 0.512 0.042 0.286 
AAD                 
SWM                 
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 Table 3A.2 – Consumer Staples sector 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons AIC BIC arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC 
MTS                         
BKL                         
GNC 
            0.527492 -0.36152 0.744189 6.75E-06 -7358.99 -7333.28 
            0 0 0 0     
WES                         
WOW                         
TWE                         
CCL 
-0.00146 0.211258 0.37261 -5.32072 
-7177.316 -7151.606 
            
0.934 0.000 0.002 0.000             
 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Gaussian distribution) APGARCH (Student's t-distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power AIC BIC aparch 
aparch_
e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
MTS 
0.111736 -0.12345 0.8796 0.000575 1.122218 
-6145.44 -6114.59 
                
0.000 0.047 0.000 0.054 0.000                 
BKL 
          
    
0.23234 -0.03028 0.761476 0.0064939 0.724339 -0.10486 -6263.48 -6227.49 
          0 0.784 0 0.23 0 0.732     
GNC                               
WES 
          
    
0.037558 -0.51254 0.95892 0.0006174 0.675019 1.212503 -8013.91 -7977.91 
          0.003 0.06 0 0.614 0.063 0     
WOW 
0.107984 -0.06718 0.89742 0.000834 0.766426 
-7592.18 -7561.33 
                
0.000 0.429 0.000 0.139 0.000                 
TWE 
          
    
0.123927 -0.25399 0.197525 6.28E-06 2.886495 0.498172 -6795.96 -6759.97 
          0.156 0.088 0.311 0.871 0.066 0.007     
CCL                               
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 Table 3A.3 – Energy sector 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons AIC BIC arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC 
WPL                         
ORG                         
OSH                         
STO 
-0.04934 0.136676 0.992111 -0.05267 
-6087.567 -6061.857 
            
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000             
CTX                         
WHC 
            0.065885 -0.0368 0.9477 5.48E-06 
-5401.03 -5375.32 
            0.000 0.001 0.000 0.016 
WOR                         
BPT 
-0.0196 0.137647 0.98884 -0.07542 
-5568.06 -5542.35 
            
0.039 0.000 0.000 0.005             
 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Gaussian distribution) APGARCH (Student's t-distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power AIC BIC aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
WPL 
              0.110026 -0.25401 0.898635 0.0005462 0.829559 1.38254 
-7326.64 -7290.64 
              0.000 0.071 0.000 0.355 0.000 0.000 
ORG 
              0.040449 -0.55308 0.963667 0.0000741 1.065947 1.467877 
-6561.06 -6525.06 
              0.001 0.033 0.000 0.539 0.002 0.000 
OSH 
0.073047 -0.93619 0.924287 8.79E-05 1.243929 
-6833.41 -6802.56 
                
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.1420 0.000                 
STO                               
CTX 
              0.119762 -0.00676 0.796595 0.0039489 0.804869 1.07319 
-7151.16 -7115.17 
              0.000 0.966 0.000 0.556 0.040 0.000 
WHC                               
WOR 
0.023352 -0.71495 0.949243 0.037959 -0.17055 
-5435.53 -5404.68 
                
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001                 
BPT                               
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Table 3A.4 – Financials sector 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons AIC BIC 
CBA -0.05198 0.088454 0.982152 -0.16011 -7912.773 -7887.063 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 
WBC -0.04262 0.1323 0.983056 -0.14848 -7628.789 -7603.078 
0 0.000 0.000 0.002 
ANZ -0.03047 0.062777 0.991567 -0.07331 -7645.293 -7619.583 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 
NAB             
MQG -0.04322 0.091509 0.989411 -0.08554 -7205.753 -7180.043 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
IAG             
SUN             
AMP             
QBE             
ASX 0.003532 0.071033 0.994951 -0.04372 -8079.081 -8053.371 
0.620 0.000 0.000 0.129 
CGF -0.01184 0.182712 0.857737 -1.16039 -6771.63 -6745.92 
0.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BEN             
BOQ             
MFG             
JHG -0.11485 0.150733 0.890892 -0.86221 -6486.086 -6460.376 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IFL             
PTM 
            
            
NHF             
PPT             
 
Stock 
Name 
GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC 
CBA             
WBC             
ANZ             
NAB             
MQG             
IAG             
SUN             
AMP             
QBE             
ASX             
CGF             
BEN 0.093654 -0.04516 0.880082 9.63E-06 -7281.63 -7255.92 
0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 
BOQ             
MFG             
JHG             
IFL             
PTM 0.117915 0.023162 0.537211 0.000115 -6534.08 -6508.37 
0.001 0.551 0.000 0.000 
NHF             
PPT 0.062597 -0.04616 0.933738 6.16E-06 -7003.73 -6978.02 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 3A.4 continued (Financials sector) 
Stock 
Name 
GJR-GARCH (Student's t-distribution) 
(if applicable) 
arch garch tarch cons 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
CBA               
WBC               
ANZ               
NAB               
MQG               
IAG               
SUN               
AMP 
0.054296 -0.0179 0.892086 0.000012 1.063947 -7376.36 -7345.51 
0.012 0.471 0.000 0.048 0.000   
QBE               
ASX               
CGF               
BEN               
BOQ               
MFG               
JHG               
IFL               
PTM               
NHF               
PPT               
 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power AIC BIC 
CBA               
WBC               
ANZ               
NAB 
0.096782 -0.51309 0.866575 0.0007043 0.994019 
-7737.22 -7706.37 
0.000 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.000 
MQG               
IAG               
SUN               
AMP               
QBE               
ASX               
CGF               
BEN               
BOQ 
0.068511 -0.95806 0.81405 0.0004332 1.305589 
-7326.14 -7295.29 
0.035 0.074 0.000 0.276 0.000 
MFG               
JHG               
IFL               
PTM               
NHF 
0.138693 -0.33582 0.665698 0.004785 0.950449 
-6794.54 -6763.69 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.000 
PPT               
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Table 3A.4 continued (Financials sector) 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Student's t distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
CBA                 
WBC                 
ANZ                 
NAB                 
MQG                 
IAG 
0.07276 -0.50942 0.804702 0.00063 1.231669 1.161592 
-7565.94 -7529.95 
0.022 0.109 0.000 0.581 0.003 0.000 
SUN 
0.060682 -0.81965 0.871517 0.009794 0.487822 1.22604 
-7732.59 -7696.59 
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.422 0.056 0.000 
AMP                 
QBE 
0.239709 0.009998 0.151227 0.002902 1.330123 0.925371 
-6921.51 -6885.51 
0.000 0.939 0.347 0.632 0.008 0.000 
ASX                 
CGF                 
BEN                 
BOQ                 
MFG                 
JHG                 
IFL 
0.109074 0.181797 0.848731 0.001612 0.904136 0.936385 
-7205.7 -7169.71 
0.000 0.155 0.000 0.535 0.011 0.000 
PTM                 
NHF                 
PPT                 
 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (GED distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1nshape AIC BIC 
CBA                 
WBC                 
ANZ                 
NAB                 
MQG                 
IAG                 
SUN                 
AMP                 
QBE                 
ASX                 
CGF                 
BEN                 
BOQ                 
MFG 
0.005871 1.000000 0.996773 3.02E-05 0.221606 0.330788 
-6330.34 -6294.35 
0.081 0.000 0.000 0.963 0.525 0.000 
JHG                 
IFL                 
PTM                 
NHF                 
PPT                 
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Table 3A.5 – Health Care sector 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons AIC BIC 
CSL             
RMD 
0.028084 0.096385 0.977585 -0.17937 
-7025.585 -6999.875 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RHC 
-0.06751 0.048599 0.928411 -0.61306 
-7264.358 -7238.648 
0.000 0.008 0.000 0.011 
COH             
SHL 
0.019566 0.057842 0.992208 -0.06426 -7362.677 -7336.967 
0.038 0.000 0.000 0.014     
FPH             
ANN 
-0.03701 0.157794 0.157794 -0.10295 
-6785.676 -6759.966 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
PRY             
SRX             
SIG             
 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Student's t distribution) 
(if applicable) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
CSL               
RMD               
RHC               
COH 
-0.00598 0.360507 0.444323 -4.68584 0.496494 
-7415.32 -7384.46 
0.916 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.012 
SHL               
FPH               
ANN               
PRY               
SRX               
SIG               
 
Stock 
Name 
GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC 
CSL             
RMD             
RHC             
COH             
SHL             
FPH 
0.026611 -0.01586 0.962464 3.44E-06 
-7310.16 -7284.45 
0.003 0.083 0.000 0.121 
ANN             
PRY             
SRX             
SIG             
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Table 3A.5 continued (Health Care sector) 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Student's t distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
CSL 
0.212352 -0.08362 0.432122 0.0029076 1.117353 1.252369 
-7712.56 -7676.57 
0.000 0.507 0.003 0.652 0.026 0.000 
RMD                 
RHC                 
COH                 
SHL                 
FPH                 
ANN                 
PRY 
0.143265 -0.0337 0.587116 0.0003479 1.668201 0.875048 
-6816.08 -6780.08 
0.002 0.814 0.000 0.665 0.004 0.000 
SRX 
0.307517 -0.07362 0.047538 0.0606561 0.695542 -0.10322 
-6138.04 -6102.04 
0.000 0.608 0.723 0.301 0.007 0.631 
SIG 
0.181533 0.193607 0.186066 0.0136437 1.010178 1.275016 
-6288.42 -6252.43 
0.000 0.285 0.351 0.538 0.015 0.000 
 
 
 
 
Table 3A.6 – Industrials sector 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons AIC BIC 
TCL 
-0.08484 0.234227 0.713962 -2.60491 
-7957.402 -7931.691 
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BXB             
SYD 
-0.04295 0.15686 0.900767 -0.87378 
-7608.1 -7582.39 
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CIM 
-0.02891 0.210504 0.964436 -0.25966 
-6363.696 -6337.986 
0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
QAN             
AZJ             
SEK             
SVW 
-0.04312 0.244703 -0.53901 -11.6865 
-6016.06 -5990.35 
0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DOW             
ALQ 
-0.04007 0.010816 0.998265 -0.01195 
-5721.548 -5695.838 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.094 
QUB 
-0.00771 0.224672 0.909714 -0.7329 
-6871.794 -6846.084 
0.622 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MND             
MMS             
GWA 
0.169568 0.311094 0.203998 -6.13625 
-6194.208 -6168.497 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
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Table 3A.6 continued (Industrials sector) 
Stock 
Name 
GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC 
TCL             
BXB             
SYD             
CIM             
QAN             
AZJ 
0.067151 0.04421 0.852619 1.19E-05 
-7294.29 -7268.58 
0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 
SEK             
SVW             
DOW 
0.037759 0.056497 -0.06868 0.000482 
-6076.25 -6050.54 
0.179 0.270 0.792 0.000 
ALQ             
QUB             
MND             
MMS             
GWA             
 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power AIC BIC 
TCL               
BXB               
SYD               
CIM               
QAN 
0.098742 -0.37868 0.806443 0.011594 0.600017 
-6255.73 -6224.88 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.337 0.011 
AZJ               
SEK               
SVW               
DOW               
ALQ               
QUB               
MND               
MMS               
GWA               
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Table 3A.6 continued (Industrials sector) 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Student's t distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
TCL                 
BXB 
0.040238 -0.27054 0.952357 0.000821 0.704722 1.043274 
-7566.31 -7530.32 
0.004 0.335 0.000 0.534 0.031 0.000 
SYD                 
CIM                 
QAN                 
AZJ                 
SEK 
0.090701 -0.02821 0.899595 0.0004102 1.064142 1.078988 
-6930.66 -6894.67 
0.000 0.816 0.000 0.494 0.001 0.000 
SVW                 
DOW                 
ALQ                 
QUB                 
MND                 
MMS 
0.025803 -0.43429 0.967266 0.0001147 1.203209 0.655136 
-6527.65 -6491.66 
0.041 0.279 0.000 0.294 0.000 0.000 
GWA                 
 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (GED distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1nshape AIC BIC 
TCL                 
BXB                 
SYD                 
CIM                 
QAN                 
AZJ                 
SEK                 
SVW                 
DOW                 
ALQ                 
QUB                 
MND 
0.035255 -0.21107 0.965427 0.000823 0.603824 0.233514 
-5834.78 -5798.78 
0.004 0.172 0.000 0.528 0.128 0.000 
MMS                 
GWA                 
 
 
 
 Table 3A.7 – Information Technology sector 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) E-GARCH (Student's t distribution) (if applicable) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons AIC BIC earch earch_a E-GARCH cons 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
REA 
            -0.03137 0.125093 0.968617 -0.24991 1.331592 
-6779.07 -6748.21 
            0.109 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.000 
CPU                           
CAR                           
TNE 
0.005735 -0.005 1.008177 0.064938 
-6512.532 -6486.822 
              
0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000               
IRE                           
 
Stock 
Name 
GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) APGARCH (Student's t distribution) (if applicable) 
arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
REA                             
CPU 
            0.046315 -0.56903 0.85594 0.0005734 1.22832 0.97586 
-7318.27 -7282.28 
            0.085 0.187 0.000 0.696 0.038 0.000 
CAR 
0.129153 0.133304 0.004145 0.000193 
-6986.86 -6961.15 
                
0.002 0.033 0.966 0.000                 
TNE                             
IRE 
            0.153354 0.046007 0.166074 0.0004524 1.749564 0.642989 
-7275.61 -7239.61 
            0.014 0.805 0.462 0.794 0.055 0.004 
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Table 3A.8 – Materials sector 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons AIC BIC 
BHP             
RIO             
AMC 
-0.00395 0.090636 0.96792 -0.27613 
-7462.616 -7436.906 
0.736 0.000 0.000 0.001 
NCM             
FMG             
JHX 
-0.01797 0.028342 0.996252 -0.02911 
-6733.143 -6707.433 
0.038 0.000 0.000 0.141 
BLD 
-0.05963 0.087461 0.963122 -0.30559 
-7020.802 -6995.091 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BSL             
AWC             
ORI             
IPL             
ILU             
ABC             
FBU 
-0.00196 -0.07431 -0.96245 -16.6356 
-7111.425 -7085.715 
0.791 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MIN             
DLX             
NUF             
IGO 
-0.02155 0.063004 0.983535 -0.11237 
-5242.488 -5216.778 
0.05 0.000 0.000 0.009 
OZL             
CSR 
-0.00173 0.221501 0.742175 -2.03762 
-6448.593 -6442.883 
0.947 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BKW             
RRL             
SFR             
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Table 3A.8 continued (Materials sector) 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Student's t distribution) 
(if applicable) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
BHP               
RIO               
AMC               
NCM               
FMG               
JHX               
BLD               
BSL               
AWC               
ORI 
0.016864 0.240387 0.779493 -1.78791 0.940267 
-6889.03 -6858.17 
0.641 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 
IPL               
ILU               
ABC               
FBU               
MIN               
DLX               
NUF 
-0.0337 0.059405 0.994999 -0.0365 1.164695 
-6625.49 -6594.64 
0.011 0.002 0.000 0.250 0.000 
IGO               
OZL               
CSR               
BKW               
RRL 
-0.02815 0.103843 0.986786 -0.08635 0.98671 
-5286.99 -5256.14 
0.111 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.000 
SFR               
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Table 3A.8 continued (Materials sector) 
Stock 
Name 
GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC 
BHP 
0.09341 0.020732 0.881418 5.67E-06 
-6768.8 -6743.09 
0.000 0.148 0.000 0.012 
RIO 
0.058752 0.031373 0.851679 2.13E-05 
-6757.84 -6732.13 
0.001 0.085 0.000 0.003 
AMC             
NCM             
FMG 
0.097601 0.122377 0.684134 0.000167 
-5135.34 -5109.63 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
JHX             
BLD             
BSL 
0.000519 -0.00949 -0.8826 0.001317 
-5591.08 -5665.37 
0.930 0.185 0.000 0.000 
AWC             
ORI             
IPL             
ILU             
ABC             
FBU             
MIN             
DLX             
NUF             
IGO             
OZL             
CSR             
BKW 
0.118513 -0.01715 -0.14428 0.000142 
-7675.39 -7649.68 
0.000 0.222 0.015 0.000 
RRL             
SFR             
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Table 3A.8 continued (Materials sector) 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power AIC BIC 
BHP               
RIO               
AMC               
NCM 
0.044643 -0.2379 0.963837 0.0000609 1.017263 
-5761.07 -5730.21 
0.000 0.024 0.000 0.529 0.000 
FMG               
JHX               
BLD               
BSL               
AWC 
0.080642 0.236435 0.821243 0.0005928 1.381761 
-6011.51 -5980.66 
0.000 0.056 0.000 0.503 0.000 
ORI               
IPL               
ILU 
0.053874 -0.00022 0.945148 0.0019133 0.472199 
-6009.74 -5978.89 
0.000 0.999 0.000 0.358 0.022 
ABC               
FBU               
MIN               
DLX 
0.150455 0.466741 0.484492 0.0076952 0.910744 
-7413.63 -7382.78 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.392 0.001 
NUF               
IGO               
OZL               
CSR               
BKW               
RRL               
SFR               
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Table 3A.8 continued (Materials sector) 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Student's t distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
BHP                 
RIO                 
AMC                 
NCM                 
FMG                 
JHX                 
BLD                 
BSL                 
AWC                 
ORI                 
IPL 
0.081819 0.031129 0.267869 0.004698 1.231673 1.112836 
-6704.78 -6668.79 
0.072 0.922 0.506 0.818 0.267 0.000 
ILU                 
ABC 
0.056507 0.391224 -0.83071 0.003383 1.46828 1.437416 
-7279.53 -7243.54 
0.039 0.034 0.000 0.396 0.000 0.000 
FBU                 
MIN 
0.047704 -0.12798 0.957368 0.000398 0.822148 1.121629 
-5844.74 -5808.75 
0.001 0.531 0.000 0.656 0.116 0.000 
DLX                 
NUF                 
IGO                 
OZL 
0.039224 -0.70225 0.96219 0.000408 0.879736 1.233397 
-5640.28 -5604.29 
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.440 0.007 0.000 
CSR                 
BKW                 
RRL                 
SFR 
0.017284 -0.9705 0.982851 0.002229 0.173768 1.388222 
-5772.62 -5736.63 
0.024 0.000 0.000 0.496 0.496 0.000 
 
 
 Table 3A.9 – Real Estate sector 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) E-GARCH (GED distribution) (if applicable) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons AIC BIC earch earch_a E-GARCH cons 1nshape AIC BIC 
GMG                           
LLC                           
SGP                           
DXS                           
VCX 
0.056404 0.156232 0.788018 -1.86013 
-7520.317 -7494.607 
              
0.030 0.000 0.000 0.001               
GPT                           
MGR                           
CHC                           
IOF                           
GOZ                           
CMW                           
ABP                           
BWP                           
CQR 
            0.002609 0.149655 0.908484 -0.83354 0.326093 
-8011.38 -7980.52 
            0.909 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AOG                           
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 Table 3A.9 continued (Real Estate sector) 
Stock 
Name 
GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) APGARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power AIC BIC 
GMG 
            0.068383 0.123695 0.92881 0.0002079 1.013969 
-7510.00 -7479.14 
            0.000 0.235 0.000 0.368 0.000 
LLC                           
SGP 
0.11132 0.001167 0.118225 0.000102 
-7705.03 -7679.32 
              
0.024 0.985 0.519 0.000               
DXS 
0.010828 0.036566 0.94959 3.71E-06 
-7376.3 -7350.59 
              
0.050 0.005 0.000 0.166               
VCX                           
GPT 
            0.139031 -0.48496 0.40434 0.0024593 1.179465 
-7746.52 -7715.66 
            0.000 0.002 0.001 0.576 0.003 
MGR 
0.119059 0.070366 0.612276 3.81E-05 
-7470.85 -7445.14 
              
0 0.05 0 0.004               
CHC 
0.040669 0.022996 0.92074 5.04E-06 
-7277.85 -7252.14 
              
0.000 0.143 0.000 0.006               
IOF 
0.062458 0.02817 0.901762 3.11E-06 
-7682.73 -7657.02 
              
0.000 0.069 0.000 0.005               
GOZ 
0.165951 -0.01962 0.663837 2.26E-05 
-7879.85 -7854.14 
              
0.000 0.574 0.000 0.000               
CMW 
0.030306 0.010353 0.915203 5.39E-06 
-7951.96 -7926.25 
              
0.044 0.599 0.000 0.092               
ABP 
            0.02453 -0.69707 0.953722 0.0327031 -0.14415 
-7431.22 -7400.36 
            0.008 0.000 0.000 0.369 0.577 
BWP 
            0.0674379 0.1384891 0.9340758 0.0000148 1.4966400 
-7629.63 -7598.78 
            0.000 0.062 0.000 0.377 0.000 
CQR                           
AOG 
            0.103664 -0.18551 0.772637 4.49E-06 2.474882 
-6679.21 -6648.35 
            0.000 0.000 0.000 0.385 0.000 
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 Table 3A.9 continued (Real Estate sector) 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Student's t distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
GMG                 
LLC 
0.049117 -0.85358 0.92552 0.000753 0.925424 1.790855 
-7184.17 -7148.18 
0.003 0.007 0.000 0.518 0.008 0.000 
SGP                 
DXS                 
VCX                 
GPT                 
MGR                 
CHC                 
IOF                 
GOZ                 
CMW                 
ABP                 
BWP                 
CQR                 
AOG                 
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 Table 3A.10 – Telecommunication Services sector 
Stock 
Name 
E-GARCH (Student's t distribution) 
(if applicable) GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) 
earch earch_a E-GARCH cons 1ndfm2 AIC BIC arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC 
TLS 
-0.02904 0.074382 0.978961 -0.19089 1.307869 
-8072.768 -8041.92 
            
0.093 0.003 0.000 0.051 0.000             
SPK 
              0.089263 0.07162 0.591975 6.55E-05 
-7015.55 -6989.84 
              0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 
TPM                           
CNU                           
 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (Student's t distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
TLS                 
SPK                 
TPM 
0.162558 0.032173 0.52838 0.000808 1.533465 0.85313 
-6575.24 -6539.25 
0.001 0.816 0.000 0.675 0.013 0.000 
CNU 
0.085951 -0.35503 0.891447 0.000274 1.244725 0.360327 
-7270.09 -7234.1 
0.000 0.009 0.000 0.485 0.000 0.085 
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 Table 3A.11 – Utilities sector 
Stock 
Name 
GJR-GARCH (Gaussian distribution) APGARCH (Student's t-distribution) (if applicable) 
arch garch tarch cons AIC BIC aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1ndfm2 AIC BIC 
AGL 
            0.051521 -0.09708 0.939347 0.001355 0.611735 1.569202 
-7724.77 -7688.77 
            0.004 0.600 0.000 0.612 0.098 0.000 
APA 
0.008715 0.008715 0.971791 1.21E-06 
-7526.466 -7500.756 
                
0.133 0.001 0.000 0.035                 
AST 
0.031247 0.001223 0.945654 3.07E-06 
-7648.71 -7623 
                
0.001 0.861 0.000 0.101                 
SKI 
                            
                            
 
Stock 
Name 
APGARCH (GED distribution) 
(if applicable) 
aparch aparch_e pgarch cons power 1nshape AIC BIC 
AGL                 
APA                 
AST                 
SKI 
0.098072 -0.28508 -0.56928 0.05329 0.763011 0.149579 
-7565.88 -7529.89 
0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 
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 Appendix 3B: Example of selection criteria employed for identification of best fitted asymmetric GARCH model 
E-GARCH GJR-GARCH APGARCH APGARCH (t) APGARCH (GED) 
earch  -0.0287347 arch 0.3813829 aparch 
Convergence 
not achieved 
aparch 0.085951 aparch 
Convergence 
not achieved 
earch_a 0.4344333 tarch -0.101494 aparch_e aparch_e -0.3550275 aparch_e 
E-GARCH 0.1775885 garch -0.008974 pgarch pgarch 0.8914465 pgarch 
constant -6.665649 constant 0.000219 constant constant 0.0002735 constant 
Number of 
iterations 
before 
convergence 
achieved 
29 
Number of 
iterations 
before 
convergence 
achieved 
14 
Number of 
iterations 
before 
convergence 
achieved 
Number of 
iterations 
before 
convergence 
achieved 
32 
Number of 
iterations 
before 
convergence 
achieved 
AIC -6751.67 AIC -6787.79 AIC AIC -7270.09 AIC 
BIC -6725.96 BIC -6762.08 BIC BIC -7234.10 BIC 
 
CNU stock (Telecommunications Services sector) was used in this example to explain the process of how the best fitting asymmetric GARCH model was chosen for the panel 
regression. The example indicates that convergence was reached for E-GARCH and GJR-GARCH, but not for APGARCH (Gaussian distribution). Therefore, the APGARCH (t) 
and APGARCH (GED) distributions were employed (see Appendix 1A for methodology). Based on the above results, APGARCH (t) converged at 32 iterations; however, 
APGARCH (GED) did not converge. Therefore, the selection process of the lowest AIC and BIC values was between the E-GARCH, GJR-GARCH and APGARCH (t) models. Since 
the lowest AIC and BIC values were produced by the APGARCH (t) model, this was selected for the panel regression. This selection process was applied across each of the 
127 stocks in the study. 
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 Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix 
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 Appendix 4 continued (Correlation Matrix) 
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Appendix 5A: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test for Stock Returns 
(Unit Root Test for Stock Returns) 
Sector ASX Code z(t) - Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
10% Critical 
Value p-value 
Co
ns
um
er
 D
is
cr
et
io
na
ry
 
CWN -35.621 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
FLT -34.247 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
DMP -36.082 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
PMV -35.532 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SKC -34.787 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
ARB -36.628 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SUL -35.191 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
AAD -36.325 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
ALL -26.372 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SGR -25.516 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
HVN -25.982 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
JBH -25.706 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
NVT -26.673 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SWM -26.517 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
IVC -20.804 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
FXJ -18.189 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
TAH -16.533 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
TME -17.152 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
Co
ns
um
er
 S
ta
pl
es
 MTS -34.797 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
WES -36.102 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
TWE -36.354 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CCL -36.16 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
GNC -24.615 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
BKL -20.027 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
WOW -17.958 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
En
er
gy
 
ORG -35.057 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
OSH -34.389 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CTX -36.449 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
WHC -34.685 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
WOR -34.929 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
STO -24.745 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
BPT -25.487 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
WPL -19.711 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
Fi
na
nc
ia
ls
 
CBA -35.085 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
MQG -34.48 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
ASX -36.757 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
BEN -34.286 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
MFG -36.036 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
WBC -24.537 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
ANZ -23.41 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
NAB -23.479 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
JHG -24.762 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
PTM -26.124 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
NHF -25.106 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
PPT -25.973 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
AMP -19.905 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
IAG -18.2 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SUN -18.123 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
QBE -17.625 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
BOQ -18.149 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CGF -17.288 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
IFL -15.674 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
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Sector ASX Code z(t) - Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
10% Critical 
Value p-value 
H
ea
lth
 C
ar
e 
RHC -36.743 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
COH -36.878 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
PRY -34.753 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SIG -35.525 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SHL -25.825 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
ANN -25.96 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SRX -26.978 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CSL -21.369 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
FPH -21.485 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
RMD -19.365 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
In
du
st
ria
ls
 
SYD -34.756 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
QAN -36.012 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
GWA -36.598 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
TCL -26.576 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
BXB -26.282 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CIM -25.111 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SVW -23.543 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
DOW -26.458 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
ALQ -25.837 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
QUB -26.198 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
MND -24.458 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
MMS -25.284 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
AZJ -18.782 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SEK -14.547 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 CPU -35.449 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CAR -36.621 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
IRE -35.893 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
REA -26.58 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
TNE -17.382 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
M
at
er
ia
ls 
NCM -34.835 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
BLD -36.943 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
BSL -36.575 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
ORI -36.373 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
IGO -36.594 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CSR -36.571 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
AMC -26.385 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
JHX -26.573 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
ABC -27.08 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
NUF -25.697 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
OZL -25.618 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
RRL -25.839 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SFR -26.038 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
ILU -20.808 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
FBU -21.69 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
MIN -19.827 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
DLX -22.392 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
BHP -17.632 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
RIO -16.923 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
FMG -17.125 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
AWC -19.4 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
IPL -18.778 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
BKW -15.96 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
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Sector ASX Code z(t) - Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
10% Critical 
Value p-value 
Re
al
 E
st
at
e 
LLC -27.196 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SGP -26.437 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CMW -26.236 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
ABP -27.487 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
BWP -26.336 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
GOZ -23.448 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
GMG -19.155 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
GPT -19.626 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CHC -18.735 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
IOF -20.392 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CQR -19.575 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
DXS -18.265 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
VCX -17.087 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
MGR -17.522 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
AOG -14.298 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
Te
le
co
m
-
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
es
 TLS -36.429 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
TPM -35.29 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
CNU -22.312 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
SPK -17.7 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
U
til
iti
es
 SKI -35.988 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
APA -25.349 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
AGL -20.269 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
AST -18.894 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 0.0000 
 
 
 Appendix 5B: Levin-Lin-Chu Test for PTR and MSR (Panel Regression Unit Root Test) 
 
  Consumer Discretionary  
Consumer 
Staples Energy Financials  Health Care Industrials 
h(t) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PTR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
  Information Technology Materials Real Estate 
Telecommunication 
Services Utilities 
h(t) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PTR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix 6: Panel Regression Results for each GICS sector 
*** indicates significance at 1% level 
** indicates significance at 5% level 
* indicates significance at 10% 
Table 6.1: Consumer Discretionary sector 
Number of companies in sample: 18 
Number of observations: 22,500 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified 
PTR 0.1989780 17.84 0.000*** 0 
MSR -0.0484933 -29.70 0.000*** 0 
TO 0.0021287 0.67 0.505 0 
SD -0.0009941 -2.14 0.033** 1 
PER 0.0019601 2.07 0.038** 1 
QAR No ASX announcements made 
QCFR No ASX announcements made 
IC 0.0004808 0.64 0.521 11 
AAD 0.0028383 1.78 0.075* 8 
NOM -0.0011307 -0.92 0.357 2 
SEA -0.0099620 -3.17 0.002*** 2 
DA -0.0001837 -0.19 0.848 4 
PR -0.0018829 -1.85 0.064* 1 
CAD -0.0022055 -2.21 0.027** 0 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT -0.0055339 -2.75 0.006*** 0 
CA -0.0012687 -0.52 0.601 1 
LTS 0.0043764 1.66 0.096* 4 
ASXQ 0.0125914 2.32 0.020** 8 
WSP 0.0091491 0.51 0.510 0 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant -0.0001002 -0.64 0.523 N/A 
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Table 6.2: Consumer Staples Sector 
Number of companies in sample: 7 
Number of observations: 8,729 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified) 
PTR 0.5027704 25.60 0.000*** 0 
MSR -0.0597817 -22.41 0.000*** 0 
TO -0.0147927 -3.83 0.000*** 2 
SD 0.0001779 0.27 0.788 0 
PER -0.0024115 -1.92 0.055* 0 
QAR -0.0002407 -0.05 0.960 11 
QCFR No ASX announcements made 
IC -0.0022881 -2.14 0.033** 7 
AAD 0.0044915 2.15 0.032** 0 
NOM -0.0042285 -2.23 0.026** 1 
SEA -0.0105655 -2.18 0.030** 2 
DA -0.0003053 -0.23 0.822 4 
PR -0.0014013 -0.96 0.339 1 
CAD -0.0011428 -0.87 0.386 1 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT -0.0042113 -1.31 0.190 1 
CA 0.0090556 2.60 0.009*** 0 
LTS No ASX announcements made 
ASXQ 0.0232903 2.80 0.005*** 0 
WSP No ASX announcements made 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant 0.0000914 0.43 0.669 N/A 
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Table 6.3: Energy Sector 
Number of companies in sample: 8 
Number of observations: 9,968 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified) 
PTR 0.2740791 9.29 0.000*** 0 
MSR -0.0833846 -24.12 0.000*** 0 
TO 0.0214017 3.51 0.000*** 0 
SD 0.0006405 0.67 0.501 6 
PER 0.0013929 0.98 0.327 3 
QAR 0.0003744 0.17 0.867 5 
QCFR -0.0022309 -0.09 0.925 18 
IC -0.0023156 -2.09 0.036** 0 
AAD 0.0011594 0.44 0.659 6 
NOM -0.0003448 -0.15 0.879 4 
SEA 0.0032894 0.64 0.522 0 
DA 0.0036902 2.01 0.045** 6 
PR -0.0008077 -0.83 0.408 6 
CAD 0.0033725 1.68 0.093* 0 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT 0.0010913 0.28 0.780 3 
CA 0.0049657 1.14 0.252 1 
LTS -0.0086768 -1.68 0.093* 2 
ASXQ -0.0124026 -0.74 0.462 15 
WSP No ASX announcements made 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant 0.0002106 0.55 0.582 N/A 
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Table 6.4: Financials Sector 
Number of companies in sample: 19 
Number of observations: 23,693 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified) 
PTR 0.4037625 20.38 0.000*** 0 
MSR -0.0637742 -31.86 0.000*** 0 
TO 0.0080485 2.89 0.004*** 1 
SD -0.0000152 -0.04 0.964 5 
PER -0.0011112 -2.24 0.025** 0 
QAR No ASX announcements made 
QCFR No ASX announcements made 
IC 5.05E-07 0.00 0.999 9 
AAD 0.0026171 1.84 0.065* 1 
NOM -0.0030292 -2.61 0.009*** 0 
SEA -0.0040715 -3.07 0.002*** 0 
DA -0.0008612 -1.74 0.083 4 
PR -0.0020384 -2.45 0.014** 1 
CAD 0.0004242 0.67 0.503 2 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT 0.0008571 0.56 0.577 5 
CA 0.0044523 2.55 0.011** 0 
LTS -0.0014103 -1.01 0.311 3 
ASXQ -0.015239 -2.54 0.011** 8 
WSP 0.0012149 1.80 0.072 2 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant -0.00022 -1.60 0.111 N/A 
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Table 6.5: Health Care Sector 
Number of companies in sample: 10 
Number of observations: 12,500 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified) 
PTR 0.9191119 41.92 0.000*** 0 
MSR -0.0652949 -26.48 0.000*** 0 
TO -0.0421569 -2.40 0.017** 0 
SD 0.001111 1.80 0.072* 2 
PER -0.0041344 -3.90 0.000*** 0 
QAR No ASX announcements made 
QCFR -0.0012593 -0.07 0.943 0 
IC 0.0000878 0.15 0.879 5 
AAD -0.002176 -0.97 0.334 9 
NOM -0.0006774 -0.39 0.700 3 
SEA -0.0580985 -12.68 0.000*** 0 
DA 0.0024281 1.83 0.068* 2 
PR 0.0004141 0.33 0.745 4 
CAD -0.0024007 -1.78 0.074* 0 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT -0.0065957 -2.68 0.007*** 0 
CA 0.0026426 0.83 0.409 2 
LTS -0.0031733 -0.97 0.331 6 
ASXQ -0.0190959 -1.85 0.065* 1 
WSP No ASX announcements made 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant -0.0002905 -1.33 0.182 N/A 
 
SEA Additional Regression 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value Lag Length 
SEA 
-0.039406 -7.770 0.000*** 0 
-0.047755 -8.410 0.000*** 1 
0.049214 8.460 0.000*** 2 
-0.020521 -3.540 0.000*** 3 
0.005177 0.910 0.362 4 
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Table 6.6: Industrials Sector 
Number of companies in sample: 14 
Number of observations: 17,486 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified) 
PTR 0.5062075 27.05 0.000*** 0 
MSR -0.066875 -33.78 0.000*** 0 
TO 0.0037234 1.33 0.184 0 
SD -0.001484 -2.69 0.007*** 4 
PER 0.0014175 1.64 0.101 3 
QAR 0.0086282 0.65 0.516 0 
QCFR No ASX announcements made 
IC 0.0015264 2.24 0.025** 1 
AAD 0.0042663 2.63 0.009*** 0 
NOM -0.002856 -1.63 0.104 1 
SEA -0.01037 -3.48 0.001*** 1 
DA 0.0007989 0.67 0.504 3 
PR 0.0021154 2.42 0.016** 1 
CAD -0.002898 -2.48 0.013** 0 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT 0.0047323 1.87 0.061* 6 
CA -0.000393 -0.15 0.879 1 
LTS -0.006594 -1.8 0.072* 8 
ASXQ 0.0204964 2.63 0.009*** 0 
WSP No ASX announcements made 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant -0.000235 -1.26 0.207 N/A 
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Table 6.7: Information Technology Sector 
Number of companies in sample: 5 
Number of observations: 6,240 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified) 
PTR 0.3665773 9.60 0.000*** 0 
MSR -0.0511617 -19.13 0.000*** 0 
TO 0.0065636 0.59 0.556 0 
SD -0.0021625 -2.25 0.024** 0 
PER -0.0005236 -0.32 0.751 1 
QAR -0.0274049 -1.74 0.082* 16 
QCFR No ASX announcements made 
IC -0.0019204 -1.69 0.091* 8 
AAD 0.0053552 2.49 0.013** 1 
NOM -0.0016392 -0.71 0.475 4 
SEA -0.0170189 -2.09 0.037** 4 
DA 0.0056983 2.58 0.01** 1 
PR -0.0002441 -0.13 0.896 4 
CAD 0.0046368 2.07 0.038** 0 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT 0.0034718 0.69 0.491 1 
CA -0.0012079 -0.29 0.769 0 
LTS -0.0091033 -0.58 0.565 16 
ASXQ No ASX announcements made 
WSP No ASX announcements made 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant -0.0002485 -0.97 0.332 N/A 
 
  
174 
Table 6.8: Materials Sector 
Number of companies in sample: 23 
Number of observations: 28,750 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified) 
PTR 0.407488 20.18 0.000*** 0 
MSR -0.064059 -39.13 0.000*** 0 
TO -0.0024151 -0.54 0.590 0 
SD 0.0009157 1.92 0.055* 1 
PER -0.0011763 -1.27 0.204 0 
QAR 0.004479 2.90 0.004*** 2 
QCFR 0.0087566 1.44 0.149 0 
IC 0.0025202 3.24 0.001*** 2 
AAD 0.0039596 2.40 0.017** 0 
NOM -0.0025879 -1.68 0.094* 0 
SEA -0.0109896 -3.09 0.002*** 0 
DA 0.0023509 2.03 0.043** 1 
PR -0.0026039 -3.65 0.000*** 0 
CAD 0.0016084 1.62 0.105 2 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT 0.004502 2.06 0.039** 0 
CA 0.0038582 1.69 0.092* 0 
LTS -0.0004628 -0.14 0.891 6 
ASXQ -0.0006836 -0.10 0.923 12 
WSP No ASX announcements made 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant -0.0000696 -0.41 0.680 N/A 
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Table 6.9: Real Estate Sector 
Number of companies in sample: 15 
Number of observations: 18,735 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified) 
PTR 0.1456364 5.82 0.000*** 1 
MSR -0.0453835 -24.48 0.000*** 0 
TO 0.0033013 2.000 0.046** 0 
SD -0.0011192 -2.76 0.006*** 0 
PER 0.0016468 2.63 0.009*** 0 
QAR No ASX announcements made 
QCFR No ASX announcements made 
IC -0.0007968 -1.50 0.134 7 
AAD 0.0006656 0.94 0.349 1 
NOM 0.0003472 0.38 0.705 3 
SEA -0.0032692 -1.60 0.109 0 
DA -0.0017777 -3.16 0.002*** 3 
PR 0.00146 2.01 0.044** 0 
CAD -0.000425 -0.55 0.582 2 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT 0.0062743 2.39 0.017** 0 
CA 0.0030634 1.66 0.096* 0 
LTS 0.0007972 0.50 0.617 7 
ASXQ 0.0159984 2.55 0.011** 1 
WSP 0.0110407 0.87 0.870 0 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant -0.0000888 -0.74 0.459 N/A 
 
  
176 
Table 6.10: Telecommunications Sector 
Number of companies in sample: 4 
Number of observations: 4,996 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified) 
PTR 0.2450188 7.31 0.000*** 0 
MSR -0.0560101 -17.81 0.000*** 0 
TO 0.0208259 4.26 0.000*** 0 
SD -0.0024141 -1.83 0.068* 3 
PER 0.0018213 1.36 0.174 5 
QAR No ASX announcements made 
QCFR No ASX announcements made 
IC 0.0003011 0.25 0.801 10 
AAD -0.0001203 -0.06 0.954 3 
NOM -0.0048718 -2.19 0.028** 4 
SEA -0.032263 -4.78 0.000*** 0 
DA 0.0007902 0.39 0.697 2 
PR 0.0025949 1.96 0.05** 0 
CAD -0.0049159 -3.44 0.001*** 0 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT 0.0058987 2.24 0.025** 1 
CA 0.0014212 0.37 0.709 0 
LTS -0.0102257 -3.36 0.001*** 0 
ASXQ -0.1351829 -8.33 0.000*** 0 
WSP No ASX announcements made 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant -0.0002308 -0.77 0.439 N/A 
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Table 6.11: Utilities Sector 
Number of companies in sample: 4 
Number of observations: 5,003 
Model Overall Significance (Prob>chi2): 0.0000 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Lag length 
(Levin-Lin-Chu) 
– AIC specified) 
PTR 0.24573 4.37 0.000*** 0 
MSR -0.049562 -15.50 0.000*** 0 
TO -0.008817 -2.07 0.038** 0 
SD 0.0014048 1.70 0.090* 0 
PER 0.0024673 2.41 0.016** 1 
QAR No ASX announcements made 
QCFR No ASX announcements made 
IC 0.0012556 1.25 0.210 0 
AAD 0.0074016 3.75 0.000*** 1 
NOM 0.0055023 2.40 0.016** 0 
SEA -0.01584 -4.46 0.000*** 1 
DA 0.0022102 1.92 0.055 0 
PR -0.001138 -1.18 0.238 0 
CAD 0.0011589 0.96 0.338 1 
NOC No ASX announcements made 
OT -0.00177 -1.00 0.317 2 
CA -0.004575 -1.37 0.171 0 
LTS -9.94E-05 -0.04 0.965 1 
ASXQ No ASX announcements made 
WSP No ASX announcements made 
CTE No ASX announcements made 
Constant -0.000211 -0.98 0.327 N/A 
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Appendix 7: List of ASX 200 Stocks Utilised in the Study  
ASX Code Company Name  ASX GICS Sector 
ALL Aristocrat Leisure Consumer Discretionary 
TAH Tabcorp Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 
CWN Crown Resorts Limited Consumer Discretionary 
FLT Flight Centre Travel Consumer Discretionary 
SGR The Star Entertainment Group Consumer Discretionary 
HVN Harvey Norman Consumer Discretionary 
DMP Domino Pizza Enterprises Consumer Discretionary 
JBH JB Hi-Fi Limited Consumer Discretionary 
PMV Premier Investments Consumer Discretionary 
SKC Skycity Entertainment Group Limited  Consumer Discretionary 
NVT Navitas Limited Consumer Discretionary 
TME Trade Me Group  Consumer Discretionary 
ARB ARB Corporation Consumer Discretionary 
FXJ Fairfax Media Limited Consumer Discretionary 
IVC Invocare Limited Consumer Discretionary 
SUL Super Ret Rep Limited Consumer Discretionary 
AAD Ardent Leisure Group  Consumer Discretionary 
SWM Seven West Media Limited Consumer Discretionary 
MTS Metcash Limited Consumer Staples 
BKL Blackmores Limited Consumer Staples 
GNC Graincorp Limited  Consumer Staples 
WES Wesfarmers Limited Consumer Staples 
WOW Woolworths Group Limited Consumer Staples 
TWE Treasury Wine Estate Consumer Staples 
CCL Coca-Cola Amatil Consumer Staples 
WPL Woodside Petroleum Energy 
ORG Origin Energy Energy 
OSH Oil Search Limited Energy 
STO Santos Limited Energy 
CTX Caltex Australia Energy 
WHC Whitehaven Coal Energy 
WOR Worleyparsons Limited Energy 
BPT Beach Energy Limited Energy 
CBA Commonwealth Bank Financials 
WBC Westpac Banking Corp Financials 
ANZ ANZ Banking Group Limited Financials 
NAB National Aust. Bank Financials 
MQG Macquarie Group Limited Financials 
IAG Insurance Australia Financials 
SUN Suncorp Group Limited Financials 
AMP AMP Limited Financials 
QBE QBE Insurance Group Financials 
ASX ASX Limited Financials 
CGF Challenger Limited Financials 
BEN Bendigo and Adelaide Financials 
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ASX Code Company Name  ASX GICS Sector 
BOQ Bank of Queensland Financials 
MFG Magellan Fin Group Limited Financials 
JHG Janus Henderson Financials 
IFL IOOF Holdings Limited Financials 
PTM Platinum Asset Financials 
NHF Nib Holdings Limited Financials 
PPT Perpetual Limited Financials 
CSL CSL Limited Health Care 
RMD Resmed Inc  Health Care 
RHC Ramsay Health Care Health Care 
COH Cochlear Limited Health Care 
SHL Sonic Healthcare Health Care 
FPH Fisher & Paykel Healthcare Corp Ltd Health Care 
ANN Ansell Limited Health Care 
PRY Primary Health Care Health Care 
SRX Sirtex Medical Health Care 
SIG Sigma Health Limited Health Care 
TCL Transurban Group  Industrials 
BXB Brambles Limited Industrials 
SYD SYD Airport  Industrials 
CIM Cimic Group Limited Industrials 
QAN Qantas Airways Industrials 
AZJ Aurizon Holdings Limited Industrials 
SEK Seek Limited Industrials 
SVW Seven Group Holdings Industrials 
DOW Downer Edi Limited Industrials 
ALQ Als Limited Industrials 
QUB QUBE Holdings Limited Industrials 
MND Monadelphous Group Industrials 
MMS Mcmillan Shakespeare Industrials 
GWA GWA Group Limited Industrials 
REA REA Group Information Technology 
CPU Computershare Limited Information Technology 
CAR Carsales.com Limited Information Technology 
TNE Technology One Information Technology 
IRE Iress Limited Information Technology 
BHP BHP Billiton Limited Materials 
RIO RIO Tinto Limited Materials 
AMC Amcor Limited Materials 
NCM Newcrest Mining Materials 
FMG Fortescue Metals Group Materials 
JHX James Hardie Industries Materials 
BLD Boral Limited Materials 
BSL Bluescope Steel Limited Materials 
AWC Alumina Limited Materials 
ORI Orica Limited Materials 
IPL Incitec Pivot Materials 
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ASX Code Company Name  ASX GICS Sector 
ILU Iluka Resources Materials 
ABC Adelaide Brighton Materials 
FBU Fletcher Building Materials 
MIN Mineral Resources Materials 
DLX Duluxgroup Limited Materials 
NUF Nufarm Limited Materials 
IGO Independence Group Materials 
OZL OZ Minerals Materials 
CSR CSR Limited Materials 
BKW Brickworks Limited Materials 
RRL Regis Resources Materials 
SFR Sandfire Resources Materials 
GMG Goodman Group  Real Estate 
LLC Lendlease Group  Real Estate 
SGP Stockland  Real Estate 
DXS Dexus  Real Estate 
VCX Vicinity Centres  Real Estate 
GPT GPT Group  Real Estate 
MGR Mirvac Group  Real Estate 
CHC Charter Hall Group Real Estate 
IOF Investa Office Fund  Real Estate 
GOZ Growthpoint Property  Real Estate 
CMW Cromwell Prop Real Estate 
ABP Abacus Property Group  Real Estate 
BWP BWP Trust  Real Estate 
CQR Charter Hall  Real Estate 
AOG Aveo Group  Real Estate 
TLS Telstra Corporation Telecommunication Services 
SPK Spark New Zealand  Telecommunication Services 
TPM TPG Telecom Limited Telecommunication Services 
CNU Chorus Limited  Telecommunication Services 
AGL AGL Energy Limited Utilities 
APA APA Group Units FP Stapled Securities Utilities 
AST Ausnet Services Limited Utilities 
SKI Spark Infrastructure Utilities 
 
 
 
